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FM 100-5 and
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From the Editor

Change is difficult to see and accept, especially accept with a common perspective of future needs and goals. At its best, doctrine provides a common approach to thinking about the effective use of military force, but realizing this optimal condition takes time and effort. Beginning this month, we are expanding our format horizontally to include more than a single theme each month. This approach will allow for a continual debate of multiple important themes throughout the year.

Consider the impact of change, force projection and operations other than war from US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, 14 June 1993. One way to pick your way through the fog of an uncertain future is to look to the past for navigational aids. We are pleased to offer, as our lead article, "Ulysses S. Grant and America's Power-Projection Army," by General Gordon R. Sullivan. Sullivan uses an analysis of Grant's success in picking the strategic keys to victory at the dawn of modern warfare as just such an aid.

The next two articles in the continuing FM 100-5 theme are "Force Projection: Essential to Army Doctrine," by Lieutenant General John H. Tilelli Jr., and "Light Forces in the Force-Projection Army," by Lieutenant General Robert L. Ord III and Major Ed Morston. Tilelli's analysis of force projection uses the Mobility Requirements Study and the Army's Strategic Mobility Program to explain the Army's application of force projection from the national strategic level. Ord's article, on the other hand, approaches force projection from the operational and tactical perspective of the US Pacific Command. The remaining articles in this issue examine a few of the complications involved in conducting operations other than war—a certain role in an uncertain future. We invite you to take a new look at the problems of urban operations, religious and ethnic conflict and the complications of organized crime that have escaped the confinement and solutions of the Cold War calculus.

The letters this month address the military-media relationship. A visiting fellow who has been researching US military-media relations writes to counter Major Melissa Wells-Petry's "Reporters as the Guardian of Freedom." This letter and Wells-Petry's response offer an interesting exchange. In an age of instant communication, the potential for widespread news coverage with significant effects on military operations is an important part of the future environment of leaders at all levels.

I was reminded of this media reach and tempo because of a *New York Times* article printed on Sunday, 5 December, about a *Military Review* author who, unknown to us when we accepted and printed his article, is apparently a paranoid schizophrenic. The news angle was not that he was mentally ill but that he was an alleged terrorist and murderer, known by the FBI, who succeeded in publishing an article about portable nuclear weapons. The story was picked up by the *Early Bird* in the Pentagon on Monday, followed by an Associated Press story on Tuesday and (as I learned by E-mail and phone) was seen, read or heard on CNN, CBS, National Public Radio and papers in both Europe and Japan (*Stars and Stripes*), San Francisco, Indianapolis, Tidewater, Virginia, and who knows where else by Thursday of the same week. Because of my media training, I could respond quickly and confidently, but still I was surprised at the speed and scope of the coverage. This inconsequential encounter with the media encourages me even more to advance the media training in our Combat Training Centers and Battle Command Training Programs exercises as an important skill for the consequential encounters of the Information Age.

JWR

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Letters

Media Coverage Unfair

Editor's Note—The following letter is in response to an article that appeared in the 9 August 1993 issue of Newsweek which painted a picture of the School of the Americas (SOA) as being a training ground for despots and human rights abusers. The authors are currently enrolled as students in SOA's US Army Command and General Staff College.

Over the past 47 years, more than 56,000 individuals have graduated from the School of the Americas (SOA), the majority of whom have distinguished themselves as soldiers and citizens in their own countries. Many of these graduates have held significant positions in their homelands—10 became presidents of their republics, and 38 became defense ministers. Many others have held important positions in the public and private sectors. While it is apparent that some graduates have not always followed the proper precepts of military ethics that are taught at SOA, they represent a small fraction of the individuals who have received military training at the school.

There is much confusion, both here and abroad, about what SOA is and why it exists. At the end of World War II, several Latin American countries requested that the United States provide instruction on equipment maintenance and on those aspects of military doctrine that might be applicable to their own regional needs. From this emerged the decision to establish a school to train Latin American military personnel, mainly in the areas of engineering, maintenance and management.

The initial site chosen for this training center was Fort Amador in the Panama Canal Zone. The demand for training continued to grow, based on the success of the initial courses. Soon, other Spanish-speaking countries were invited to participate and additional subjects, such as road construction, excavation of artisan wells, jungle operations, water crossings and map reading were added to the curriculum. Later, as it outgrew its original facilities, the school was transferred to Fort Gulick on the Atlantic side of the isthmus, where it occupied hospital facilities built during World War II. Field instruction was conducted in a wooded, swampy zone that was slowly urbanized by the school's students, who later turned it over, completely developed, to the *Cuna* tribe for use as a residential area.

It was while at Fort Gulick that SOA adopted its current name and its logo, "One for All and All for One." It was also during the Fort Gulick era that an important precedent was established—the position

of school deputy commandant was reserved, on a rotational basis, for an officer from one of the Latin American countries that sent students, beginning with Colombia. The position currently belongs to the Chilean army and, in 1994, will be occupied by a Costa Rican colonel. In addition to US military officers, Latin American officers are assigned to the faculty as instructors to educate and guide the students according to US Army doctrine. These individuals, both officers and noncommissioned officers, represent different specialties from the four branches of the armed services and serve two years at the SOA, where they share the same responsibilities and rights as do their US colleagues. The school also maintains a body of 40 guest professors, without whom it would be impossible to meet the training establishment's objectives and to continue its teaching program in Spanish as the official language. SOA also sends its instructors to the regional countries to evaluate the military schools' development of joint and combined military exercises.

In 1984, after having trained more than 40,000 students from nearly every Latin American country, SOA suspended its teaching activities as a result of the 1977 Panama Canal treaties and relocated to the Continental United States. When the school reopened its doors, this time at Fort Benning, Georgia, it retained its traditional mission: to promote military professionalism, to foster cooperation between the armed forces of the Western Hemisphere and to share US customs and traditions with Latin American military members and their families. The move to Georgia brought about another change: SOA now belongs to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, rather than the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Nevertheless, it still maintains a special relationship with USSOUTHCOM to ensure that the school continues to meet regional security objectives.

To this day, new courses of instruction are being added to satisfy training requirements. In December 1991, in response to the need to provide pilots and helicopter maintenance personnel, the Helicopter Battalion School was created. Based at Fort Rucker, Alabama, it provides flight training. C Company of the same battalion is located at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and is responsible for teaching subjects related to the maintenance of helicopters.

The US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) course is also taught at SOA. It prepares military leaders from the region to conduct joint and combined arms operations according to

universal military professional principles and doctrines. The course, which both Latin American and US officers attend, has evolved without modifying the basic parameters imposed by the USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It provides Military Education Level 4 and Joint Professional Military Education Phase I credit. SOA has, however, given its USACGSC course a regional focus and an incomparable continental perspective with its program of conferences that include presentations and frank discussions from a wide variety of important people. Included, among others, are ambassadors from area countries, members of the US Congress, Latin American diplomats and members from the Organization of American States, military officers from all countries sharing in the American way of life, clergy from different religions, military officers with experience commanding troops in times of crisis, human rights activists, members of the business sector of regional countries, university chairpersons and distinguished journalists. During these conferences, there is ample opportunity to debate and discuss subjects of vital importance to the region.

The contribution the school makes to the permanent defense of democracy as a form of government, as well as its contribution to human rights within the context of the law of land warfare, is particularly worth mentioning. Taking advantage of the guest speaker program, mentioned above, as well as a structured program of courses that deal with ethics and military values, both the students who attend the school on a regular basis and the professors who teach them are enriched by the free and open discussion of ideas.

Courses are managed by academic departments that are responsible for training in joint and combined operations, tactical operations, special operations and civic-military operations, among other subjects. Latin American and US students alike attend the majority of the courses, indicating that the instruction is neither elitist nor exclusive nor, more important, any different from US Army doctrine. For example, the course on Advanced Combined Arms is equivalent to the Advanced Combined Arms Officers' course of the US Army Infantry School. Their ranger course also has the same rigorous mental and physical norms as the US Army Ranger course.

It is only logical to imagine that maintaining an institute of such magnitude is costly. Nevertheless, although the school has grown, its budget continues to decrease. In Fiscal Year (FY) 1993, it was \$4 million. In FY 1994, it will be \$2.9 million (principally allocated for Foreign Military Sales and the International Military and Education Training Program). The cost of the teaching establishment is shared by all participating countries.

We can say without hesitation that, after nearly 50 years of SOA's continuous work and contributions to the regional nations, the benefits reaped are many. It is possible that significant errors have been com-

mitted along the way, but only those who attempt great undertakings risk making such errors. The fact that some graduates have gone on to do wrong does not mean that we should jeopardize the school's present and future stability by submitting to pressures imposed by isolated circumstances which in no way affect the global nature of the system. Ultimately, individuals are responsible for their own actions.

SOA meets challenges on a daily basis that stem from its mission, and it meets them with pride, trusting that the American hemisphere is a living and growing democracy and that the school's graduates are an important part of its defense.

LTC Victor M. González, *Mexican Army*
 CDR Juan Obdulio Sainz, *Argentine Gendarmerie*
 MAJ Steven M. Seybert, *US Army*
 MAJ Victor Edwin Vargas, *Bolivian Police*
School of the Americas, Fort Benning, Georgia

Military-Media Argument Flawed • 1993

Last year, in her February 1993 article, "Reporters as the Guardian of Freedom," Major Melissa Wells-Petry argued that the press deserves little or no consideration from the military—especially in wartime combat situations. In essence, Wells-Petry asserts that all media complaints against the military are ideologically motivated, therefore the complaints are ill-founded and thus not worthy of serious attention from the military.

She believes "four primary assumptions underlie the media's arguments that . . . the press must have unfettered access to military operations and unfettered ability to report those operations." Her arguments against and conclusions about these four assumptions are misplaced and, if followed, would exacerbate military-media relations, most likely damaging the public's image of the military.

"Assumption 1. The absence of reporters equals the absence of truth." Wells-Petry states that truth does not depend on the presence of reporters, and consequently, pool arrangement limits (such as those in the Gulf War) do not suppress the truth. She is right that the presence of reporters does not guarantee that the truth will necessarily come out. However, rhetorically, we could ask: Does the absence of reporters guarantee truth? No, of course not. On a more fundamental level, the United States is a democracy, and in a democratic society, the press must have the freedom to choose what to report and how to report it.

By deciding what reporters could see, the pool structure created the impression, if not the reality, of a selective, partial and perhaps misleading presentation of the situation on the ground. The pool arrangements did not enable the press to make its own choices, which might have differed from the military's. For example, the pool system sent Peter

continued on page 66

FM 100-5 OPERATIONS

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Chapter 3

Force Projection

General Gordon R. Sullivan presents an analysis of General Ulysses S. Grant's campaign strategy of annihilation during the American Civil War, which occurred at the beginning of the industrial age. Grant may not have fully understood why he unleashed General William T. Sherman's army to burn its way through the Confederacy but by doing so, he brought the South's war production to a virtual halt. Next, Lieutenant General John H. Tilelli Jr. offers an analysis of force projection, using the Mobility Requirements Study and the Army's Strategic Mobility Program to explain the Army's application of force projection from the national strategic level. He points out that force projection now assumes a critical role in our doctrine as the trained and ready forces necessary for decisive victory are becoming more and more Continental United States-based. Finally, Lieutenant General Robert L. Ord III and Major Ed Mornston approach force projection from the perspective of the 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. They note that a light force, in particular, must maintain its warfighting skills and lethality; must be capable of contributing to peace and stability; must be rapidly deployable; and must be trained and ready to conduct operations other than war when necessary.

3-7 OPERATIONS

3-3 CONSIDERATIONS

3-1 FORCE PROJECTION

Ulysses S. Grant and America's Power-Projection Army

General Gordon R. Sullivan, US Army

WE FIND ourselves today at the nexus of two great transformations. The first is social, economic and technological: the information age emerging from the industrial. The second, international and political: a yet-to-be defined international order replacing the bipolar Cold War system. We also find ourselves at a time of shifting national priorities and fiscal difficulty. The confluence of these transformations and changes identifies this as a period of historic transition. Practice often leads theory during such periods, for the future is too uncertain to be precisely defined or estimated. The US Civil War was fought as the industrial age began to mature—a period of historic social, economic and technological transition. We have taken counsel from the way in which General Ulysses S. Grant dealt with such a transition as we deal with ours.

On 3 May 1864, just 53 days after being placed in command of all the Union armies, Grant began what may have been the first campaign of the industrial age. Prior to this campaign, annihilation was understood as the destruction of the enemy's army accomplished via the classic Napoleonic *decisive battle*. In fact, one could argue that up to this point, the US Civil War was little more than a series of loosely connected battles, none of which had proven to be decisive. By the end of Grant's campaign, this classic understanding had been supplanted by a new understanding—a historic transformation in the conduct of war had taken place.

First, Grant expanded the understanding of "annihilation" to include destruction of the Con-

Grant had no "theory of industrial age warfare" upon which to draw, but he had good "strategic sense" and astute political instincts. Furthermore, he had a "genius" for finding a solution to a complex problem that had never been solved before, then doggedly seeing the solution carried out. . . . These qualities, this genius, allowed him to see clearly enough to craft a workable solution to the strategic problem for which he was responsible.

federacy's main armies and its war-making capability—infrastructure, agriculture, transportation system and manufacturing base. Second, Grant realized that he could not annihilate his enemy by a single decisive battle. It would take a campaign. Grant expanded the understanding of annihilation by linking battles and engagements conducted by his subordinate armies into a single, coherent campaign that encompassed the entire theater of war. In doing so, he became what we now call an "army group commander," broke the Napoleonic paradigm that had governed military thinking from the beginning of the 19th century and ushered in industrial age warfare.

While we cannot document whether Grant understood explicitly that he was at the cutting edge of military art, he was certainly aware that what had been tried before—the old paradigm, to use contemporary terms—was not working. This awareness is revealed in Grant's assessment



[Grant] envisioned a campaign—not a battle—as the way to achieve victory. He conceived of one unified campaign throughout the depth of his theater . . . a campaign that tied together the activities of all his armies. . . [and] realized that “it will not be possible to unite [his subordinate armies] into two or three large ones. . . But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by Armies moving to the interior of the enemy’s country.”

of the situation when he assumed command: “The opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations toward each other as three years before. . . . Before this time . . . various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another. . . . I determined to stop this.”¹ Grant

had no “theory of industrial age warfare” upon which to draw, but he had good “strategic sense” and astute political instincts. Furthermore, he had a “genius” for finding a solution to a complex problem that had never been solved before, then doggedly seeing the solution carried out. He did not have a theory of industrial age warfare, but these qualities, this genius, allowed him to see clearly enough to craft a workable solution to the strategic problem for which he was responsible.

Two features of the plan are important. First, Grant identified the armies of Generals Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston as two of his main objective points. Lee’s army was important because it personified the rebellion and protected Richmond, Virginia; Johnston’s, because it protected one of the major transportation hubs of the south—Atlanta, Georgia. In addition, Grant had to make sure that the two armies did not merge, for if they did the war would exceed President Abraham Lincoln’s acceptable political and economical limits. His third objective point concerned resources, the war-making capability of the South. Grant’s campaign would attack selected portions of the infrastructure, agriculture, transportation system, ports and manufacturing base of the Confederacy. In the words of his final report: “I . . . determined . . . to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources.”² Grant knew that he must not only destroy the main Confederate armies, but also destroy the capability of the Confederacy to raise and maintain armies.

The second important feature of Grant’s plan was that he envisioned a campaign—not a battle—as the way to achieve victory. He conceived of one unified campaign throughout the depth of his theater of war, a campaign that tied together the activities of all his armies. The scope of this vision was unprecedented. He realized that “it will not be possible to unite [his subordinate armies] into two or three large ones. . . . But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by Armies moving to the interior of the enemy’s country.”³ This realization is vital, for it shows that Grant was not thinking of the classic battle of annihilation. Rather,



[For] 40 years, we studied, in an increasingly detailed way, Soviet tactics, equipment, operational style and overall modus operandi. We trained "against" this enemy ... [and] "fought" the land campaign in countless exercises. ... So compelling was this vision, that RC forces were "capstoned" to plans with an implied certainty that, in retrospect, seems altogether unreal. ... "World War III" would have been an updated version of World War II—more "high-tech," perhaps faster paced and likely nuclear. But it would be a war generally recognizable to Generals George C. Marshall ... Erwin Rommel or Zhukov.

his was a radically new vision: one of "practical" concentration—or concentration of effects in today's jargon. This also enabled Grant to stay focused on his strategic aim, yet accommodate both change and failure. After Sherman took Atlanta, for example, he was to move against Mobile, Alabama. When conditions changed, Grant's plan was flexible: Sherman marched to Savannah, Georgia then north through the Carolinas. When Benjamin Franklin Butler failed to attack Richmond quickly after his movement up the James River and ended up on the defense, again Grant accommodated this development.

Grant sought not merely to exhaust the South's will to fight. His goal was annihilation, to break the military power of the rebellion and bring the Civil War to a close on Lincoln's terms. And the campaign plan that he developed was well thought out.

The importance of Grant's campaign plan cannot be overstated. In this plan are combined his strategic aim, military end-state conditions,

operational objectives, identification of his main effort and the missions of each of his subordinate theater armies. This plan unified the efforts of all toward common objectives. Grant's end-state conditions and operational objectives remained constant from start to finish; his means varied as the situation directed. During the conduct of the campaign, his subordinates exercised their initiative to take advantage of opportunities unforeseen at the start of the campaign, but none ever strayed from the objectives identified in Grant's overall vision.

Since Grant never claimed to be much of a theoretician, we will never know whether he understood that his 1864 campaign was revolutionary in nature. But Grant did know the "old way" would not work. So he applied his strategic sense, political instincts and problem-solving and leadership skills to the situation in which he found himself. He crafted a workable solution to the strategic problem before him. Theory followed practice.⁴

The social, economic, technological and international, political transformations are challenging the Army to change the way it operates. We are meeting those challenges. We are a different Army that we were when the wall came down. . . . Like Grant, we are shaping the situation in which we find ourselves, doing what works given the problems we face. We are undergoing a paradigm shift and trying to look into the future to see what information age warfare is going to be like.

Change

Metaphorically speaking, we find ourselves today in a situation similar to Grant's. The social, economic, technological and international, political transformations are challenging the Army to change the way it operates. We are meeting those challenges. We are a different Army that we were when the wall came down. We are continuing to change. In some ways, we are on the leading edge of the revolution in military affairs. Like Grant, we are shaping the situation in which we find ourselves, doing what works given the problems we face. We are undergoing a paradigm shift and trying to look into the future to see what information age warfare is going to be like. We are not waiting for a full articulation of a theory of information age warfare. Nor can we wait; we are moving out. Practice is leading theory.

The Cold War Army was a "consequence" of a particular set of post-World War II historical and technological conditions. Initially, these conditions remained somewhat uncertain. By 1950, the set of conditions against which we would have to create our Army started to clarify. Our enemy would be the Soviet Union, its allies and its surrogates. Our war would be global and possibly nuclear, with the main theater in Europe (or at least we thought that the initial emphasis would be in the European theater), and within a well-defined alliance system. Further, we assumed a strong American economy and a relatively cohesive society. To fight this war, the

Army developed a sequential operational concept: the fight would initially include forward-deployed Regular units who would be reinforced first by Continental United States-based Regular units using pre-positioned equipment, then by mobilized units from the Reserve Components (RCs).

For the next 40 years, we studied, in an increasingly detailed way, Soviet tactics, equipment, operational style and overall *modus operandi*. We trained "against" this enemy. We created a world-class Soviet motorized rifle regiment to fight "against" our forces at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. We scripted and rehearsed our battle plans in general defense plan battle books, terrain walks and field exercises. We "fought" the land campaign in countless exercises, simulations, workshops and symposiums. We codified our practices and rehearsals in doctrine; developed tactics, techniques and procedures; organized and equipped our force; and prepared our logistics system and stockpiled supplies. So compelling was this vision, that RC forces were "captioned" to plans with an implied certainty that, in retrospect, seems altogether unreal.

To be sure, there were units of the Cold War Army whose focus was what we called "low-intensity conflict," but no one can doubt that the primary focus of the US Army during the Cold War was the Soviet threat in Europe. "World War III" would have been an updated version of World War II—more "high-tech," perhaps faster paced and likely nuclear. But it would be a war generally recognizable to Generals George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton Jr., Field Marshals Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, Erwin Rommel or Zhukov. The Army—both Active Component (AC) and RC—was raised, equipped, deployed, organized, trained, educated, sustained, resourced and command and controlled with this war in mind.

Although the Cold War Army fought other wars, its focus was on Europe and "the big one." Europe was the worst-case scenario for which the Army had to be prepared. All other scenarios were "lesser included" missions that we



An Army psychological operations unit assists Marines with civilian control during an arms search in Mogadishu's Bakara Market, circa January 1993.

The fog of peace may cloud our vision of the future, but we can see clearly enough to know that our potential enemies—or potential allies for that matter—will range from “armies” of agrarian societies, religious groups, tribes, guerrilla bands or clan leaders to “industrial armies” of nation-states to “high-tech forces” of post-industrial, knowledge-based societies . . . Thus, the doctrine, leadership and organization of today’s power-projection Army require a degree of versatility not foreseen during the Cold War.

could take care of with the force structure and equipment needed for the “warfight,” namely, the warfight in Europe.

This was the Cold War paradigm. It fit the realities of its day. From relatively known conditions, the Army developed, then fine-tuned a set of processes—raising, equipping, deploying, organizing, training, educating, sustaining, resourcing and commanding and controlling—that built the Cold War Army. The relationship among the known conditions, the processes and the Cold War Army is essential. The kind of Army we built during the Cold War was derivative of the conditions in which we expected to use that Army and the processes we developed to build it. The Cold War Army had a considerable degree of flexibility, flexibility gained primarily through its size.

The relatively known conditions upon which the Cold War Army was built are no longer valid. Ambiguity and uncertainty are the pri-

mary characteristics of the post-Cold War transition period in which we find ourselves today. Certainly, the Cold War had its share of ambiguity. But in today’s world, the areas of uncertainty are wider and nearly unresolvable. Today, we cannot forecast with any degree of certainty the theater in which we may be employed, the political or alliance conditions under which we will fight, the sequence of operations that we will follow or where our mission will fall on the operational continuum. We do not know the tactics, equipment, operational style and overall *modus operandi* of our enemy. We can neither script nor rehearse our battle plans.

Today’s basis for planning is relatively *unknown*, as compared to the relative “knowns” of the Cold War. This is the essence of our Army’s paradigm shift. All of the processes by which we built the Cold War Army assumed a relatively known set of variables. That fundamental planning assumption is gone.

The processes that built the Cold War Army will not produce a power-projection Army. Processes that were designed, honed and fine-tuned for 40 years against a relatively known set of variables will not work under the wider degree of nearly unresolvable uncertainty that we now are experiencing. Some will suggest a

The reality is: the use of RC and AC simultaneously—this is happening right now. Today, soldiers of all three components, civilians and contractors are deployed around the world on operational missions. This pattern will continue. America's Army will grow more seamless.

new set of "knowns" upon which, in their view, we should build the Army. Such a suggestion is seductive, for the processes that we used to build the Cold War Army will work using any set of "knowns"—for the processes designed to work from that kind of start point. If we succumb to our insatiable quest for certainty and posit some set of "knowns" so that our planning processes will work, we will have been seduced. No set of "knowns" can reflect the essential reality of our post-Cold War period of transition—uncertainty.

This uncertainty results from the two great transformations now unfolding, as well as the shifting national priorities and fiscal difficulties. It would be comforting and expedient to postulate some set of knowns from which we could derive and build America's power-projection Army because in doing so we would be "verifying" the adaptability of our systems to the new post-Cold War environment. But it would be wrong for two reasons. First, we would not be facing reality. Whatever set of knowns one postulates would not reflect the essential reality with which we have to contend in the post-Cold War period—that we do not know against whom we will fight, where, when, how or even with whom. Strategic uncertainty and ambiguity is the essential characteristic of our world. We must learn to deal with reality as it is, not as we want it to be. Second, in not facing reality

as it is, we could prepare the Army for the wrong war. If we postulate a set of knowns and build a force optimized against that set, we risk violating Michael Howard's prime principle that during times of peace, armies cannot get "it" too badly wrong.⁵ Prior to World War II, the Army had years to move from its interwar state of training and capability to that required to fight the war. Such a luxury no longer exists. "Optimizing" under extreme uncertainty such as we face today makes little strategic sense.


The fog of peace may cloud our vision of the future, but we can see clearly enough to know that our potential enemies—or potential allies for that matter—will range from "armies" of agrarian societies, religious groups, tribes, guerrilla bands or clan leaders to "industrial armies" of nation-states to "high-tech forces" of post-industrial, knowledge-based societies. Most likely, we will face a mix. We also know that we must be prepared to fight in any number of cultural, climactic and political environments. Thus, the doctrine, leadership and organization of today's power-projection Army require a degree of versatility not foreseen during the Cold War. The variety of missions, range of skills and reduced budgets demands a different, and closer, relationship among the AC and RC forces. All this is clear enough to use in our current plans and exercises. The essential reality of our post-Cold War period of transition is uncertainty, but that uncertainty is absolute.

Like Grant, we have a campaign plan. It describes how we will transform ourselves into the US Army of the 21st century. Our plan unifies the efforts of all toward common objectives. No doubt we will have to adjust as the situation develops and all leaders will have to use their initiative to take advantage of opportunities unforeseen at the start of the campaign. While our campaign plan is flexible as to how we will move toward our objectives, it is fixed with respect to the objectives it identifies and the mission we will accomplish (see fig.).

Growth

The US Army is growing, but not in the sense of getting larger. Rather, in the sense of "progressive development." We are resisting

Campaign Plan: America's Army of the 21st Century



the immediate tendency to find some new "set of knowns" that we can use in place of the Cold War set for this tendency is flawed. No set of knowns will reflect the essential reality of the day: uncertainty. All will miss the mark. This is the shift in paradigm, and what is so hard to grasp. Over the past several years, we have thought through the implications of this paradigm shift—implications which fall into at least these five areas:

First, we understand that the relative knowns forming the start point of the Cold War paradigm are actually derivative from what the nation asked its Army to do during the Cold War—contain Communism, deter war, fight and win if required. The start point for the post-Cold War paradigm, therefore, should come from the same source: what is the country asking its Army to do now? At least a partial list of these requirements can be found in "Land Warfare in the 21st Century."⁶ They are:

- Help "promote an environment conducive to political and economic stability abroad"—that is, "promote the conditions in which corporations will invest, products can be sold, and economies [will] prosper." This includes doing its part to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- "Contribute to domestic recovery, participate in global stability operations and retain its capability to produce decisive victory in whatever circumstances we are employed.

- "Prevent crises from occurring or from developing into conflicts; resolving conflicts before they spread or become war; or ending wars decisively on terms favorable to the United States and its allies."

Second, realize that our future wars will not look like the armies of one nation-state or group of nation-states fighting another. This understanding of war is too narrow; it always has been. But the stakes of the Cold War were so high that the variety of war was often overshadowed by the narrow understanding. This narrow view, however, is not useful in helping to identify appropriate solutions to the real problems that we face now and will face in the future.

Contending armies of nation-states do wage war, that much is accurate. But war's realm is larger. The Zionists waged war to realize their goal of an Israeli state, so did the Palestine Liberation Organization. Vladimir I. Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung waged war to down established governments, as are the Shining Path in Peru and drug cartels in Colombia. Serbia and Croatia are fighting a war to extend their territory at the expense of Bosnia. Mohammed Farrah Aideed and other warlords are fighting to determine who will rule Somalia. A similar power struggle is now raging in Haiti. The examples go on.

War involves the use of violent force to compel the submission of one's opponents and to attain one's political aim. Wars can be, and in

other periods of history have been, waged by states, corporations, religious groups, terrorist organizations, tribes, guerrilla bands, drug cartels, clan leaders or others. Nation-states do not have a monopoly on war making; war can be waged by a variety of entities. The realm of war is one of violence, force, dominance and submission—to compel the submission of an

War involves the use of violent force to compel the submission of one's opponents and to attain one's political aim. Wars can be, and in other periods of history have been, waged by states, corporations, religious groups, terrorist organizations, tribes, guerrilla bands, drug cartels, clan leaders or others. Nation-states do not have a monopoly on war making.

opponent and attain a specific political purpose. The realm of war is wide; its forms, many. We are "warfighters" in all these senses. We fight the nation's wars, not the ones we choose.

Third, resist the temptation to quantify or precisely define what in essence is unknown, and quite possibly unknowable. As we get closer to the end of the transition period we are now in, we may be able to describe some set of known threat conditions. Right now, that is not the case. Thus, we cannot use some set of knowns as the basis for building the power-projection Army just because without such a start point, our models will not work. This is Cold War thinking. Models do not run the Army; reality does. Under conditions of relative uncertainty, we are concentrating on:

- Versatility of mind, organization and execution means that the power-projection Army requires the very best *leader development program* in the world, one that will create leaders who are comfortable with change and uncertainty. We are changing our school and training systems to ensure that our leaders can succeed under extremely ambiguous conditions. More junior leaders are finding themselves in situations where they are required to read and react to sophisticated nuances at the

tactical level, and sometimes at the operational and strategic levels. The Army's leader development program will educate our current and future leaders to this new standard. Versatility also means that we must be able to build, quickly, *resilient organizations*.⁷ A resilient organization is an organization that adapts itself to the requirements of a particular situation. Task-organized structures will be too narrow for future requirements; tasks will change as the situation develops. Resilient organizations are situation-organized. They will be able to adapt to changes in task and react to political and military nuances. Last, the Army is extending the concept of versatility to execution—the ability to succeed under any conditions. This kind of versatility comes from *excellence in the basics*.

- Excellence in the basics and quality people: As any winning coach knows, "You cannot defend against well-executed basics, and it takes good people to make a good team." America's power-projection Army is in the process of identifying what its core strategic, operational and tactical competencies are and developing an excellence in them. Without excellence in the basics, versatility is impossible. Concentration on basics will mean that we reduce the numbers of tasks on a unit's mission-essential task list (METL), not increase them. Football has six basics—run, pass, catch, block, tackle and think. Hockey has five basics—skate, pass, check, shoot and think. In this time of ambiguity and uncertainty, we are structuring our approach to training in a similar way. We will develop the ability to adapt to changes in task and react to the political and military nuances of a particular situation by focusing on excellence in the basics and initiative in our troops and leaders. Versatility in mind (leader development) and organization (building resilient organizations) plus excellence in the basics (reduced METL) will result in versatility in execution.

All of the above, however, depends upon the *quality of the people* we bring into the Army and of the soldiers we retain. Information age warfare fought under extremely ambiguous threat, geographic and political conditions will require an unprecedented degree of disci-

pline, quick thinking, cohesion and technical competence—all depend on quality people. The Army cannot hope to acquire these characteristics without high recruiting standards complemented by the right mix of high quality of life and tough, challenging training under realistic conditions.

- The right menu and numbers of forces includes combat, combat support and combat service support; light, heavy and special operations forces (SOF); AC and RC. Uncertainty requires depth on the bench. We are going to have to build resilient organizations by mixing and matching units as the situation requires. We understand that this means that we need the right menu and number of trained and ready units from which to choose. This menu will provide the depth necessary to win regardless of the size or duration of the mission, regardless of the threat conditions and political constraints. Also, the "menu of forces" will have to be affordable. Hence, the emphasis on "America's Army" in the post-Cold War period.

- America's Army must be based on a new AC/RC partnership. Meeting the requirements of affordability, accommodating uncertainty and creating a depth of capability—all mandate a total force policy in America's power-projection Army different from that of the Cold War Army. We have been re-crafting this new policy for several years. The "AC first, RC follow" sequence of the Cold War era no longer applies to the post-Cold War world. The reality is: the use of both AC and RC simultaneously—this is happening right now. Today, soldiers of all three components, civilians and contractors are deployed around the world on operational missions. This pattern will continue. America's Army will grow more seamless. A power-projection Army needs connectivity to America, and a more complete integration of the components will provide that connectivity. We are building a force structure, a mobilization system and access policies that recognize these realities. This will require regulatory changes, maybe even legislative. It will also require a "paradigm shift" in thinking in both the AC and RC, a shift we are making. AC and RC forces will be mixed in ways and assigned missions pre-

We must continue to tap the intellectual resources of our Army.

We must continue reading, studying, discussing and debating what the future holds for the Army and how we might best prepare for that future. We cannot break from our values, for they are the heart and soul of our profession. But neither can we be held captive by "what worked before." The future will be fundamentally different from the past in ways we have not yet begun to understand.

viously not required.

Fourth, we must reexamine each of the processes by which we build the Army. The processes that created the Cold War Army cannot create the power-projection Army. The names of each of the processes will probably remain the same—raising, equipping, deploying, organizing, training, educating, sustaining and command and control—but how each process works and what it produces must be different. Ford does not build a Taurus on a Fairlane assembly line. We cannot build a power-projection Army with Cold War-Army processes.

The following are a few examples: the process by which we call up RC forces developed to bring the nation to total mobilization for global war must change to reflect more precise requirements associated with regional wars (understood in the broader sense) and operations other than war. Research and development, part of the equipping process, must be altered to reflect the pace of technological change. The training process is both expanding and contracting. It is expanding relative to the conditions under which the Army must be prepared to operate and contracting relative to the numbers of tasks. These changes—and many more—are going to be required to shift our Army from a Cold War total force to America's power-projection Army. We have made and are making some changes right now, but we still have a long way to go.

Fifth, we need to encourage intellectual vitality. Times of great change require new ways of

thinking, deciding and acting. The revised US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, Louisiana Maneuvers, battle labs, creative scenarios at our CTCs and a host of other ongoing programs all are helping to create the sense of intellectual vitality that permeates our Army, but we have to do more. We must continue to tap the intellectual resources of our Army. We must continue reading, studying, discussing and debating what the future holds for the Army and how we might best prepare for that future. We cannot break from our values, for they are the heart and soul of our profession. But neither can we be held captive by "what worked before." The future will be fundamentally different from the past in ways we have not yet begun to understand. Martin Blumenson said of Patton during the interwar years, "He pondered and acted on new ideas and innovations in procedures, techniques and equipment, in the hope of advancing his profession and the well-being of his troops."⁸ Our challenge is to come to grips with the future. We must all become professional thinkers.

The many ways in which the Army has already changed as well as those now under consideration are all examples of growth. We are changing, but we are neither throwing the proverbial "baby out with the bathwater" nor changing for change's sake. We have recognized the shift in paradigm from the Cold War Army to America's power-projection Army.

And we are acting upon that recognition. We are positioning America's Army for the 21st century right now.

We have no "theory of information warfare" upon which to rely, but we understand what is going on. We have new doctrine and a campaign plan—and we are using them and the Louisiana Maneuver process as our guide. Like the great campaigns of history, we are prepared to adapt as we move, but we are moving out and we will continue to do so. This is nothing new to our Army.

Early in the century, Elihu Root, Lieutenant General John M. Schofield and General Francis A. March created the professional Army. Just prior to World War II, Marshall and Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair crafted the modern, mass Army. Following the Vietnam War, Generals Creighton Abrams and William E. DePuy began building the Army that triumphed in the Gulf. We are building America's power-projection Army in this tradition.

The two great transformations, as well as our shifting national priorities and fiscal difficulties provide the reason to move the Army into the 21st century. The campaign plan is our map; growth is our direction; continuity, our compass. America's Army is the most competent army in the world today, and we are changing to make sure that we remain so in the future. **MR**

NOTES

1. Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant*, ed. E. B. Long (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), 364-65 and 419.

2. Grant, "Report of Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, US Army Commanding Armies of the United States, Including Operations March 1864-May 1865," *Dwight D. Eisenhower: The Professional Soldier and the Study of History*, ed. Richard M. Swain (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), 27.

3. David L. Wilson, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant* Vol. 10 (Carbondale IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), 245-46.

4. See Peter F. Drucker, *Post Capitalist Society* (New York: Harper Business, 1993), especially 78, 113-14 and 183 for examples of practice leading theory in

the case of "pension fund capitalism" and "knowledge as an economic resource."

5. Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies* (March 1974).

6. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan and LTC James M. Dubik, *Land Warfare in the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 6-8 and 24.

7. Margaret J. Wheatley, *Leadership and the New Science: Learning About Organization from an Orderly Universe* (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 1992), 18-23.

8. Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1972), 19.

General Gordon R. Sullivan is chief of staff of the US Army. He received a B.A. from Norwich University and an M.A. from the University of New Hampshire. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in joint and allied assignments in the Continental United States, Europe, Vietnam and Korea, including deputy chief of staff for Operations and Plans and vice chief of staff of the Army, Washington, D.C.; deputy chief of staff for support with the NATO staff, Central Army Group; deputy commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and commander, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas. His article "Land Warfare in the 21st Century" appeared in the September 1993 *Military Review*.

Force Projection: Essential to Army Doctrine

Lieutenant General John H. Tilelli Jr., US Army

*"The United States Army exists to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. It does that by deterring war and, if deterrence fails, by providing Army forces capable of achieving decisive victory as part of a joint team on the battlefield—anywhere in the world and under virtually any conditions."*¹

US ARMY Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, provides the Army's approach, as a member of the joint team, to the conduct of war and operations other than war. The Army's ability to project decisive force and conduct sustained land combat operations reflects our new war-fighting manual, as well as the National Military Strategy (NMS). The concept of force projection now assumes a critical role in our doctrine as the trained and ready forces necessary for decisive victory become increasingly Continental United States (CONUS)-based. Because of this reality, this article focuses on what the US Army, in full partnership with the Air Force, Navy and Marines, is doing to improve its ability to project forces anywhere in the world.

Following Operation *Desert Storm*, the Army began its planning on implementing the January 1992 NMS. Using the lessons from the Gulf War and FM 100-17, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization*, as guides, Army planners developed a concept for implementing the NMS that identified the necessary changes required to support force-projection operations across the continuum of conflict from peacetime engagement to major regional conflicts. Five general force-projection principles evolved to

guide those charged with considering the question of how the Army could best support future combatant commanders executing our military strategy:²

- Task organize an effective mix of Active and Reserve component forces against the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available, including transportation.
- Respond quickly with highly trained, flexible units.
- Apply overwhelming, disciplined combat power at the point of decision.
- Resolve the battle quickly with rapid battlefield maneuver, simultaneous and synchronized attacks and application of firepower.
- Prepare to reinforce the operation with additional combat force and logistics.

These principles reflected the Army's fundamental philosophy concerning force projection and provided the context in which our new doctrine evolved from the AirLand Battle doctrine.

The Revised FM 100-5

The differences between the outdated and revised FM 100-5 concerning the importance of force projection are dramatic. Predicated on forward-deployed forces and full mobilization, the 1986 AirLand Battle version considered strategic deployment and contingency operations in only several pages. However, an entire chapter in the revised FM 100-5 addresses the concept of force projection. This reflects a physical and philosophical change on the part of the Army to address the post-Cold War world and prepare itself for the conflicts of the 21st

century. We no longer are a forward-deployed army oriented on deterring and, if necessary, defeating a global Soviet threat. As a result of the sweeping changes at home and abroad, we are completing the transition to a smaller, largely CONUS-based, regionally focused army.

FM 100-5 addresses this reality and provides an overview of how the Army's force-projection

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capabilities support the national security and military strategies. It reflects the increased complexity of war as demonstrated in operations *Just Cause* and *Desert Storm* and the need for joint, complementary capabilities to simultaneously overwhelm the enemy across the depth of the battlefield. For the first time, FM 100-5 addresses force-projection considerations and operations in both war and operations other than war. In addition, a number of other important manuals reflect similar changes. FM 100-7, *The Army in Theater Operations*, FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations* and FM 100-17, all have been revised recently to address the new environment and the implications for force projection. Moreover, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is drafting a new field manual, FM 100-23, tentatively titled *Peace Support*, which will reflect the Army's approach to operations other than war, to include peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.


The Army has thoroughly considered the wide range of doctrinal considerations impacting force projection. Consequently, in order for the Army to rapidly project decisive force, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army undertook several important initiatives that will allow the

Army to meet its future force-projection commitments to the American people and our allies.

Strategic Mobility Programs

As a result of both the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War, strategic mobility programs have become increasingly important in the past several years. To address the shortfall in strategic mobility brought to light by the Gulf War, Congress tasked the DOD to study the issue of strategic mobility. This tasking consisted of two parts: a determination of strategic mobility requirements, and the development of an integrated strategic mobility plan. In January 1992, the secretary of defense signed the Mobilization Requirement Study (MRS) and delivered this study to Congress. This study represented an unprecedented review of all aspects of mobility—intertheater, intratheater and CONUS—including airlift, sealift, amphibious lift, transportation and pre-positioning (sea and land). The MRS specified four critical strategic mobility requirements: strategic airlift with an oversized load capacity; increased fast sealift; a larger, more responsive Ready Reserve Force (RRF); and an enhanced CONUS infrastructure.

The MRS also recommended specific solutions to these four requirements. First, the Air Force should continue the C-17A program in order to eventually purchase 120 strategic-lift aircraft, the first of which became operational on 14 June 1993. A significant improvement over the aging C-5A and C-141B fleets, the C-17A will allow Army force-projection units access to an additional 6,000 airfields worldwide. Next, the Navy should build or convert 20 large, medium speed, roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships (LMSRs). Nine will be used to pre-position afloat an Army combat maneuver brigade equipment set, as well as theater-level combat service and combat service support sustainment for 30 days. This set will provide the combatant commander a heavy response capability early in any crisis. The other 11 LMSRs are designated to "surge" Army heavy divisions from CONUS to rapidly reinforce early arriving forces. Also, the RRF, which provides a large portion of our sealift



The USNS *Mercury* taking on Marine vehicles before sailing to the Indian Ocean where it and two other RO/RO ships formed the first increment of a pre-positioned force off Diego Garcia, 3 July 1980.

One of the key aspects of the Strategic Mobility Program . . . is [a] pre-positioned afloat brigade set of combat and support equipment. This equipment package will provide the combatant commander with a complementary asset to the US Marine Corps' Marine Expeditionary Brigades, Navy Carrier Battle Groups and Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings within his area of responsibility. Similar to the Marine Pre-positioning Fleet concept, the Army's pre-position afloat will be stored on RO/RO vessels in a climate-controlled environment.

capacity, requires an increase from 17 to 36 RO/RO vessels. In addition, the readiness of existing and future RRF vessels needs continued support. Finally, CONUS infrastructure will be enhanced in several areas. Upgrades at key installations will include railroads, pre-positioned rail cars, highways and port-handling equipment to improve the fort-to-port infrastructure and facilitate the smooth and rapid flow of forces and materiel. The MRS also recommended construction of a West Coast containerized ammunition facility similar to that on the East Coast.

To implement the recommendations of the MRS, the Army initiated the Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP). The ASMP will ensure that the rapid force-projection goals for the Army as a result of MRS are met. Upon its full im-

plementation, the Army will be able to provide the combatant commander with the following capability:

- A light brigade anywhere in the world within 4 days.
- A light division anywhere in the world within 12 days.
- A heavy brigade (pre-positioned afloat) anywhere in the world within 15 days.
- Two heavy divisions from CONUS anywhere in the world within 30 days.
- A five-division corps with support (more than 150,000 soldiers) anywhere in the world within 75 days (see fig. 1).

The precise timing will depend on many factors including the other forces requested by the combatant commander.

To address the shortfall in strategic mobility brought to light by the Gulf War, Congress tasked the DOD to study the issue of strategic mobility. This tasking consisted of two parts: a determination of strategic mobility requirements, and the development of an integrated strategic mobility plan. In January 1992, the secretary of defense signed the Mobilization Requirement Study (MRS) and delivered this study to Congress.

One of the key aspects of the ASMP that illustrates the Army's commitment to rapid force projection from CONUS is the pre-positioned afloat brigade set of combat and support equipment. This equipment package will provide the combatant commander with a complementary asset to the US Marine Corps' Marine Expeditionary Brigades, Navy Carrier Battle Groups and Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings within his area of responsibility. Similar to the Marine Pre-positioning Fleet concept, the Army's pre-position afloat will be stored on RO/RO vessels in a climate-controlled environment. The Army's pre-position afloat provides a robust, heavy package for prompt and sustained land combat. In a time of crisis, the RO/ROs will sail for a port of debarkation where soldiers flown in from CONUS will quickly fall in on the equipment and will be ready for combat operations.




Figure 1

This Army heavy brigade gives the combatant commander the necessary capability to conduct sustained operations inland and protect key objectives from a wide range of potential adversaries early in a conflict until the rapid reinforcement, decisive corps arrives from CONUS.

The Army is taking a number of steps to make this a reality in Fiscal Year (FY) 1994. In late 1993, we began loading a brigade set of pre-positioned equipment aboard seven RRF RO/ROs. Deactivating units in US Army Europe will provide most of the equipment. The US Transportation Command is coordinating currently with the US Pacific Command, US Central Command and European Command to determine berthing sites for these ships after the loading is complete. In addition, it is coordinating closely with the joint, Navy and Marine Corps staffs on the establishment of a pre-positioned equipment maintenance site in CONUS.

The Army has committed significant resources to the ASMP. The Army has spent \$205 million this past fiscal year on projects ranging from improving the outload infrastructure at Fort Stewart, Georgia and Fort Hood, Texas, to purchasing 100 heavy-duty flatcars, to improvements in the worldwide port system. We will spend at least \$286 million on similar projects in this fiscal year. In addition, this past July, the Navy awarded \$1.05 billion in contracts to Virginia and California shipyards to convert five civilian cargo vessels to LMSRs for delivery in late 1995. Finally, the Navy recently awarded the first contracts for construction of 14 new RO/ROs in September 1993.

Training and Readiness Implications

In addition to the funding aspects, the deployment standards set forth in the ASMP will impact significantly on the training environment of CONUS contingency forces. As a matter of routine, heavy divisions will be tasked to meet a "ready brigade" standard previously associated with only airborne, air assault and light units. Under the ASMP, both heavy contingency divisions must clear the seaports by C+10. Contingency forces continue to spend considerable

A Wisconsin Guardsman drives his M88A1 recovery vehicle down the ramp of the RO/RO vessel USNS *Algo* during a training exercise in Germany.



By the end of 1993, more than 2,000 Active Component officers and noncommissioned officers were in direct support of Reserve unit training. Operations Bold Shift and Standard Bearer continue to focus on the Reserve contingency force pool's ability for rapid, no-notice deployments. Increases in overseas deployments for training opportunities continue to support readiness and forward-presence missions worldwide.

training time on short-notice force-projection exercises, often for Combat Training Centers driven by realistic contingency scenarios. In FY 1993, the Army initiated the Sea Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (SEDRE) program to provide deployment training for up to brigade-level units. The SEDRE program complements the longstanding emergency flyaway training exercises conducted in partnership with the Air Force. Finally, TRADOC is playing a critical role in the development of a force-projection army. In addition to addressing the concept of force projection in the revised FM 100-5, TRADOC is developing guidance for

alerted units on the procedures to fall in on the pre-positioned equipment.

The ASMP also impacts the Reserve Component (RC) significantly. With reductions in the Active force structure, the RC remains critical to the Total Army's success beginning on the first day of force-projection operations. These operations will require the rapid selective call-up of RC units and individuals. The five-division contingency corps includes nearly 100,000 RC soldiers. Therefore, our Army will continue to devise approaches that will bring round-up units into the fight quickly and maintain other RC forces at a less ready state of readiness as an




Figure 2

insurance policy. RC forces also must be prepared for an increased role in operations other than war to include humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and peacemaking, which many times are a result of force-projection operations.

In recognition of the new requirements for the RCs, Congress enacted Title XI in 1992. It establishes the necessary standards to get trained and ready Reserves into the fight as rapidly as possible. The Total Army has a number of initiatives to support its commitment to provide proper training and preparation for all soldiers. By the end of 1993, more than 2,000 Active Component officers and noncommissioned officers were in direct support of Reserve unit training. Operations *Bold Shift* and *Standard Bearer* continue to focus on the Reserve contingency force pool's ability for rapid, no-notice deployments. Increases in overseas deployments for training opportunities continue to support readiness and forward-presence missions worldwide. Two new organization concepts, the creation of exercise divisions and the Future Army School

Twenty-one Study, also support Total Army readiness to conduct future force-projection operations.

The Army is also greatly enhancing its force-projection capability by repositioning over half our pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets from Western Europe. This initiative creates a system of global pre-positioned unit equipment sets for the combatant commanders to use in crisis response situations. In addition, the Army is consolidating and reconfiguring theater war reserve stocks to eliminate costly excesses and to make those stocks more accessible.³

Modernizing the Force-Projection Army

Equally important as the means and methods to project the Army in future battlefields, it is a simple fact that we must be a modern, well-equipped force. Our potential adversaries will possess highly lethal forces through the continuing proliferation of world-class technology. To counter this reality, last year the Army published

a new equipment modernization strategy. This strategy identifies five major groups of capabilities or thrusts designed to provide US soldiers with the ability to continue to dominate future battlefields as they did during *Just Cause* and *Desert Storm*. The five thrust areas that will preserve our modernization overmatch are:

- Projecting and sustaining the force anywhere in the world, which was discussed earlier.
- Protecting the force by investment in more reliable friendly force identification means, defense against weapons of mass destruction, air defense and counterfire systems.
- Winning the information war by continued development of systems to better see the battlefield, improve communications and blind our adversaries.
- Providing precision fires throughout the depth of the battlefield by fusing joint sensors with precision strike means.
- Dominating the battlefield by continuing to develop systems such as the Comanche, the Armored Gun System and Advanced Field Artillery System to provide an even more lethal ground maneuver force (see fig. 2).⁴

In short, these modernization thrusts will ensure that America's soldiers will continue to use systems unmatched by any future opponent.

As we prepare to enter the 21st century, the Army's ability to project force will remain an essential element of our nation's military power. The Army is well positioned to meet the challenge. Our revised warfighting manual, FM 100-5, provides the intellectual foundation for considering the concept of force projection. The MRS and ASMP provide the blueprints for

obtaining the means to project our forces. We have a modernization strategy to ensure that America's sons and daughters will have the

The Army has spent \$205 million this past fiscal year on projects ranging from improving the outload infrastructure at Fort Stewart, Georgia and Fort Hood, Texas, to purchasing 100 heavy-duty flatcars, to improvements in the worldwide port system. We will spend at least \$286 million on similar projects in this fiscal year. In addition . . . the Navy awarded \$1.05 billion in contracts to Virginia and California shipyards to convert five civilian cargo vessels to LMSRs . . . [and] awarded the first contracts for construction of 14 new RO/ROs.

equipment with which to dominate land combat. We will continue to "train as we expect to fight" in war and operations other than war. This will allow the Army, in full partnership with the Air Force, Navy and Marines, to deliver one light and two armored divisions in 30 days, and eventually a full five-division contingency force in 75 days, to fight and win anywhere in the world. With a firm commitment to these programs and strategies, the US Army, a force thoroughly grounded in FM 100-5, will fulfill the *Army Vision—A Total Force Trained and Ready to Fight . . . Serving the Nation at Home and Abroad . . . A Strategic Force Capable of Decisive Victory*. **MR**

NOTES

1 US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), 1-1.

2 *The National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: January 1992), 8-10, and FM 100-17, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28

October 1992), Chapter 1.

3 For a thorough discussion of this subject, see LTC Nathan J. Powers's "Force Projection Logistics," *Military Review* (July 1993) 45-49.

4 GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, "Moving into the 21st Century: America's Army and Modernization," *Military Review* (July 1993) 4-9.

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Light Forces in the Force-Projection Army

Lieutenant General Robert L. Ord III, US Army, and
Major Ed Mornston, US Army

BY THIS time, it has become clear that the 1990s are an era of monumental change in the global environment. What is unclear, however, is what the cumulative effect of all these changes will be or what the final effect will be on our Army. The degree of uncertainty in the global security environment, the pressures of economic recovery and revolutionary changes in military technology are combining to define new roles for our Army and new concepts for how the US Army will be used.

What is clear is that international and domestic realities have resulted in the dilemma of declining military resources and increasing military missions. Now, more than at any time in our past, all Army units, and light forces in particular, must maintain the capability to deploy anywhere in the world and fight for any of the combatant commanders. Being a key player on the joint team that wins our nation's wars remains the Army's most fundamental and defining role. We must accept also the likelihood of being committed for other purposes in other arenas.

The tenet of versatility, recently added to US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, is very appropriate in an era when the Army will be smaller in terms of personnel, units and budget and will likely be assigned more missions concerning operations other than war. Obviously, Army units, leaders and soldiers must possess the ability to adapt to rapidly changing situations. This versatility has been a characteristic of our Army for 218 years. But today, military operations are taking on added diversity. Soldiers may complete one operation only to find themselves

immediately committed to another of a very different nature. The Army is accepting added tasks, with varying conditions and demanding standards. We must not only be flexible enough to adapt to changing situations within a particular operation, but versatile enough to anticipate and shift among various roles and missions while retaining our essential warfighting readiness. The Army no longer sees itself only as a prize-fighter, but rather as a triathlete that is skilled in multiple events.

Light forces contribute to our role as a strategic force-projection Army by capitalizing on their versatility. Four of the unique aspects and capabilities that light infantry divisions provide the Army and the strategic leaders of our nation are:

- A force that readily maintains its warfighting readiness and lethality, even during periods of constrained resources, and is capable of decisive action on the battlefield.
- A force with characteristics that make it capable of contributing to peace and stability through forward-presence activities.
- Rapid deployability as a part of force projection.
- A force whose routine training makes it readily capable of conducting operations other than war when necessary.

This article will discuss these four aspects of a light division's versatility and capabilities by highlighting the activities of the 25th Infantry Division (ID) (Light) in the Pacific region. This discussion will demonstrate how light forces will continue to play a key part in the strategic force-projection Army of the future.

The Pacific Rim

The Pacific rim is a region of dynamic change. It is characterized by economic prosperity, abject poverty, emerging nationalism, insurgencies, political upheavals, terrorism, illegal drug traffic and unpredictable, violent weather. Forty-two nations, each pursuing its national interests, are players in the Pacific theater. The geographic size and diversity of this region make the challenge even greater. The region is home to almost two-thirds of the earth's population and nations with seven of the 10 largest armies in the world. The United States has mutual defense treaties with seven separate nations in the Pacific region.

The national interests of the United States, as specified in the White House National Security Strategy, are embodied in the commander in chief, Pacific's (CINCPAC's) strategy that is executed in the Pacific. Key to this strategy are economic considerations, pursuit of regional stability, cooperative relationships with our allies, support for human rights, free markets and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The economic and trade potential with nations in the Pacific rim is truly spectacular. It is not an overstatement that the economic future (and therefore the political well being) of the United States is inextricably tied to the region. The combination of all of these factors ensures that the Pacific rim will remain critical to US interests.

The 25th ID (L) stationed at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, has been part of the US military forward-presence and power-projection capability in the Pacific since its activation in 1941 and subsequent deployment to Guadalcanal. As the Army's forward-deployed force in the Pacific and a component of the regional CINC's force of choice for contingency operations, the 25th ID (L) remains a key player in the strategic force-projection Army of the future.

Warfighting Readiness

Although the Army faces an increasing number of potential missions, the essence of the Army clearly remains warfighting. Being prepared for and, when necessary, waging sustained

ground combat is the most demanding, dangerous and important of our potential tasks.

To have a role in the strategic Army of the future, light forces must be capable of achieving decisive victories on the battlefield. As a force created for rapid deployment, light infantry divisions project US national intent through rapid, early commitment to tailored crisis situations. In this circumstance, light infantry divisions

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were designed to achieve favorable decisions by speed and indirect approach, not overwhelming strength. What light forces lack in powerful systems and weapons they make up for with skilled leaders, appropriate tactics, techniques and tough, disciplined soldiers with the indomitable spirit to overcome adversities.

It is complementary forces that form combined arms teams to maximize the capabilities of armored, light and special operation forces (SOF) that will provide ultimate decisiveness on the battlefield. As such, light/armored and armored/light operations are two of our most important training imperatives.

Even in the aftermath of our great victory in operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, there will always be a need for dismounted soldiers who possess consummate infantry skills. The Army must maintain the capability to field light infantrymen to complement armored forces. Only light infantry units can close with and destroy the enemy in close terrain. The ongoing military-technical revolution will enable light forces to remain rapidly deployable while making them powerful enough to contribute to

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decisiveness on the battlefields that fit their unique capabilities. Five dominant trends of the technological revolution are having a dramatic effect on the Army:

- Lethality and dispersion.
- Volume and precision of fire.
- Integrative technology.
- Mass and effects.
- Invisibility and detectability.²

This technological revolution will contribute to smaller, lighter forces that are more capable than those we have today in gaining decisive victories on the battlefield.

Lightweight, technologically advanced equipment is a key component of the light infantry concept. Expediting the fielding of systems such as the Avenger, M119 howitzer, a night-capable attack helicopter such as the Comanche or AH-58, and an effective lightweight, antitank weapon will greatly improve the lethality of light forces and reverse the unfulfilled promise of providing light forces with all the high-tech equipment they need to fight with desired lethality.

One aspect of technology is especially critical to light forces. Integrative technology (combining unrelated technical advances to maximize their effect on the battlefield) greatly enhances the effectiveness and versatility of light forces. Advancements in this area greatly mitigate the inherent limitations of light forces while having minimal effect on their deployability. The ability to receive, integrate and employ a full array of augmentation forces is a key task for a light force commander. It is through integrative technology that the light infantry unit commander will fuse with heavy, SOF and joint forces to truly become a decisive element on the battlefield.

This technology is largely related to communications architectures that link intelligence-gathering systems, maneuver systems, fire systems and logistic support systems to each other for the light force commander. We are already seeing some of these systems fielded in light infantry divisions. Multichannel tactical satellite communication systems, the Tactical High Mobility Terminal, bringing national-level intelligence into the command posts of tactical commanders, the Light Contingency Communication Package, position-locating equipment, the light version of the Maneuver Control System (the Light Maneuver Reporting System) and other systems are the first step toward enhancing the capabilities of our light forces.

In spite of these technological gains, there remains no substitute for well trained soldiers and leaders. Our recent experiences during operations *Just Cause*, *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* demonstrate that training is the key to our warfighting readiness and, therefore, is absolutely essential to the Army's strategic utility.

The 25th ID (L) operates from a simple philosophy published in the division's annual training guidance. Four statements succinctly capture the commander's guidance and focus training efforts:

- Think war.
- Train as you will fight.
- Develop leaders.
- Take care of families.

These precepts apply to the spectrum of collective training events from large-scale, division-level simulations to squad battle drills as well as to individual training.

Combat Training Centers (CTCs) are the keys to developing the warfighting capabilities and lethality of Army units. The 25th ID (L) approaches each rotation at one of the training centers as a great opportunity to make substantial improvements in its warfighting skills. It is at the CTCs that we are able to put the entire warfighting team together and train with the augmentation forces which make light forces lethal in a mid-intensity environment. Recognizing the successes of the CTCs, the division's external evaluation (EXEVAL) program is standardized for



A member of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force is instructed in the use of MILES equipment by 25th Division light fighters.

Individual training is the coequal counterpart to collective training and ensures that light fighters maintain their battle focus and warfighting readiness. Recognizing the areas of responsibility for light infantry soldiers and leaders and the challenges of operating in the environs of the Pacific, the 25th ID (L) created the Light Infantry Training Command, a table of distribution and allowance organization.

battalion and brigade task forces and replicates the multiechelon, realistic training experience of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. This EXEVAL program, called *Lightning Thrust*, takes place in the rugged training areas on the island of Oahu, Hawaii.

Light infantry units were created to deploy rapidly and fight decentralized, small-unit actions in close terrain. Aggressive, well-trained soldiers and leaders are critical to success in this environment. Individual training is the coequal counterpart to collective training and ensures that light fighters maintain their battle focus and warfighting readiness. Recognizing the areas of responsibility for light infantry soldiers and leaders and the challenges of operating in the environs of the Pacific, the 25th ID (L) created the Light Infantry Training Command (LITC), a table of distribution and allowance organization.

The division uses LITC as a combat multiplier by assisting commanders in training and develop-

ing leaders. LITC conducts a variety of courses that range from the demanding 15-day Light Leader Training Course that develops small unit leaders' ability to plan, coordinate and conduct tactical operations, to a US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) certified Air Assault School. A recent addition to the curriculum at LITC is the Pacific Warrior Orientation Course. This program was designed to rapidly integrate newly arrived combat support and combat service support soldiers into the division by introducing these team members to the tactics, techniques and procedures used by light fighters.

Additionally, LITC conducts training to prepare 25th ID (L) soldiers who have been selected to attend the US Army Ranger school. Light infantry units rely heavily on soldiers and leaders who possess the unique skills and mind-set provided by Ranger training. The LITC pre-Ranger training programs toughen and hone candidates in order to maximize their success at

Ranger school so these soldiers return to the division and enhance our warfighting readiness. The success of the LITC's pre-Ranger programs is demonstrated by the Tropic Lightning Division's

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outstanding results in the 1993 David E. Grange Best Ranger Competition where the division's teams placed second, third, fourth and 15th.

Demanding, realistic training for units at the CTCs and other collective training events complemented by a focus on disciplined, tough, capable individuals ensure that the Army's light forces will be trained and ready. Technologically advanced systems in the hands of these well-trained light fighters ensures that they will be capable of decisive victories on the battlefield and remain key players in the strategic force-projection Army.

Forward Presence

As overseas units are inactivated or reassigned to the Continental United States (CONUS), the Army is driven to force-projection and other peacetime engagement and forward-presence activities to remain a strategic force. "Forward presence" is an all-encompassing term. It ranges from supporting an embassy staff, to engineer units building schools in rural villages, to a show of force by combat units in an unstable region. It includes numerous ways to preserve US access, influence and interoperability. Other components of forward presence may include combined exercises, exchange programs, participation in regional conferences and many other military-to-military contacts. These forward-presence

activities provide a stabilizing effect in the regions where they are conducted. They also take the place of large, forward-deployed formations that existed in the past. The 25th ID (L) is very active in the Pacific and serves to maintain peace in this region by remaining engaged in forward-presence activities with our allies.

While all military services are capable of executing these peacetime engagement activities and are doing so, the Army is exceptionally well suited because of the influence ground forces have in developing countries. Because high-tech weapon systems with huge price tags continue to dominate the naval and air forces of the world, armies that can be maintained for a much smaller percentage of the national budget will play increasingly important roles in the governments of many of our allies. The 25th ID (L) is an especially good match for the armies that are maintained by our allies in the Pacific region, where the environment and terrain favor light forces. Tropic Lightning soldiers and our allies have a common understanding of the terrain and of training, equipping and employing light forces. In a five-month period between January and May 1993, the 25th ID (L) deployed to, and conducted three division-level command post exercises (CPXs) in the Pacific. Each of these exercises was a major deployment involving large numbers of personnel and equipment. Each event presented unique challenges in its combined command structure and each represents commitment to fostering interoperability between the Army and the armies of our allies.

Exercise YAMA SAKURA was a bilateral CPX conducted by units from the northeastern army of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) and the US Army Japan/IX Corps. The 25th ID (L) deployed its division main command post from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to Sendai, Japan, and fought in a mid-intensity combat simulation. The III Marine Expeditionary Force, 5th Air Force and 7th Fleet completed the US joint force that fought in a bilateral command relationship with the JGSDF.

In March, the Tropic Lightning Division returned to the Korean peninsula, where 25th



Large-scale, high-visibility, joint and combined exercises are important forward-presence activities, [but] it is the hundreds of small-unit exercises and exchanges that keep the 25th ID (L) constantly engaged with our allies in the Pacific. In 1992, the 25th ID (L) and USARHAW's 45th Support Group exercised in 26 different nations. . . . These exercises were conducted from company to brigade level; involved combat, combat support and combat service support soldiers and units; were from one week to two months in duration; and included the full range of training events.

ID(L) soldiers had fought 40 years earlier. Exercise *TEAM SPIRIT 93* added a large CPX to the traditional field training exercises (FTXs) that have characterized previous *TEAM SPIRIT* exercises. The 25th ID (L) deployed a brigade task force and the division headquarters to participate in the FTX and CPX respectively.

For the 25th ID (L), *TEAM SPIRIT 93* provided all the challenges associated with coalition warfare. In the Third Army, Korea (TROKA) commanders' task organization, the 25th ID (L) was attached to the VII (ROK) Corps. The division became immersed in fighting as a full coalition partner. In an even more challenging situation, the 2d Brigade Warrior Task Force was attached to the 26th (ROK) division for the duration of the FTX.

Finally, in May, the 25th ID (L) headquarters and the 1st Brigade Task Force deployed from their home station in Hawaii to exercise with another ally, this time in Thailand. *COBRA GOLD*

was a CINCPAC exercise that involved I Corps and the 3d Royal Thai Army forming a combined joint task force headquarters. Again, the Tropic Lightning Division and its light fighters represented the Army from individual soldier to division command level through joint and combined training with the 4th Royal Thai Division.

By early June, the division headquarters and significant portions of its subordinate units had deployed three times in five months and executed training events with three of our major allies in the Pacific. Each of these training events included all of our sister services and provided valuable joint and combined training. It is significant to note that during this same five-month period, the division's 3d Brigade Task Force participated in a JRTC rotation at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

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States Army, Hawaii's (USARHAW's) 45th Support Group exercised in 26 different nations as part of the US Army Pacific and CINCPAC expanded relations program. These exercises were conducted from company to brigade level; involved combat, combat support and combat service support soldiers and units; were from one week to two months in duration; and included the full range of training events from live-fire maneuver, to force-on-force exercises, to command and control (C²) interoperability training, to competitive athletic events. Soldiers in the Tropic Lightning Division—from a rifleman in an infantry company to communicators working in mobile subscriber equipment vans to division staff officers in command posts—have established professional and personal relationships with their counterparts in allied armies throughout the Pacific. The civilian and military leaders in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia and many other nations have been exposed to the capabilities and professionalism of the Army through these exercises.

The presence of the Army in peacetime exercises serves to maintain regional stability. The

ability to provide this presence is an important capability of light forces. The 25th ID(L) has been present in the Pacific for 52 years. The Tropic Lightning patch is recognized throughout the region and represents the commitment of the United States to preserving peace and stability.

Force Projection

The first battle the Army must fight and win to have a role in the strategic force-projection Army is that of force projection. This term implies deploying worldwide, from CONUS or outside CONUS bases quickly and without prior notice. The wide variety of situations that will require the employment of the Army as part of a joint and combined team in peace, conflict or war have the potential to occur without warning and will demand a capability for immediate response. An Army that is unprepared, slow to react or unable to be moved on existing strategic lift cannot be projected effectively.

Rapid deployability of any type of Army force is a demanding mission that is not accomplished easily. Soldiers, units, leaders and activities must constantly train to remain prepared to accomplish the thousands of tasks required to deploy an Army organization. In the 25th ID (L), every commander's mission-essential task list (METL) begins with "Rapidly Deploy the Force." The division uses a multitude of training events focused on our deployment mission. For example, as units assume the mission cycle that places them at the highest level of readiness within the division, commanders conduct intensive inspections, call-outs and other compliance checks to ensure they meet stringent standards and can deploy the lead battalion task force (the Division Ready Force-1 [DRF-1]) battalion within 18 hours as required by the division, US Army Pacific and the regional CINC. All other divisional units are trained and ready to deploy immediately after the division ready brigade (DRB).

Divisions conduct emergency deployment training exercises that require various subelements of the division (division tactical command post, DRF-1, entire DRB, aviation package, and so on, to process through the deployment system.

Some of the more than 500 Chinese nationals who spent 47 days in the hold of a ship attempting to smuggle them into the United States.



An event that demonstrates the unusual nature of operations other than war and the versatility of light forces is Operation Provide Refuge. In February 1993, the Merchant Vessel Eastwood, a commercial ship in the Pacific sea lanes, transmitted a distress signal that was monitored in Hawaii. When the Coast Guard boarded the vessel, they found the crew had abandoned the ship and left aboard 525 Chinese migrants who had embarked in an attempt to gain illegal entry to the United States.

All aspects of the system are checked, including personnel readiness, equipment maintenance, compliance with load standards, drawing contingency supplies and ammunition and movement to various departure airfields and port facilities. These exercises are usually 48 hours in duration and are followed immediately by an extensive after-action review.

The division also uses its prescribed deployment system whenever units deploy from Oahu for training events. This use of the system provides further opportunities to remain familiar with the intricacies of rapid deployment.

Another component necessary to achieve rapid deployability is a constant search for ways to improve the system. Requirements, techniques, responsibilities and time schedules must be codified in a readiness standing operating procedure

that must be a realistic, living document. Innovative enhancements to the deployment system must be sought in terms of facilities, C² and time-saving techniques. Needed enhancements become obvious after executing several iterations of the process.

A final component necessary for rapid deployment is a suitable power-projection platform. This involves integrating the installation staff and other agencies that contribute to transforming the force from its training posture into an effectively functioning organization moving expeditiously toward ports of embarkation.

The division can deploy itself only to the point that the sequence overtakes the units that are "pushing out" other units. An orderly transition is essential to ensure continuity in the process. In USARHAW, the 45th Support Group and US

Army Support Command-Hawaii (the garrison command) are designated to relieve divisional units that must cease their outload assistance tasks and actually move with the division. The existence and transfer of equipment required to deploy a unit (computers, facsimile machines,

As overseas units are inactivated or reassigned to CONUS, the Army is driven to force-projection and other peacetime engagement and forward-presence activities to remain a strategic force. "Forward presence" . . . ranges from supporting an embassy staff, to engineer units building schools in rural villages, to a show of force by combat units in an unstable region. It includes numerous ways to preserve US access, influence and interoperability . . . [such as] combined exercises, exchange programs, participation in regional conferences and many other military-to-military contacts.

telephones, light sets, scales, automotive test equipment, and so on) between changing organizations in the outload business is critical for deploying large units.

Light infantry divisions were designed, developed and fielded to provide the Army with a strategically responsive force in an era when most of the force was postured as heavy, forward-deployed divisions poised primarily to defend Europe against the Warsaw Pact. The 1984 decision to create light infantry divisions was a drastic departure from the previous 40 years of Army force design concepts. The lean force structure that deliberately avoided heavy equipment, oversized cargo and unnecessary redundancy was designed to be rapidly deployable on C-141s.

In the almost 10-year existence of light infantry divisions, these organizations have repeatedly demonstrated that they meet their charter to rapidly deploy tailored force packages throughout the world. Notable examples are the 7th ID (L) participation in operations in Central America,

including *Just Cause* and Exercise *GOLDEN PHEASANT*, the 10th Mountain Division's peacemaking operations in Somalia and hurricane relief in Florida and the 25th ID (L) in numerous operations in the Pacific discussed in this article.

The second half of the force-projection equation must focus on the force itself. Rapid deployment of an ill-equipped, undermanned unit will not accomplish any of our nation's strategic objectives. The Army must continue its emphasis on fielding technologically advanced, deployable and lethal weapons and equipment to light divisions. The versatility demanded by the strategic environment requires that light divisions possess systems that enhance the firepower, maneuver and protection capabilities of the force without sacrificing the ability to project it.

Operations Other Than War

At 0530, Friday, 11 September 1992, blaring civil defense sirens woke startled residents of the Hawaiian Islands. Only 18 hours previously, weather forecasters had discounted Hurricane Iniki as a threat. During the night, however, Iniki made an ominous turn, and by 1630, her 165 mph winds were wreaking havoc on the island of Kauai. The following morning, President George Bush signed Disaster Declaration Number 76.

The lead elements of the 25th ID (L) response, which would become known as Task Force *Garden Isle*, immediately deployed to a base at Lihue Airport on Kauai and began providing lifesaving emergency assistance and assessing the damage. For the next 25 days, the 25th ID (L) Emergency Operations Center at Schofield Barracks operated around the clock to provide and coordinate resources for the joint task force that was created to provide relief. Forward deployed to Kauai, Task Force *Garden Isle* was composed of units from the 25th ID (L) and other USARHAW units to include the 45th Support Group. In addition to commanding Army elements on Kauai, Task Force *Garden Isle* coordinated the efforts of all of the armed services and worked closely with civil authorities, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Coast



A member of the 503d Military Police Battalion deployed to the Virgin Islands for crowd control in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo, September 1992.

In the past, the Army protected citizens at the edge of the frontiers of an expanding America; built roads, canals and bridges; assisted nations abroad; and performed a variety of other tasks. These operations have become well publicized in the wake of recent man-made and natural events that have occurred in the post-Cold War environment.

Guard and a myriad of other relief agencies.

Today, the Army is often required, in its role as a strategic force, to protect and further the interests of the United States at home and abroad in operations other than war. In the past, the Army protected citizens at the edge of the frontiers of an expanding America; built roads, canals and bridges; assisted nations abroad; and performed a variety of other tasks.⁴ These operations have become well publicized in the wake of recent man-made and natural events that have occurred in the post-Cold War environment. It certainly seems that operations other than war are a growth industry and that the US Armed Forces will continue to be involved, often in the lead.

Operations other than war is an umbrella term for a wide variety of activities the Army performs in support of the nation's strategic objectives. FM 100-5 lists a dozen activities that are part of the Army's role in operations other than war:⁵

- Nation assistance.

- Security assistance.
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
- Support to counterdrug operations.
- Peacekeeping.
- Combatting terrorism.
- Show of force.
- Attacks and raids.
- Noncombatant evacuation operations.
- Peace enforcement.
- Support to insurgency or counterinsurgency.
- Support to domestic civil authority.

Light infantry divisions have participated in virtually all of these activities in the past several years. The 25th ID (L) alone has had a role in at least half of these activities. During Operation *Iniki Response*, the 25th ID (L) demonstrated that its warfighting capabilities could be quickly and effectively reconfigured to provide humanitarian assistance and aid to the citizens of the United States. The versatility of the leaders and soldiers was critical to the success of this operation.

The range and scope of the support required to sustain the residents of Kauai in the aftermath of Iniki was staggering. Army forces, predominantly units from Schofield Barracks and the Hawaii Army National Guard provided: meals ready-to-eat; mobile kitchens; water purification systems; tentage; tactical generators; emergency

Another component necessary to achieve rapid deployability is a constant search for ways to improve the system. Requirements, techniques, responsibilities and time schedules must be codified in a readiness standing operating procedure that must be a realistic, living document. Innovative enhancements to the deployment system must be sought in terms of facilities, C² and time-saving techniques.

communications at police and fire stations; a brigade of soldiers to repair roofs, reduce health hazards, and clear transportation routes; and logisticians from the division support command and 45th Support Group to operate a wholesale distribution center and airhead where an incredible tonnage of supplies flowed onto the island.

Even in an operation other than war, the deployability and force structure of the light infantry division contributed to mission success. The fact that land lines of communication did not exist between Kauai and any location capable of providing assistance made our training for rapid deployment a key to success. Personnel, equipment and supplies moved by air and sea in accordance with the same deployment system and on the same time line that would be used in wartime.

Iniki Response is only one of several humanitarian assistance operations the division has participated in during the past several years. Operation *Fiery Vigil* was the response to the eruption of Mount Pinatubo on the Philippine Islands, and Operation *Sea Angel* was the operation to assist Bangladesh when a monsoon devastated that country.

An event that demonstrates the unusual nature of operations other than war and the versatility of

light forces is Operation *Provide Refuge*. In February 1993, the Merchant Vessel *Eastwood*, a commercial ship in the Pacific sea lanes, transmitted a distress signal that was monitored in Hawaii. When the Coast Guard boarded the vessel, they found the crew had abandoned the ship and left aboard 525 Chinese migrants who had embarked in an attempt to gain illegal entry to the United States.

The conditions on the ship were deplorable. It would have only been a matter of days before the ill-fated passengers would have begun to die from dehydration, starvation and a variety of diseases resulting from unsanitary conditions.

On 11 February 1993, a portion of the division's ready brigade and a C² package from the 25th ID(L) headquarters were alerted and deployed to Kwajalein atoll to respond to this unusual situation. Infantrymen, military police, linguists, logisticians and medics prepared to execute an operation that would require ingenuity, restraint and synchronization of a variety of activities to accomplish the mission. After-action reviews and firsthand experiences from leaders who had participated in similar operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were used to plan for this operation. This mission also reinforced the assumption that military and other governmental agencies are required to work closely in operations other than war.

During the 20 days it took the UN high commissioner on refugee affairs and other diplomats to solve the delicate political issues involved in this situation, light forces again demonstrated their versatility. A light infantry battalion, augmented with personnel from civil affairs, psychological operations and medical units constituted the Army forces in *Provide Refuge*. In addition to emergency humanitarian assistance, the light fighters of 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry accomplished security, accountability and processing and life support tasks on Kwajalein. Following the transfer of the Chinese migrants to the International Organization for Migrants, the light infantrymen closed the camp, redeployed to home station and resumed their training program and deployment posture.

Committing the Army to selected operations other than war is done in support of our national

military strategy. Army soldiers serve daily in this capacity, and the opportunities for such operations are sure to increase in the future. The Army in general—and light forces in particular—can respond quickly, appropriately and professionally to a variety of unique, challenging situations. These units, which are organized, properly equipped, well trained and led and disciplined for combat, can and do adjust easily for successful operations other than war.

The Future

The Army is changing to adapt to the evolving strategic environment. An organization that has previously had a single focus on combat is now demonstrating its versatility without compromising its ability to fight and win. Light forces, as characterized in this article by the 25th ID (L) and its activities, are essential players in the strategic force—projection Army. As the Army prepares for and is committed to additional roles, we must capitalize on our ability to execute many different missions. Light forces epitomize the tenet of versatility. First, light forces are an indispensable part of the combined arms team on the battlefield. Dismounted soldiers using appropriate tactics, armed with the latest equipment and integrated with heavy and special operating units are a decisive force. Second, light forces are great warrior—ambassadors for the US military and superb representatives of the interests of the United States through the execution of peacetime engagement and forward—presence activities. With an empha-

During Operation Iniki Response, the 25th ID (L) demonstrated that its war-fighting capabilities could be quickly and effectively reconfigured to provide humanitarian assistance and aid to the citizens of the United States. The versatility of the leaders and soldiers was critical to the success of this operation.

sis on small-unit, fundamental infantry skills, light units are a good match for the armies of our allies. The third aspect of versatility, the ability to rapidly and repeatedly deploy, is essential and contributes to executing peacetime engagement and forward—presence activities, operations other than war and responding to crisis situations worldwide.

Rapid deployment, an ideal mission for light infantry divisions, is a critical component of our Army's force—projection strategy. Events in recent history have repeatedly demonstrated that light infantry divisions are rapidly deployable and that an early presence by US light forces is a viable strategic tool. Finally, light forces are exceptionally well suited to be employed in operations other than war.

Future military operations, combat or otherwise, will require the versatility and capabilities that are the hallmark of light forces. The 25th ID (L) and other light infantry forces are essential to the strategic force—projection Army. **MR**


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1. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), 2-9.
2. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan and LTC James M. Dubik, *Land Warfare in the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February

- 1993), 12.
3. *Ibid.*, 19.
4. FM 100-5, Operations, 13-0.
5. *Ibid.*

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Operations Other Than War

Operations other than war have taken on a new dimension with the latest version of US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. We offer three articles that examine a few of the complications involved in conducting operations other than war. First, Graham H. Turbiville Jr. looks at how organized crime activities are centered, in part, on developing relationships between groups in distant areas of the world that formerly had few or no ties. Next, retired Colonel William W. Mendel takes a look at the island nation of Haiti and its importance to the United States and the role US military forces might play in supporting nation assistance efforts of the United States and the UN. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey B. Demarest provides a look at the island nation of Cuba. He offers some thoughts as to what contributing events could lead to a collapse of Fidel Castro's regime and possible US Army assistance roles in a post-Castro Cuba.

Operations Other Than War: Organized Crime Dimension

Graham H. Turbiville Jr.

AS US national security planners seek to define, anticipate or react to a host of security problems around the post-Cold War world, they are faced both with familiar, enduring problems, as well as with security issues, that in terms of content, scale and impact seem strikingly new. This mix of continuing and new concerns is particularly evident in evolving Army concepts, doctrine and planning associated with military operations other than war, which will be carried out in a complex security environment characterized by diverse and shifting challenges to existing state structures and institutions around the world.¹

Among these challenges are what have come to be termed by some as "gray area phenomena" or problems of "global ungovernability." These designations have been coined recently by security specialists to capture the proliferation of nonstate security threats that are new, recently visible or have come to be of far greater concern than in the past. They include, among others, widespread population dislocations; ethnic and religious conflict; epidemic health problems and environmental damage; terrorist organizations and agendas; international organized crime; and "informal" economic organizations that bypass or avoid state and regional economic systems.² Country after country has come to identify these elements in various combinations as national security concerns. Individually and collectively, these problems are joining more traditional national concerns to define the security environment throughout the world.

Organized crime . . . may increasingly influence [planning for] operations other than war . . . in many areas of the world. . . . Because of its effectiveness, success and impact, organized crime is already an integral part of the overall environment in which operations other than war take place, as well as closely intertwined with national security threats of direct concern to military planners.

Within this environment, each of the military operations other than war operational categories—support to insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping, support to counterdrug operations and a range of contingency operations—has acquired new dimensions.³ Notable among these is the emergence of an organized crime component that may increasingly influence operations other than war planning in many areas of the world. That is, because of its effectiveness, success and impact, organized crime is already an integral part of the overall environment in which operations other than war take place, as well as closely intertwined with national security threats of direct concern to military planners.

Organized criminal activities—increasingly linked regionally and internationally—are centered in part on developing relationships between narcotics trafficking, arms trafficking and other international organized criminal groups in distant areas of the world that formerly had few visible relationships. In environments

In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) turned to narcotics trafficking years ago as a means of financing their separatist goals. . . . Hundreds of Tamils have been picked up for narcotics trafficking in foreign countries in Europe, North America and elsewhere. While the principal drug in these arrests was heroin, there are reports that the LTTE concluded an agreement with the Colombian cartels in which representatives of the former serve as drug couriers in return for "arms training."

where state institutions have been rendered ineffective by sweeping political and economic change, war, internal challenges or other factors, criminal enterprise has been quick to fill vacuums or seize new opportunities.

In addition, the new or reinvigorated centers of interethnic conflict, insurgency and various forms of regional and international terrorism have acquired an organized crime content that blurs distinctions between military and law enforcement problems in many regions of the globe. Of particular importance, some security problems that had in the past been driven by ideological or other imperatives, now have strong criminal motivations as well. Thus, for example, while the Cold War framework had shaped the way we looked at most security problems in the recent past, the disappearance of the former Soviet Union, the Socialist bloc, and regional surrogates has removed immediate sources of financing, arms, training, safe havens or other support for client states, insurgencies and terrorist organizations.

To some extent at least, organized crime has provided an alternative means of support, as well as a seductive source of personal, criminal profit that may subvert ideological or political fervor. This phenomenon is not limited to specific regions, but is evident in many areas of the world in often analogous ways. Of particular importance are those areas of insurgency, civil war and ethnonational conflict that may precipitate—or already have precipitated—US

military involvement in various ways. Before addressing some of these potential operations other than war-organized crime linkages, it is useful to look at how the United States defines strategic objectives that are likely to generate military operations other than war and simultaneously confront criminal enterprise.

Defined US Interests and Operations Other Than War

There are broadly stated US policy goals that will shape the role and commitment of the US Armed Forces throughout the remainder of the decade. As the administration of President George Bush was coming to a close in the early 1990s, US security objectives constituted a number of desirable foreign policy goals around the world that clearly included the potential for military support and served as the broad rationale for US military involvement abroad. Some of these goals were also addressed in terms of countering the most pernicious form of organized crime—narcotics trafficking—though generally speaking, organized crime did not occupy a central role as a national security threat. Several brief examples from official US government statements early in this decade illustrate these various declared national "interests and goals."⁴

For example, US security assistance programs were focused on providing "aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking." Regarding the latter point more specifically, it had been a US goal for some years to "reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign [narcotics] production [and] combatting international traffickers. . . ."⁵ US foreign policy interests were aimed at strengthening and enlarging "the commonwealth of free [democratic] nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights," and supporting "greater economic and political unity" in Europe, as well as other regions. One means to these goals was to promote the growth of free democratic political institutions around the world.⁶ US objectives of supporting "aid, trade and investment



Coast Guard personnel search a vessel suspected of transporting drugs as their ship stands by, circa 1990.

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policies that promote economic development and social... progress," and promoting "an open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment," were stated and restated in various ways for some years.⁷

More recently, President Bill Clinton's administration—through National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Clinton himself—have reiterated these objectives in much the same terms. That is, these representatives assert that US goals include supporting existing democracies; fostering the expansion of democratic governments around the world; sustaining and encouraging free market economies; and fostering "humanitarian agendas."⁸ The extent to which these goals will be translated into policies that involve the employment of US military forces is far from clear.

It is clear, however, that in a world threatened

by a range of simmering and acute conflicts, these declared goals could underpin foreign policy initiatives that include the commitment of US military resources in various forms of operations other than war—unilaterally or under the auspices of regional or international security organizations—if sanctioned by the national leadership and country. All of these goals are also fundamentally affected by a number of forms of organized crime in ways that include severe damage to political and economic institutions through corruption, lost state and business revenues, currency crimes and money laundering; the deterioration of social structures through heightened levels of violence, debilitating instability and damaged value systems; and even physical threats to the continuity of government among other potential impacts.⁹ The "military" and "organized crime" aspects of these goals are now increasingly linked in ways that will be discussed below.

In the former Soviet Union—which includes several hundred ethnic groups by some assessments—one of the criteria used to classify organized crime is ethnic affiliation. Thus, of the 3,500 to 4,000 organized criminal groups that existed in the Soviet Union in its closing days, and the 3,000 groups estimated to exist in Russia itself at the end of 1992, many are “ethnic criminal groups formed on the basis of national communities. . . .”

Criminal Content

Organized criminal activity in the form of arms and drug trafficking, the smuggling of strategic materials and other profitable contraband, extortion and robbery, hostage taking for ransom and other crimes are increasingly, as noted, an integral part of insurgency, civil war and ethnic conflict. Legal and illegal immigration is taking place at an unprecedented rate, as are major population dislocations associated with internal conflict and political or economic disruption. This movement of people and the creation of refugee concentrations and ethnic diasporas in many areas of the world has facilitated the operation of conflict-associated organized criminal activities. Of particular importance for US military operations other than war in affected regions is the organized crime agendas of at least some active separatist and insurgent movements and ethnic conflicts. To cite some diverse examples, Basque (ETA) separatists largely finance their terrorist activity through “revolutionary taxes” obtained through extortion and ransoms, while the Irish Republican Army makes heavy use of tax fraud and extortion activities (as well as more overt fundraising).¹⁰ In a far different area, the emergence of a “drug mafia” in Nagaland (a northeast Indian state) and its possible merging with the insurgency there combines criminal enterprise with a separatist goal.¹¹ Even in Somalia, trade in the drug “khat” has provided a source of revenue for factions and groups, and contributed to its availability in New York, Los Angeles, Boston, Dal-

las and other US cities. UN peacekeepers have been charged by Somali factions with protecting traffickers and profiting from the drug trade, while the criminal motivations of some Somali leaders are well established.¹²


In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) turned to narcotics trafficking years ago as a means of financing their separatist goals, and the organization has been characterized by some as a kind of “mafia.”¹³ Hundreds of Tamils have been picked up for narcotics trafficking in foreign countries in Europe, North America and elsewhere. While the principal drug in these arrests was heroin, there are reports that the LTTE concluded an agreement with the Colombian cartels in which representatives of the former serve as drug couriers in return for “arms training.”¹⁴

The Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), operating inside and outside of Turkey, has the aim of setting up an independent Kurdish state in the region. The PKK has not only been credited with killing several thousand people in eastern and southeastern Turkey since 1984, but has also conducted terrorist and criminal activities in a number of West European cities, as well as in Iraq, Iran and Syria.¹⁵ Criminal and terrorist charges leveled at the PKK over the last year include obtaining heavy financial support from narcotics trafficking in Europe; producing counterfeit Turkish bank notes in cooperation with the Italian Mafia, distributing drugs principally in the larger cities of western Turkey; producing revenues of some \$20 million a year through a narcotics trafficking network in Saudi Arabia and extorting money from the 130,000 to 150,000 Turkish workers residing in that country; cooperating with Armenian terrorist organizations such as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and establishing bases in the former Soviet republic of Armenia; and attacking Turkish targets in the German cities of Frankfurt, Karlsruhe and Mainz and in Brussels, Belgium, among other locations.¹⁶

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nized crime is ethnic affiliation.¹⁷ Thus, of the 3,500 to 4,000 organized criminal groups that existed in the Soviet Union in its closing days, and the 3,000 groups estimated to exist in Russia itself at the end of 1992, many are "ethnic criminal groups formed on the basis of national communities. . . ."¹⁸ Because of their ethnonational content, affiliations and location, these groups have become actors in the various centers of interethnic conflict. Security service spokesmen in the former Soviet Union judge that criminal groups variously provide material support, encourage or simply take advantage of the disruptions and opportunities presented by the various ethnic "hot spots" and tensions. As a former KGB deputy chairman noted in early 1991 (and echoed often by other officials and analysts), "our professional criminals often cooperate with extremists, terrorists and extreme nationalists."¹⁹

This potential for profiting is especially great in arms and drug trafficking but also includes a broad array of criminal activities ranging from primitive to sophisticated. Russian estimates have put the total number of uncontrolled arms throughout the former Soviet Union at tens of millions, many of them military automatic weapons. A trade in heavier weapons is evident as well, especially in areas of ethnonational conflict like the Caucasus.²⁰ In the Caucasus, Georgian, Azeri, Armenian, Chechen and other "mafias" share the region with an equally impressive collection of "armies," national guards and provisional armed groups associated with states and factions. Narcotics trafficking, arms sales and terrorist allegations centered on Georgians, Azeris, Armenians and other Caucasus people reflect the complex intermixing that characterizes many other areas of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.



Mark H. Milstein, *Soldier of Fortune*

Teen-age Bosnian soldiers in Sarajevo armed with a Jane's assortment of weapons ranging from bolt-action hunting rifles to Heckler & Koch submachineguns, circa fall 1993.

Among many instructive cases from around the world—some of which have potential or ongoing US operations other than war involvement—are Colombia and the former Yugoslavia, where insurgent and ethnonational issues, conflicts and organized criminal activities are merging in ways that have an impact on regional security and US military support as well. Most notably, there are mounting indications that . . . the desire for criminal profit by movements and groups has in part replaced other motivations, frustrated efforts to resolve disputes, and contributed to continued conflict and instability.

The growing status of Central Asia as a drug cultivation and export region (as well as an arms trafficking center) is linked to factional conflict there as well. As one commentator noted in regard to Central Asia in 1991, "it is not just coincidence . . . that ethnic conflicts in Central Asia, as a rule, flared up during the opium poppy harvesting season."²¹ In Moldova, continuing confrontations in that former Soviet republic are characterized by an intermixing of ethnonational conflict and criminal activity, replete with charges and countercharges of corruption and crime among all parties involved.²² Parties to the Moldovan conflicts include the break-away "Dniester Republic"; the Moldovan government, which is contesting the separatist efforts; various mercenary groups including Cossacks and right-wing extremists; Romanian arms and training support; and large numbers

The insurgents have become criminal capitalists rather than ideologically motivated revolutionaries. While many analysts would judge this view to be overdrawn, considerable data has been mustered by government spokesmen to support their assertions in the form of captured documentation and the arrest of the ELN finance minister. Intelligence received from these sources ... revealed an extraordinary amount of information on FARC and ELN financing ... [and] indicated that the two guerrilla groups had become the "largest, best organized and most profitable criminal activity in [Colombia]."

of ethnic Russian residents in the area.

Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed—the commander of the Russian 14th Army, which is ostensibly serving a peacekeeping role in the complex conflict there—accused the Dniester “government” of corruption and criminal activity and declared he was “sick and tired of guarding the sleep and safety of crooks.”²³ Indeed, criminal activity in Moldova is widespread, profitable and includes drug and arms trafficking.²⁴ As in other regions, conflict has provided criminal opportunities, with criminal groups in and around the divided state becoming intermeshed with the various political and national agendas.

Among many instructive cases from around the world—some of which have potential or ongoing US operations other than war involvement—are Colombia and the former Yugoslavia, where insurgent and ethnonational issues, conflicts and organized criminal activities are merging in ways that have an impact on regional security and US military support as well. Most notably, there are mounting indications that in these two illustrations, the desire for criminal profit by movements and groups has in part replaced other motivations, frustrated efforts to resolve disputes, and contributed to continued conflict and instability. That is, there appear to be strong, well-financed criminal structures beyond—or subsumed by—the contending parties in these conflicts which have interests in the


outcome and terms of a given conflict's resolution. This may include, in particular, an interest in prolonging a conflict or exploiting tensions to increase profit. This kind of factor, to the extent it is operative, has the potential of frustrating US and international efforts to broker lasting political solutions; shaping the desirability or form of security assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and postconflict stability efforts; and influencing the forms that humanitarian assistance may take among other considerations.

Colombia

In addition to its premier role as a center for narcotics trafficking by the cocaine and heroin cartels, Colombia also faces two major insurgencies, the National Liberation Army (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*—ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*—FARC). It is the Colombian government's view that the guerrillas are becoming increasingly involved in organized crime to include—but not limited to—narcotics trafficking. As one Colombian government minister put it:

“We think the guerrillas have forsaken their self-attributed ideals of struggling for the redemption of the lower classes. We are in the presence of a large, profitable criminal organization that takes advantage of every mechanism of the capitalist economy and that has abandoned any revolutionary ideals its members might have had in the past.”²⁵

In other words, the insurgents have become criminal capitalists rather than ideologically motivated revolutionaries. While many analysts would judge this view to be overdrawn, considerable data has been mustered by government spokesmen to support their assertions in the form of captured documentation and the arrest of the ELN finance minister.²⁶ Intelligence received from these sources included a list of ransom payments and victims, extortion schemes involving businesses and individuals and other data that revealed an extraordinary amount of information on FARC and ELN financing. The intelligence also indicated that the two guerrilla



Active fighting, shifts in borders and control procedures, a breakdown in group affiliations, and especially the arms embargo imposed on all provinces of the former Yugoslavia in early fall 1991, changed routes and priorities for smugglers and state institutions alike and resulted in an innovative series of measures and readjustments being taken by affected states and criminal groups. Arms trafficking groups, in order to acquire requisite military materiel and other strategic materials, began to identify black and gray market sources for weapons and explore new routes for delivery.

groups had become the "largest, best organized and most profitable criminal activity in the country."²⁷ Further, the Colombian authorities determined a close correlation between the deployment of the various guerrilla fronts and the centers of economic enterprise of one form or another, especially oil, gold, coal, bananas, coca and—most recently—poppies.²⁸ Guerrilla deployment shifted to these areas where revenues were greater. Guerrillas reportedly have even helped revive cattle ranches when their excessive expropriation of money has caused ranches to become of marginal financial value.²⁹

The most profitable insurgent criminal enterprise, according to the Colombian police, military and government, is the per gram charge for coca leaf, paste and processors.³⁰ According to one FARC defector, his front sent the secretariat in 1991 some 2.5 billion pesos from this means

(\$1 equals approximately 750 pesos). If this is multiplied by the eight fronts (recognizing that there is no evidence that this is a meaningful exercise), it would total 20 billion pesos. While not much is known about the insurgents' relationship with poppy and heroin production, there are only some rough calculations that indicate this business is growing at an accelerated rate and, in terms of FARC income, already may represent one third of that from coca.³¹

At any rate, between coca and poppies, the FARC is judged by some Colombians to garner close to 70 percent of its income. All of this has caused Colombian President César Gaviria Trujillo to assert that the insurgents "have become the third drug cartel in Colombia" and that they are promoting the new heroin business as well.³² The conclusion reached by some analysts is that profit has become far more important to

The autonomous Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija, with a predominately Albanian ethnic population and strong separatist leanings, has by many accounts some of the most active criminal groups in the region, as well as armed groups associated with the separatist cause. Serbian authorities—concerned about Albanian separatist potential and aspirations—have been particularly vehement in denouncing what they call Albanian-run drugs-for-arms deals, together with extortion, kidnapping, corrupt law enforcement and a variety of economic crimes.

the Colombian guerrillas than ideology and that peace negotiations may become more difficult because "if the FARC and ELN effectively have converted themselves into such profitable criminal enterprises, how could a process of reincorporation appear attractive to them?"³³ Other Colombian spokesmen have suggested that the loss of ideological vigor and a dependence on "sharing the spoils" to maintain group cohesiveness is harming guerrilla effectiveness and recruiting.³⁴

The Former Yugoslavia

The continuing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have had many consequences for organized criminal activity of all types to include, in particular, the closer association of many parties in the disputes with organized crime. A combination of pressing military requirements, economic disarray, the disruption of existing institutions and organizations, expanded opportunities for many types of criminal endeavors and the potential for enormous criminal profits, have all appeared at the same time. In addition, the large numbers of refugees from the conflicts there, coupled with large, existing émigré communities of "Yugoslav" citizens around the world, have provided a potential support base and infrastructure abroad for drug and arms trafficking, other criminal undertakings and terrorist activities.

Yugoslav criminals, of course, were quite active in a variety of regional smuggling activities well before the state began its slide to dissolution and active conflict.³⁵ Indeed, smuggling and banditry in many forms had been a traditional feature of the area long before there had been a Yugoslav state. Regarding the more serious forms of organized crime, Yugoslavia had a longstanding role in the international heroin trade as a part of the Balkan route leading from Southwest Asia, through the Balkans, to Western Europe and North America. By the late 1980s, like the rest of Eastern Europe, it had also become a stop on Latin American cocaine trafficking routes as well.

As shooting conflicts in Yugoslavia developed—beginning in late June 1991 with Croat and Slovene declarations of independence—traditional smuggling routes were disrupted. Active fighting, shifts in borders and control procedures, a breakdown in group affiliations, and especially the arms embargo imposed on all provinces of the former Yugoslavia in early fall 1991, changed routes and priorities for smugglers and state institutions alike and resulted in an innovative series of measures and readjustments being taken by affected states and criminal groups. Arms trafficking groups, in order to acquire requisite military materiel and other strategic materials, began to identify black and gray market sources for weapons and explore new routes for delivery. There was a reorientation of heroin trafficking routes as well, with some of the drug traffic moving north through Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia. However, a substantial heroin transit trade and new distribution routes continued in Yugoslavia as well, with adjustments made to allow for disrupted drug flows due to armed clashes.

Hand-in-hand with the conflict has been the further development of a brisk trade in drugs and arms jointly, sometimes using the same routes, couriers and transport means. Local mafias in every former province cut out territory for their criminal activities and have developed international ties as well. A feature of these groups is their ethnic orientation—Croats, Serbs, Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians and others—

Berlin Brigade vehicles roll out of a C-5 Galaxy transport at Petrovec Airport near Skopje, Macedonia, July 1993.



The former Yugoslav province of Macedonia, where about 300 US troops are deployed, has been the target of a number of charges of criminal and terrorist activity. The Macedonian government, accused of sponsoring heroin trafficking and using the proceeds to buy weapons, in turn charges Serbs and Greeks with drug trafficking, to include the Serbian armed forces special operations component.

with numerous charges and countercharges exchanged between the groups over their alleged drug deals and criminal activities to support the armed actions of various factions. There is, in addition, a substantial trade in other scarce commodities that yield high profits.

In Serbia, increasing levels of violence have accompanied random and mafia criminal activities in Belgrade to include drug trafficking. Criminal groups increasingly began to compete for spheres of influence and pursued, in particular, their extortion and protection rackets as law enforcement efforts unraveled amid the general economic and societal disarray generated by the continuing conflicts.³⁶ Ethnic Albanians were singled out for their potential in organized crime because of their "patriarchal ties to one another."³⁷ In any event, criminal groups became better armed and more difficult to penetrate, while the police became more corrupt and less effective. Some observers pointed to a national "psychosis" where high-profit state crime (the sale of oil and other high-priced commodities)

existed with drug and arms trafficking, protection and extortion, robberies and other random and organized crimes by a variety of players.³⁸ Serbian leaders are widely accused of direct involvement in these activities. As one Serbian source noted in regard to the political leadership, "they are not only in a position to take advantage of the war, but they are also in a position to maintain it 'so long as it brings in income.'"³⁹

The autonomous Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija, with a predominately Albanian ethnic population and strong separatist leanings, has by many accounts some of the most active criminal groups in the region, as well as armed groups associated with the separatist cause.⁴⁰ Serbian authorities—concerned about Albanian separatist potential and aspirations—have been particularly vehement in denouncing what they call Albanian-run drugs-for-arms deals, together with extortion, kidnapping, corrupt law enforcement and a variety of economic crimes.⁴¹ Albanian criminal groups in Kosovo are reportedly deeply involved in narcotics trafficking in

The past few years have seen an increased internationalization of organized criminal activities with new, stronger linkages and relationships appearing that had not been observed or visible before. . . . Organized criminal groups, often cohesive, well financed and with access to new technologies that enhance their effectiveness, have demonstrated a capability to thrive amid turmoil and to expand and shift their activities rapidly to meet new requirements.

particular. While they are said to often use ethnic Albanians to transport and sell the drugs, they reportedly also use other nationalities as well.⁴² Criminal links among ethnic Albanians in Serbia, other provinces, and Albania itself are widely noted as well.⁴³ The Italian Mafia and other groups are reportedly competing for influence and a share of the market at Albanian ports such as Durrazzo, while Italian police believe that Albanians are actively working Western narcotics trafficking routes.⁴⁴

Montenegro, which remains aligned in a federal "Yugoslav" state with Serbia, is by most accounts a hotbed of smuggling, particularly along the Adriatic coast. Hydrofoils and other boats are said to trade illegally in profitable items such as tobacco, as well as the major commodities of heroin, arms and ammunition.⁴⁵ New banking and commercial establishments have been set up in Montenegro (and elsewhere) to facilitate the illegal deals. As one specialist in Belgrade noted about the role of organized crime in the conflicts, "under conditions where an expensive war is being waged at any price, expenses cannot be covered by the real implementation of national economies, so that states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are accepting crime as a source of funding and emerging as partners of the underworld."⁴⁶

Croatian citizens living abroad are widely reported to participate in arms purchasing and drug trafficking deals in behalf of the Croatian state and for personal profit as well.⁴⁷ Serbian reports, which put the worst face on alleged Croatian arms trafficking, have drawn strong

Croatian protests. Nevertheless, such charges have continued and accelerated. One report from Belgrade, for example, alleged that émigré Croat "communities" in Latin America are playing an active role in supporting Croatian military forces through arms and drug trafficking. Drugs are reportedly sent from Latin America to Western Europe, where profits then are used to purchase arms for Croat forces.⁴⁸

The former Yugoslav province of Macedonia, where about 300 US troops are deployed, has been the target of a number of charges of criminal and terrorist activity. The Macedonian government, accused of sponsoring heroin trafficking and using the proceeds to buy weapons, in turn charges Serbs and Greeks with drug trafficking, to include the Serbian armed forces special operations component.⁴⁹ The acknowledged presence of heroin and "ecstasy" laboratories on the territory of Macedonia are attributed to outside schemes by the Macedonian media. Members of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) terrorist organization (dedicated to creating a greater Macedonia that includes territory from neighboring states), are also said to be deeply involved in drug trafficking in cooperation with the Macedonian-Albanian drug mafia and Serbian traffickers.⁵⁰ Macedonia, while well situated to traffic in Turkish heroin, is also an opium poppy cultivator as well. Poppy cultivation is a legal revenue-producing undertaking in Macedonia for pharmaceutical sales (about 1,600 hectares in the fall of 1992). Even assuming that clandestine poppy crops did not exist, the potential for illegal diversion of opium products would be substantial.⁵¹

According to a Slovene Ministry of Internal Affairs official, Slovenia is well on its way to developing its own "classic underground."⁵² Criminal activities on Slovenian territory are international in nature and include drug and arms trafficking, protection, extortion and other "traditional" organized crime. Illustrating the complexity of the drug and arms trade was the December 1992 arrest by Italian police of two Slovene citizens with 11 automatic weapons, 1,000 9mm rounds and a silencer. The arrested traffickers were thought to be part of a Croatian-Slovene-

Italian drug and arms smuggling route to the Italian Mafia and other criminal groups.⁵³

Bosnia, as a center of continuing active conflict, and as a consequence of its geographic location, has been particularly hard hit by the arms embargo, local transportation blockades and the besieged status of Muslim forces and populations in particular. Materiel support to Bosnian Muslims from Islamic states abroad has been widely rumored, but organized crime seems to have been of far greater consequence.⁵⁴ That is, even with the hardships, atrocities and extreme military difficulties, criminal organizations and elements are charged with influencing the course of operations. The chief of the general staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sefer Halilovic), for example, pointed to the existence of "an assorted criminal-political mob" composed of Serbian, Croatian and Muslim members. He charged that even Muslim criminals had an interest in keeping Sarajevo under siege in order to ensure criminal profits.⁵⁵ The charge echoes that heard in other states of the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union and in far more distant areas.

There are several judgments that seem justified from the examples addressed above. First, the past few years have seen an increased internationalization of organized criminal activities with new, stronger linkages and relationships appearing that had not been observed or visible before. In addition, there is an evolving association of organized crime with insurgencies, ethnonational conflict and terrorism that seems more widespread than was the case just a few years ago. This is centered principally on the more aggressive and sophisticated financing of activities and perhaps a change in the motivation of groups from ideology and a desire for power, to an emphasis on profit. Organized criminal groups, often cohesive, well financed and with access to new technologies that enhance their effectiveness, have demonstrated a capability to thrive amid turmoil and to expand and shift their activities rapidly to meet new requirements.

Criminal activity founded primarily on ethnonational linkages, is particularly disruptive in areas where state institutions are fragile, economic resources limited and interethnic tensions high. The vastly expanded international crimi-

Regional and international organized crime increasingly influences the stability, effectiveness and reliability of foreign regimes and institutions. Considering reported criminal activities associated with the former Yugoslavia's or former Soviet Union's ethnonational conflicts, for example, would seem essential for evaluating the reliability of individual participants and their institutions. This is true as well for assessing the type and quality of military and law enforcement cooperation.

nal worlds of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union alone—notable for the ethnic character of some criminal groups—represent substantial costs for the states most immediately involved and for those other nations affected. As concern grows around the world about unprecedented population migrations, the criminal (as well as terrorist) content of some of these population shifts will emerge—justifiably or not—as more visible local and regional issues.

All of this changes the environment in which many kinds of "military operations other than war" may take place. In this regard, international organized crime will become increasingly visible as a factor in broadened "threat assessments" in specific states and regions to include the security and operations of US military bases abroad and the effectiveness and reliability of states in regional security roles, such as Andean Ridge countries, Eastern European states and states of the former Soviet Union. Regional and international organized crime increasingly influences the stability, effectiveness and reliability of foreign regimes and institutions. Considering reported criminal activities associated with the former Yugoslavia's or former Soviet Union's ethnonational conflicts, for example, would seem essential for evaluating the reliability of individual participants and their institutions. This is true as well for assessing the type and quality of military and law enforcement cooperation and interaction deemed desirable or most effective and levels of support and humanitarian assistance provided to states in many

areas of the world. Shifting developments in drug, arms and strategic material trafficking that affect the United States (and allies) directly should be considered more closely in broadened threat assessments as well.

To a great extent, planning and executing post-conflict activities may benefit from considering any organized crime dimensions involved. The aftermath of Operation *Just Cause* in Panama and a requirement to deal with developing narco-trafficking activities and the post-cease-fire training of Salvadoran armed forces elements are two earlier cases in point. US humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions in Somalia and potential US peace support roles in Bosnia are current and more pressing possibilities.

Organized crime considerations may require more attention in overall "campaign planning" for foreign security assistance programs involving military, law enforcement and other US government agencies in support of US policies abroad. International organized crime is clearly a potential factor in many decisions regarding the type and quantities of foreign aid that should be provided; the structure of the "Country Team" in US embassies, and other kinds of support provided in and out of the host country. For exam-

ple, US Southern Command's strategy explicitly focuses on eliminating threats to regional security; strengthening democratic institutions; supporting continued economic and social progress; curtailing drug cultivation and trafficking; guaranteeing US access to the region; strengthening bilateral relations; and other specific goals. All of these, as evident from the specific examples discussed earlier, are adversely affected by expanded organized criminal activities. Many specific illustrations of how organized crime potentially affects planning for the five operational categories of military operations other than war are evident, in which the illegal diversion of resources, criminal violence and other criminal undertakings undermine the effectiveness or intent of US programs. However analysts might argue the particulars of any specific issue or activity, US interests and those of our allies and friends seem increasingly affected by security concerns that are shaped substantially by organized crime. This seems at a minimum to require a more careful consideration of the impact of international organized crime on operations other than war assumptions, planning and execution in a threat environment that is still rapidly evolving. **MR**

NOTES

1 See US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), for an overview of operations other than war, and FM 100-20, *Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and the Air Force, 5 December 1990), for a detailed discussion of low-intensity conflict (LIC), the earlier designation of what is now called operations other than war.

2 Prominent among the specialists addressing these issues are Roy Godson and associates of the National Strategy Information Center who have conducted a number of seminars addressing these and related issues. Among the works that deal with these problems are National Strategy Information Center, "Dangerous Links: Terrorism, Crime, Ethnic and Religious Conflict After the Cold War," A Report on the Gray Area Phenomenon Research Seminar, Washington, D.C., July 1992; Xavier Rauter, "Gray Areas: A New Security Threat," *Political Warfare* (Spring 1992); Godson and William J. Olson, *International Organized Crime: Emerging Threat to US Security* (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1993); and J.F. Holden Rhodes and Peter A. Lupsha, "Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomenon and the New World Disorder," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* (Autumn 1993) 212-226.

3 These contingency operations include: disaster relief; shows of force; non-combatant evacuation operations; recovery; attacks and raids; freedom of navigation and protection of shipping; security assistance surges; peace enforcement; support to US civil authorities; surveillance and reconnaissance operations; maritime intercept operations; and quarantines.

4 As set out in *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], August 1991), as well as the far more general January 1993 iteration, and *National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), among other official pronouncements.

5 *National Security Strategy of the United States* (August 1991), 3-4. In regards to drug trafficking, the January 1993 *National Security Strategy of the United States* further indicates that "to choke off supply, our principal strategic goal is to identify, disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately destroy the trafficking organizations that produce or smuggle illicit drugs for the U.S. market." In addition, it defines in more detail the national security threats posed by foreign narcotics trafficking. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: GPO, January 1993), 19.

6 *National Security Strategy of the United States* (August 1991), and (January 1993), 3.

7 *Ibid.*, (August 1991), 3-4, and (January 1993), 3.

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8 See, for example, J.F.O. McAllister, "When to Go, When to Stay," *Time* (4 October 1993): 40-41.

9. In reviewing the growing drug problem in Albania, for example—to include narcotic plant production in the south of the country—an article in an Albanian newspaper pointed to the urgent need for countermeasures. Among the points highlighted were "the introduction of what are called 'dirty' foreign investments. It is now well known that drug traffickers are extremely rich and have reached the pinnacles of power. It is inevitable that they will attempt to bring investments of this kind to Albania, where they will find scope for profit in both senses. The inspection of sources of finance is vital in preventing the entry of drugs too." See Gani Leka, "Have Drugs Entered Albania?," *Republika* (26 December 1991), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-92-004-L*.

10. Michel Demelin, "ETA Money Laundered in Switzerland," *Le Figaro* (16-17 May 1992) as translated in *JPRS-TOT-92-022-L*, 42-43. Jimmy Burns, "Dealing in the Business of Fear," *Financial Times* (7 January 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TOT-92-003-L*, 39.

11. *The Statesman* (3 September 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-92-044-L*, 26.

12. Joseph R. Treaster, "From Somalia to U.S., Drug Called Khat Finds Foot-hold," *New York Times* (14 December 1992).

13. See Daya Wijesekera, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: The Asian Mafia," to be published in *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, Vol. 2, No. 2, and Colombo International Service, 1045 GMT (23 April 1991), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-91-018-L*.

14. Joseph Asoka DeSilva, "Sri Lanka's Approach to the Narcotic Problem," in Dennis Rowe, *International Drug Trafficking* (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 1988), 94-95. Wijesekera, "The Liberation Tigers"; and Colombo International Service, 23 April 1991.

15. Murat Yetkin report on PKK narcotics trafficking in *Turkish Daily News* (3 February 1993), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-93-007-L*, 23-24, and *Anatolia*, 1535 GMT (24 November 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TOT-92-042-L*, 24.

16. Ankara TNT Television Network, 1800 GMT (2 October 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-92-041-L*, 39. Gunaydin (12 April 1993), as translated in *JPRS-TOT-93-016-L*, 51. Yetkin, *Turkish Daily News* (3 February 1993). "PKK Is ASALAs Extension," *Hurriyet* (1 December 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TOT-92-044-L*, 33; and TRT Television Network, 1700 GMT (18 September 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TOT-92-033-L*, 36. *Anatolia*, 1625 GMT (11 March 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TOT-92-009-L*, 17, and *Anatolia*, 1535 GMT (24 November 1992).

17. USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, 6th Main Directorate, "Organized Crime Survey Response," 1991.

18. USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Organized Crime Survey Response," 1. *ITAR-TASS*, 1406 GMT (29 December 1992), as translated in *FBIS-SOV-92-251*. 23. *INTERFAX*, 1345 GMT (8 September 1992), as translated in *FBIS-SOV-92-175*, 25.

19. Interview with Viktor Grushko by Karl-Ludwig Guenschke, "KGB Deputy Chief: Soviet Mafia Active in Berlin," *Bild am Sonntag* (6 January 1991) as translated in *FBIS-SOV-91-004*, 28.

20. See, for example, Yekaterina Glebova and Akaky Mikadze, "Munitioneers," *Moscow News* (20-27 December 1992), and Baranovsky, "Terrorism," *Moscow News*.

21. "Whom are the Compradors Trying to Save," *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (27 March 1991), as cited in Joseph Seno, "Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union," Master of Arts Thesis, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, 1993.

22. It should be emphasized that linkages between ethnonational groups and organized crime—like issues of drug trafficking, illegal arms sales and international terrorism generally—often rest on assertions and evidence that need to be considered critically and skeptically. Accusations of ethnonational criminal activities are particularly difficult to assess since reporting often originates from governments or groups with agendas quite hostile to the accused parties.

23. Natalya Prikhodko, "General Lebed: szheg mostly," (General Lebed burns bridges), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (14 January 1993). For a detailed discussion of the Moldovan situation, see Neil V. Lamont, "Territorial Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: The Moldovan Case," Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, March 1993.

24. "Moldova: New Center of Drug Trade," a 14 July 1993 Novosti report by a Moldovan police captain translated in *SOVSET Computer Bulletin Board: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, *Daily Report* (16 July 1991).

25. Interview with Colombian government minister Humberto de la Calle Lombana, on Santa Fe de Bogota Emissoras Caracol, 1130 GMT (10 November 1992), as translated in *FBIS-LAT-92-219*, 31.

26. In the view of a British Petroleum security officer assigned to Colombia, the guerrillas are deeply involved in organized criminal activity but they still use the old ideological approaches and revolutionary idealism to recruit new members. Discussion between the author and BP representative, Miami, Florida, February 1993.

27. *Ibid.*, 27.

28. For an assessment of Colombian poppy and heroin production activity, see Arnaldo Claudio, "Heroin—the Colombian Cartels Diversity," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* (Summer 1992), 3-13.

29. "El gran negocio," 28-29. Today the most active and belligerent guerrillas occupy the petroleum zones of Arauca, Casanare, Huila and Barrancabermeja, the gold zones of western and northwestern Antioquia, the coal zones of Cesar, the coca zones of the Cauca, the Meta, the Sierra Nevada, the Putumayo, and the poppy-growing areas of the Huila, the Tolima, Nariño and Cauca. In addition, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) allegedly intends to take over the land abandoned by the demobilized popular National Liberation Army (ELN) in the Urabá banana area.

30. *Ibid.* See also Santa Fe de Bogota Invasión Television Cadena 1, 1630 GMT (7 September 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-92-038-L*, 18, for a dis-

cussion of the FARC's alleged drug-trafficking involvement in the eastern plains region of Colombia; and *El Tiempo* (16 November 1992) as translated in *JPRS-TDD-92-048-L*, 9, for a reported FARC and ELN role in protecting coca and poppy crops in 10 Colombian departments.

31. "El gran negocio," 30.

32. Santa Fe de Bogota Invasión Television Cadena, 1630 GMT (25 November 1992), as translated in *FBIS Chiva Chiva* message 260215Z November 1992.

33. "El gran negocio," 32.

34. Interview with the commander of the Colombian Armed Forces, General Ramon Emilio Gil Bermudez, *El Tiempo* (28 February 1993), as translated in *FBIS Chiva Chiva* messages 031752Z March 1993 and 031753Z March 1993. This kind of question may increasingly be applied to other insurgencies as well. Peru's Sendero Luminoso, for example, has long been alleged to earn money from its relationship with Peruvian coca growers and Colombian traffickers. Some analysts have postulated that drug profits may similarly undermine Sendero's revolutionary idealism. See Arnaldo Claudio and Stephan K. Stewman, "Peru Sendero Luminoso, and the Narcotraficking Alliance," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, (Winter 1992): 279-92.

35. For a useful chronology of events leading up to and during the "integration" of Yugoslavia, see Timothy L. Sanz, "The Yugoslav Conflict: A Chronology of Events," *Military Review* (December 1992): 21-24.

36. Uros Komdenovic, "A Second Front," *Nin* (13 September 1991), as translated in *JPRS-EEU-91-149*, 40.

37. *Ibid.*

38. For Western accounts of crime and profiteering, see Carol J. Williams, "A People Poisoned by Chaos," *Los Angeles Times* (27 March 1993); Blaine Harden, "Serb Smugglers Turn Sanctions Into a Boom," *Washington Post* (5 November 1992); and "Young Gangs Rule Belgrade Streets," *Christian Science Monitor* (6 November 1992). Amid the fighting in Yugoslavia, a Belgrade newspaper ran the bizarre story of a smuggling network trying to bring uranium into Yugoslav conflict zones, and speculated about linkages to Soviet nuclear warheads rumored to have disappeared. See Miroslav Lazanski, "Atomic Bombs Travel to Balkans," *Politika* (3 November 1992), as translated in *FBIS Vienna* message 091719Z November 1992.

39. Cerovic, "The Serbian Awakening," 41.

40. The Albanian "terrorist" organization, the "Front of Resistance and National Liberation of Albanians," reported to number several hundred members. It is said to be operating in Kosovo and Metohija. The organization's goal is to achieve a union between Kosovo, Metohija and Albania, according to Serbian security representatives. See *Tanjug*, 1128 GMT, 27 December 1991, as translated in *JPRS-TOT-92-001-L*, 2.

41. Miroslav Antic, "A Racket Under the Cloak of Politics," *Borba* (9 March 1993), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-93-012-L*, 36-38.

42. Radio Warszawa Network, 0300 GMT, 20 May 1991; *JPRS-TDD-91-022-L*, and Z. Zejneli, "Ten Kilograms of Heroin Found," *Politika* (20 May 1991), as translated in *FBIS Vienna*, 101618Z June 1991.

43. Gianni Perelli and Sandra Cecchi, "Christ Stopped at Tirana," *L'Espresso* (22 December 1991), as translated in *FBIS-EEU-92-006*, 3-5.

44. *Ibid.*, 5, and "Albania—A Transit for Drugs," 24 Ore (November 1992), as translated in *FBIS Vienna*, 102156Z December 1992.

45. Branko Vojcic, "Montenegro: Black Marketeering, and the State Leader ship itself," Montenegro on Mafia Payroll," *Novi Vjesnik* (Zagreb) (25 October 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-92-047-L*, 34.

46. *Ibid.*

47. In a typical report, on 25 June 1991—the date Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence—Yugoslav customs officials seized 10 automatic rifles, 3,000 rounds of ammunition, and 25 bulletproof vests in a truck hauling cargo for a Croatian company from the Netherlands. The weapons were bound for the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina. See *Tanjug* (Belgrade), 1355 GMT (25 June 1991), as translated in *FBIS London* 251602Z June 1991. In addition, a report in a November 1991 issue of *La Pressen* Belgrade media charged that Croatian "drugs for arms" deals were widespread, with the assistance of the Croatian Diaspora to their blood relations" facilitating the trafficking. See *Tanjug*, 1632 GMT (16 November 1991), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-91-049-L*.

48. Arms are said to be shipped principally from Argentina and Brazil and are, in part, concealed in humanitarian assistance shipments. The association of Croatian neo-Nazis and the former regime of General Augusto Pinochet was also said to result in the delivery of 11 tons of arms to Budapest, with an ultimate destination of Zagreb. Western media have also taken note of the Chilean arms shipment, as well as a shipment of South African arms purchased by a Croatian-Canadian businessman and shipped on a chartered Ugandan Airlines plane *Tanjug*, 1018 GMT (28 July 1992), as translated in *FBIS London*, 281517Z 1992 and Coll. "In the Balkans, A Balance of Terror."

49. Kresimir Meier and Mijana Glusac, "Balkan Heroin Trafficking," *Delo* (9 December 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-93-001-L*, 20-22.

50. *Ibid.*, 22.

51. "Slovenia Has Its Own Mafia," *Delo* (17 October 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-92-046-L*, 49.

52. *Ibid.*

53. "Slovene Citizens Smuggled Machine Guns," *Delo* (11 December 1992), as translated in *JPRS-TDD-93-001-L*, 22.

54. In what appeared to be a documented case of military assistance based on religious solidarity, an Iranian Boeing 747 carrying 4,000 small arms and thousands of rounds of ammunition (together with 20-40 Iranians) was detained by Croatian authorities at Zagreb in early September 1992. The shipment was to be sent over land to Muslim military units fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Iranian Arms Seized En Route to Bosnia," *New York Times News Service* (10 September 1992).

55. Interview with Sefir Halilovic by Miljenko Jergovic, "Wars Here Last Three Four Years," *Nedjeljna Dalmacija* (3 February 1993), as translated in *FBIS-EEU-93-031*, 52.

The Haiti Contingency

Colonel William W. Mendel, US Army, Retired

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I saw a familiar figure, gray-haired, straight-backed, riding a bicycle down Route Nationale. It was my friend the Senatorial Candidate. He dismounted. "Well, what do you think of our little election?" he asked. "Have the ballots arrived?" I said yes. "We'll see how long they last," he said. "They're only made of paper." Then he paraphrased a famous proverb. . . . "Bilten se papye, bayonet se fe," he said. The ballot is made of paper, but the bayonet is made of iron.¹

Why is little Haiti important to the United States? The size of Maryland, and with less than seven million people, Haiti is a nation of abject poverty suffering a negative growth rate in gross domestic product.² Its national history, replete with tyrants and dictators, and its voodoo culture influenced by the slavery experience of the 18th century, have contributed to Haiti's impoverishment and a succession of incompetent and dishonest governments.³

Although the island of Hispaniola (shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic) is close to the US mainland, and closer still to Cuba, the strategic location of Hispaniola no longer seems important in a post-Soviet era that is witnessing the decay of Fidel Castro's socialist experiment.

Yet, one million Haitians residing in the United States represent reason enough to elevate Haiti's troubled situation to national prominence.⁴ The cultural ties of a large, black minority in the United States to friends and relatives in Haiti have brought attention to Haiti, just as our traditional trans-Atlantic linkages with Europe have

often placed European issues in the national spotlight.⁵ Also, in Haiti there are approximately 8,000 US citizens, plus related Haitians.⁶

US National Interests in Haiti

National security adviser Anthony Lake has said that US foreign policy under President Bill Clinton's administration will be guided by the concepts of strengthening democracies, fostering new democracies, promoting free market economies and fostering humanitarian agendas. Haiti's situation falls squarely within the last three areas.

A further perspective is added by Donna Hrinak, deputy assistant secretary of state for Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, who advises that our interests in Haiti stem from a sense of "humanitarian obligation," concern for the potential refugee deluge and the transiting of illicit drugs through Haiti to the United States. She explained to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that US concerns in Haiti lay at two levels; first, humanitarian obligation, then the "direct, material impact on other areas of interest to us."⁷

The Haitian "boat people" vividly illustrate the potential for material impact on the United States. The large community of Haitians in the United States is a magnet that draws other Haitians who have remained behind suffering economic hardship and political turmoil.

The impact of thousands of Haitians in south Florida—still recovering from the devastation of Hurricane Andrew 18 months after it struck—could overwhelm state and county services.⁸ By implication, Hrinak's concerns for the "material impact" suggests it is in US interests to help

make Haiti a tolerable environment—and encourage Haitians to stay in Haiti.

Haiti's use as a drug transshipment country constitutes another dimension of the drug threat to the United States. In 1992, one metric ton of cocaine was seized by Haitian authorities, suggesting a cocaine throughput from Colombia to the United States that is well above three tons annually.⁹ Using Dominican passports, an estimated 2,500 Colombians have infiltrated Haiti to organize the drug trade. In addition, the added corruption that drugs have brought to Haiti's predominant power—the Haitian military—compound the problems of professionalizing the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'H) and implementing effective nation assistance programs in the country.¹⁰

The situation in Haiti and US interests there suggest strategic objectives which might be the basis for military operations requiring military resources. US military forces could be tasked to assist in several areas:

- Supporting new democratic government.
- Encouraging respect for human rights.
- Developing the economy and infrastructure.
- Professionalizing government institutions.
- Supporting law enforcement efforts to counter drug trafficking.

In the years ahead, US forces may well find themselves in Haiti as part of the UN Haiti Assistance Group, now beginning its mission to assist the government of Haiti. Then, too, US civilian and military planners must consider a range of US unilateral actions, seemingly unlikely for the moment. To assist with an appreciation of Haiti, what follows is a description of Haiti today and a linkage of Haiti's situation to potential US military contingencies.

Haiti Today

"Everything has fallen apart!"¹¹ The unsettled political situation since Jean-Claude Duvalier fled Haiti in 1986 and the sinking economic vitality, exacerbated by the US embargo since fall 1991, have left Haiti in disarray.

In Port-au-Prince and other built-up areas, electricity is produced only 10 hours a day, and nonpotable water is available about one hour a

About 10 percent of Haiti's population suffer from tuberculosis. Syphilis, gonorrhea, viral hepatitis, typhoid fever, malaria and acute diarrheal disease are endemic in the population. There is no viable medical infrastructure to provide care on a nationwide basis, although private, internationally funded hospitals . . . provide help to local people. Health care through the four-tier system (State University Hospital, regional hospital, commune health center and dispensary) is ineffective.

day. Garbage is collected intermittently and transportation is difficult. Though seemingly chaotic to people experienced with modern mass transit, the brightly colored jitneys and tap-taps work well enough to service Haiti's limited infrastructure. Roads throughout the nation are in disrepair to the extent that vehicles cannot negotiate the potholes without suffering damage to tires and suspension—and the embargo ensured that repair parts are out of reach.

While there are no apparent cases of starvation, there is malnutrition, and deaths among the very young can be traced to sanitation, diet, a lack of available medical care and pharmaceutical products.¹²

A Sick Nation

Haiti is a nation of sick people. About 10 percent of Haiti's population (over half a million people) suffer from tuberculosis.¹³ Syphilis, gonorrhea, viral hepatitis, typhoid fever, malaria and acute diarrheal disease are endemic in the population. There is no viable medical infrastructure to provide care on a nationwide basis, although private, internationally funded hospitals such as l'Hopital Albert Schweitzer at Deschappelles (in the Artibonite valley, 38 air miles north of Port-au-Prince) provide help to local people. Health care through the four-tier system (State University Hospital, regional hospital, commune health center and dispensary) is ineffective.

The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has become a serious problem in Haiti.

The killing that attended Jean-Claude Duvalier's fall in 1986, then Jean-Bertrand Aristide's accession to power, the period after his popular election in December 1990 and again as he returned to power in fall 1993, reflects the intensity by which politics are practiced in the island nation. That politics determine the distribution of scarce resources is nowhere more evident than in Haiti, where there is little of anything to go around and little to be shared.

though it is estimated that perhaps only 20 percent of the AIDS cases are reported, and AIDS statistics are imprecise. According to the Caribbean Epidemiology Centre (CAREC), the number of AIDS cases in Haiti was set at 12,000 in 1989, with 40 percent of the cases afflicting women.¹⁴ At the start of 1993, in Guantánamo Naval Base, Cuba, where Haitian "boat people" were held pending resolution of their immigration status, most of the remaining adult Haitians were HIV positive; of the last 179 remaining migrants, 153 were HIV positive.¹⁵ Within Haiti today, about 9 percent of the people are now infected with the virus.¹⁶ Haiti could have well over half a million people who are now HIV positive.

Abject Poverty

"Misery in another country is prosperity in Haiti," counseled a father to a young man ready to depart on a boat to Miami.¹⁷ In Haiti, wealth is concentrated in only 4.5 percent of the population.¹⁸ About 90 percent of the population survive on about \$100 a year.¹⁹ Unemployment runs above 50 percent.

Unable to afford building materials and fuel for cooking, the poor have cut down trees to build huts or to make charcoal to sell. But straddling the hurricane belt, Haiti is subject to severe storms, and the resulting deforestation (nearly total) has caused extensive erosion. This has hurt agriculture and the fishing industry. Following heavy rains, the waters around the island become

muddied, killing the fish as the countryside is washed into the sea.

Many people who have not been able to earn a living in the countryside have fled to the capital city of Port-au-Prince, crowding into and expanding the slum areas, thus increasing their vulnerability to a myriad of diseases. Life expectancy in Haiti is 52 years.

About 95 percent of the population is black, while the remaining 5 percent are mainly mulattos or Caucasian. This small group of light-skinned people controls approximately 95 percent of the country's wealth.²⁰

The Politics of Haiti

Haitian politics are rough. The killing that attended Jean-Claude Duvalier's fall in 1986, then Jean-Bertrand Aristide's accession to power, the period after his popular election in December 1990 and again as he returned to power in fall 1993, reflects the intensity by which politics are practiced in the island nation. That politics determine the distribution of scarce resources is nowhere more evident than in Haiti, where there is little of anything to go around and little to be shared. The competition between the Haitian armed forces and Aristide's *Lavalas* (avalanche) movement, between blacks and mulattos, wealthy business people and the dirt-poor, and even the Haitian and his failing environment characterize a Haitian style of zero-sum politics—and nearly everyone is the loser.

Elections have not been held routinely, and political parties are not well organized. The parties typically provide a focal point for galvanizing support around a charismatic personage.²¹ Real power has often centered on the country's leader and a small elite, who have used a system of counterbalances to prevent a coup.

Such a coup in 1986 forced Duvalier out of Haiti, and with international pressure, a National Council of Government (CNG) was formed. With the CNG came a period of fraudulent elections, repressive dictatorships and paper presidencies, which brought little help to the conditions spawned during Duvalier's regime. Power continued to reside with the wealthy few and the



Haitians at a house-raising.

Unable to afford building materials and fuel for cooking, the poor have cut down trees to build huts or to make charcoal to sell. But straddling the hurricane belt, Haiti is subject to severe storms, and the resulting deforestation (nearly total) has caused extensive erosion. This has hurt agriculture and the fishing industry. Following heavy rains, the waters around the island become muddied, killing the fish as the countryside is washed into the sea.

military. The *tonton makouts*, the 22,000-strong militia that directed the repression under Duvalier, began to fade from power. Finally in March 1990, Court of Cassation (Supreme Court) Judge Ertha Pascal-Trouillot became provisional president to oversee presidential elections.

The first true democratic election in Haiti's history was held on 16 December 1990, with the help of 1,500 observers from the Organization of American States (OAS). Aristide of the National Front for Change and Democracy party, was elected to the presidency. His campaign theme of working together to assure open government and human rights captured the people's support.

After a failed coup in January, Aristide was sworn in as president of Haiti on 7 February 1991. Within seven months, on 30 September, the military deposed Aristide. The coup appears on the surface as a clash between Aristide and the armed forces' leadership. Each side has accused the other of seeking dictatorial powers, crushing

democracy in Haiti and using violence to further its goals.

Brigadier General Raoul Cedras, who took control of the enlisted rebellion against Aristide, said that the president was an apprentice dictator who was forming his own security service similar to that of the *tonton makouts* of the Duvalier period.²² This force of 56 members, trained by an American, two Frenchmen and two Swiss, was said to be the core of an unlawful paramilitary force. Certainly, the military establishment feared for its own security as Aristide began to make changes in the leadership of the FAd'H and as he began movement to create a separate police force.

After the coup, the United States, with UN support, put in place an economic embargo to force the return of Aristide. Among the United States, the European Community, France, Japan and Canada, aid programs and packages totaling approximately \$400 million were suspended.²³

Regardless of Haiti's continuing political turmoil and the limited capabilities of the FAd'H, elements of the US military will have an important role to play in helping the Haitian people. This is especially true of our RCs that are composed of people and units of unique and essential skills that can be used in Haiti.

Finally, on 3 July 1993, with the help of a UN negotiating team and the support of France, the United States, Canada and Venezuela, an agreement was signed by Aristide and Cedras. Under this plan, Aristide would nominate a new prime minister (Robert Malval), who would then be accepted by the Haitian parliament. After the Haitian parliament approved an amnesty law for the military involved in the coup against Aristide, Cedras, Police Chief Michel Francois and other military leaders would resign. Aristide would then appoint new military leadership. The police force would be reorganized as a civilian agency not under the command of the armed forces. Finally, Aristide would return to Haiti on 30 October 1993.

Resolution of Haiti's devastating problems depends upon how well Haitians are able to get beyond the reestablishment of democratic government and proceed with the business of social and economic recovery.

The FAd'H

The military traditionally has been a critical factor for maintaining power within Haiti. The FAd'H and security forces of about 8,100 active duty personnel (900 officers and senior noncommissioned officers and 7,200 enlisted) include some 6,200 in the army, a small navy and air corps of around 300 people each, plus 1,300 civil police in Port-au-Prince, and a handful of other security specialists in firefighting, customs and immigration positions.

Notable units include the Headquarters Defense Force (formerly Presidential Guard) of five infantry companies, and an independent heavy weapons company (mortars, armored vehicles,


artillery), all located in and around Port-au-Prince. The metropolitan police have 10 companies (and other units such as anti-gang) located in the capital, responsible for routine police activities such as maintaining order and traffic control, as well as countering drug smuggling.

The FAd'H is organized into nine military departments and the metropolitan (Port-au-Prince) region to reflect the geographic regions of the country. Command of the FAd'H is centralized in the General Staff Headquarters and in the nine department headquarters. Each department is divided into districts that correspond to company areas of responsibility. Because the FAd'H has administered the nation at the departmental and the rural communal section levels, the military has traditionally enjoyed great influence over the daily activities of the Haitian people.

The Haitian army has depended on foreign arms imports. The result is an arsenal of old and ineffective equipment from many countries, such as five V-150 light armored vehicles (the most mobile and effective system in the FAd'H), plus assorted small arms and mortars (for example, two 90mm guns and three 20mm machine-guns).²⁴ The air corps has but two dozen varied fixed-wing aircraft and about eight helicopters (usually inoperative), representing no serious threat in the Caribbean. However, these limited systems give the armed forces sufficient clout to maintain internal security, their traditional role. In the Haitian experience, the military has been designed to maintain complete power in a single person, and it remains adequate for the task.

There continue to be credible reports that involve members of the military (and police) in narcotrafficking. Haiti's poor communications and transportation infrastructure, plus the ineffectiveness of the military, police and judicial systems, have created conditions wherein transshipment of illicit drugs is difficult to control. Reports show that there have been some increases in air and surface drug shipments to Haiti in the past few years. Equally disturbing is the report of the "increased use of crack cocaine by military personnel."²⁵ This suggests that some

Civil police in Port-au-Prince. The FAd'H and security forces include about 8,100 active duty personnel plus 1,300 civil police in the capital that are organized into ten companies and other units.



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military personnel are being paid in kind by Colombian narcotraffickers for facilitating drug transshipments to the United States and elsewhere.

The US Military Connection

Regardless of Haiti's continuing political turmoil and the limited capabilities of the FAd'H, elements of the US military will have an important role to play in helping the Haitian people. This is especially true of our Reserve Components (RC's) that are composed of people and units of unique and essential skills that can be used in Haiti. The advent of the UN Haiti Assistance Group (HAG) of some 1,270 people gives US personnel and units an opportunity to make significant contributions to a combined nation assistance effort. Initial US participation in the HAG started October 1993 with about 600 engineers, linguists, medical specialists, trainers and civil affairs personnel. However the tumultuous political situation in Haiti has put this on hold.

Whatever the near- or long-term success of the HAG, prudent US military planners must consider a range of military requirements that might apply to the situation in Haiti. These might include noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), peacekeeping or peace enforcement, as well as civil-military operations for assisting Haiti.

Noncombatant Evacuation

The objective of NEO is to move US civilians and third country nationals from locations in Haiti, where their lives could be threatened, to safe areas such as the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico or Florida. Ideally, NEO is conducted in a permissive environment. A hostile situation calling for the evacuation of US citizens would involve a "swift insertion of a force and temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned rapid withdrawal."²⁶ Given the unstable political situation, condition of the population and the difficult terrain, this contingency

The employment of psychological operations and helicopter units would be central to successful NEO in Haiti. Military units will need psychological operations to assuage Haitian concerns about evacuation operations and should begin before NEO operations become apparent. This will place a premium on finding Creole-speaking soldiers and civilians and print plant and telecommunications operations to support psychological operations objectives.

force should be a minimum of a reinforced brigade task force or a Marine expeditionary unit or brigade.

The difficult terrain and weather (hurricanes and monsoons), dilapidated transportation and communications networks and the mood of the Haitian people will be some of the key factors affecting any NEO mission in Haiti.

The employment of psychological operations and helicopter units would be central to successful NEO in Haiti. Military units will need psychological operations to assuage Haitian concerns about evacuation operations and should begin before NEO operations become apparent. This will place a premium on finding Creole-speaking soldiers and civilians and print plant and telecommunications operations to support psychological operations objectives.

Helicopters will be necessary to move evacuees, especially in the countryside, where badly deteriorated roads are typically blocked at checkpoints by dispersed squad-size army forces (or thugs and bandits). Because these checkpoints operate at the end of a lengthy and ineffective chain of command, the behavior of such detachments is difficult to predict. In any event, the Republic of Haiti has 28,000 square kilometers of mostly mountainous terrain lacking a usable road network, so helicopters will be essential. In Port-au-Prince, the densely packed and volatile population suggests that an early decision by the US Embassy to activate NEO plans, before Americans are threatened directly by violence, will be critical for success.

Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not solutions to Haiti's problems, but they could become necessary precursors to humanitarian and civic assistance. Peacekeeping operations, conducted with the consent of the belligerents to facilitate resolution of Haitian political and social conflict, could serve to set the conditions for national renewal. The 200-odd multinational observers, initially positioned in Haiti under the aegis of the UN and OAS to encourage respect for human rights, have represented a type of small peacekeeping initiative that seems acceptable to the Haitians.

Should political turmoil become overwhelming, a larger military peacekeeping organization might be called upon to separate conflicting parties, maintain law and order, and set the conditions for a lasting peace. US Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, suggests a peacekeeping command (under a political council) and subordinate military area commands.²⁷ The peacekeeping force would have a multinational complexion and be tailored to the specific needs in Haiti.

A more forceful approach, peace enforcement is a military operation in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not consent to intervention, and who may be engaged in combat activities.²⁸

The peace enforcement mission suggests a situation so unhinged that only an outside force can bring about order. The likelihood of massive disorder, indeed anarchy, is difficult to assess, but the scope of such an operation would require large and capable forces to ensure success. Regional military forces are possible participants.

The French have maintained a small Combined Antilles Command in the Caribbean, with headquarters at Cayenne, French Guiana. About 8,000 personnel in two French Marine detachments and a Foreign Legion regiment are supported by four ships, helicopters and a small air troop transport unit.

The British maintain a frigate or destroyer in

the area with an attendant oiler (known as the West Indies Guard Ship) committed to the security of the West Indies Associated States. A 1,500-man tactical combined arms force designed around an infantry battalion will be kept in Belize until it phases back to the United Kingdom throughout 1994.

In the Netherlands Antilles, the Dutch maintain a flag-rank officer as head of their Netherlands Forces Caribbean of 1,200 men. They have a frigate, an amphibious detachment of over a battalion of Dutch Marines and maritime patrol aircraft.

In addition, Canadian interests in the region must be considered, and Canadian forces represent a potential contribution to any military initiative in the Caribbean.

Yet, it is likely that a major peace enforcement operation will require the US military to step up to its leadership role and become the primary contributor. Such a mission could entail significant military resources.

Sustaining a peacekeeping or peace enforcement unit requires three times the force structure of the deployed force: a replacement force must be in preparation, and a recovering force will require extensive combat training upon return to home base. Another major concern in planning will be the interoperability of the multinational forces involved, especially their communications and doctrinal procedures.²⁹

The great danger for US military forces involved in peace enforcement would "seem to lie in people using a foreign intervention as a cover for seeking retribution against the FAd'H, the police, and their *attaches* (strongarm extortionists)."³⁰ Additionally, the incursion of any large military force is likely to drive the Haitian military underground to bleed the invading force until it withdraws. Revenge is the prescription for the Haitian malady *cœur sauté*, a heart terrorized by brutal repression.³¹

Assisting Haiti: Civil Military Operations

Civil-military operations are the most likely use of US forces in Haiti. These operations

Peacekeeping operations, conducted with the consent of the belligerents to facilitate resolution of Haitian political and social conflict, could serve to set the conditions for national renewal. The 200-odd multinational observers, initially positioned in Haiti under the aegis of the UN and OAS to encourage respect for human rights, have represented a type of small peacekeeping initiative that seems acceptable to the Haitians.

include: military civic action (assisting Haitian authorities to help their people); civil assistance (teaching and helping to administer government functions and policy); humanitarian assistance (assisting with disaster relief or refugees and emigrants); and psychological operations (informing the people in support of goals).

Although presented in US joint doctrine as capabilities that can help counter insurgencies, some of these activities can be applied to assist in Haiti. The goal should be to assist in developing the capability of the nation to provide effective government administration and services so that democracy, the economy and the health of the people might flourish. Such ingredients of social stability could establish Haiti as a secure environment where its citizens can live in relative comfort and contribute toward the legitimacy of a newly democratic government.

Clearly, the US military is not the lead player in such an interagency activity. But just as important as the US aid programs, private humanitarian organizations and international support programs are the human and physical resources that the US military can bring to the table in support of US government and international initiatives in Haiti.

Haiti has a national disaster on its hands now. The basic assumption for US military involvement in Haiti should be its presence to help in a developmental role. The opportunities are plentiful.

Poor farming practices and widespread tree cutting have reduced the soil through erosion and exhaustion to unproductiveness. Like a dirty ring around the bathtub, the rainy season carries to sea

Military planners can quickly incorporate the skills of individual US service personnel and the capabilities of selected small units into the UN assistance effort. But should the US and Haitian governments agree to a large-scope bilateral development effort, then US military forces will need to be task organized for the effort. . . . Whatever the scale of US military assistance in Haiti, military personnel and units will participate as integral parts of an interagency, even international, task organization. Individuals and institutions critical of such military participation are already late in recognizing that this type of military support is not guns and grenades.

an arc of muddy water around Haiti. This loss of topsoil contributes to Haiti's import dependence to properly feed itself.³² Also, with Haitian medicine centered in Port-au-Prince, a program to get care into the countryside is essential. Medical readiness exercises at the small town and village level are needed to provide care and to train Haitians in care giving. A program that does not threaten the traditional role of voodoo *houngan* and *manbo* (men and women voodoo specialists), who diagnose illnesses and identify herbs, could be critical to success in the countryside. Co-opting the traditional culture into the application of modern resources may be one concept that ensures the advances made by such assistance are retained for the long run.

Such an approach could also assist with the rebuilding of the national infrastructure. Nation assistance units can provide expertise and materials to assist Haitian laborers rebuild and develop schools, water and sewage systems, roads and bridges. Haitians need jobs and a stake in their own recovery.

Getting Organized

Military planners can quickly incorporate the skills of individual US service personnel and the capabilities of selected small units into the UN assistance effort. But should the US and Haitian

governments agree to a large-scope bilateral development effort, then US military forces will need to be task organized for the effort.

To support such projects, a small Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force (FIDAF) could be of assistance to the Ambassador's Country Team for nation assistance.³³ By minimizing the combat and combat support elements and placing emphasis on service support (especially engineers and medical corps units), a modified FIDAF could be helpful in Haiti. There are also other possible configurations to facilitate nation assistance. For assistance on a grand scale, our recent experience in Kuwait is a start point for task organization.

Task Force *Freedom* was America's organization to assist Kuwait's restoration. Elements under Brigadier General Robert S. Frix, deputy commander of US Army Forces Central Command, were a combined civil affairs task force that planned and coordinated the restoration effort with Kuwait; a support command task force to provide necessary services and logistical support; an aviation brigade and psychological operations battalion; and other essential units.³⁴ Critical to the success of the mission was the expertise of the Disaster Assistance Recovery Team, which was provided by the US Aid Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance to the operational control of the task force.

Whatever the scale of US military assistance in Haiti, military personnel and units will participate as integral parts of an interagency, even international, task organization. Individuals and institutions critical of such military participation are already late in recognizing that this type of military support is not guns and grenades—it is represented by unique skills and equipment, discipline and organizational capability to get tough jobs done in environments other than war.

The Haiti Contingency

While military planners are obliged to consider a range of military contingencies that could apply in Haiti, the most likely use of military forces there will be to support nation assistance efforts of the US government or the UN.

Certainly, addressing the political and economic situation in Haiti lies in the domain of the US Department of State and other US and international agencies. Yet, the dramatic history of Haiti, its more recent political-military events, its devastated economy and the unhealthful conditions in which Haitians must exist, all portend action to assist. If the international community and the United States should swing into action with meaningful and long-term projects, then US military support will be an important factor contributing to success. **MR**

Sustaining a peacekeeping or peace enforcement unit requires three times the force structure of the deployed force: a replacement force must be in preparation, and a recovering force will require extensive combat training upon return to home base. Another major concern in planning will be the interoperability of the multinational forces involved, especially their communications and doctrinal procedures.

NOTES

1. Amy Wilentz, *The Rainy Season: Haiti Since Duvalier* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 310.
2. "Haiti," *The World Factbook 1991-92* (Washington, DC: US Central Intelligence Agency, 1991), 133. "About 85 percent of the population live in abject poverty. Agriculture is mainly small-scale subsistence farming and employs two-thirds of the work force. The majority of the population does not have ready access to safe drinking water, adequate medical care, or sufficient food. Few social assistance programs exist, and the lack of employment opportunities remains one of the most critical problems facing the economy, along with soil erosion and political instability."
3. See Lawrence E. Harrison, "Voodoo Politics," *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 1993), for a discussion of the impact of the Haitian culture in framing its current condition.
4. Donna Hrnak, deputy assistant secretary of state for Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, "Restoring Democracy in Haiti: Persistence and Patience," US Department of State Dispatch (24 February 1992), 134. The figure one million was a State Department estimate in a paper presented to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington, 9 February 1992.
5. Witness the Reverend Jesse Jackson's efforts to dramatize the plight of Haitians and his personal hunger strike in behalf of HIV-infected Haitians begun on Valentine's Day, 1993, as reported by Ron Fournier, "Jackson Hungers for End to Ban," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* (16 February 1993), A6.
6. COL Steven Butler, US Army Retired, formerly chief, Political Military Division, US Forces Caribbean, interview at Tonganoxie, Kansas, 2 March 1993. Butler suggests that as many as 14,000 US citizens may be in Haiti, although since the trouble in Haiti over the past two years that figure has declined to about 8,000, to which might be added several more thousand persons who could be eligible for a US-sponsored noncombatant evacuation. In another interview with Louis P. Kernisan, Haitian businessman and former US Army officer, the number of US citizens in Haiti was estimated at about 11,000.
7. Hrnak.
8. Encouraged by the election of President Bill Clinton and a belief that he would be receptive to their cause, thousands of Haitians prepared boats during the winter of 1992-1993 for the 600-mile voyage to the United States sometime after the inauguration. It was predicted that as many as 500,000 people would attempt the trip. For a rough comparison, 125,000 Cubans made the Mariel boat lift in a period of 158 days during the summer of 1980, but the circumstances then were different: both governments cooperated in the boatlift and the boats used were seaworthy, although small. See Alex Lantieri, *The 1980 Cuban Boatlift* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1988), for lessons learned.
9. The US Department of State estimated that one metric ton of cocaine was seized by Haitian authorities in 1992. If the National Narcotics Bureau and other Haitian authorities were as efficient as US drug law enforcement agencies, then the one metric ton would represent about 35 percent of the cocaine entering Haiti. With Haitian law organizations being subject to corruption and lacking equipment and commitment, it is likely that something greater than three tons move through Haiti annually. This is a small but contributing part of the 320 or more metric tons that enter the United States each year, mostly through Mexico. See the "Haiti" section, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (Washington, DC: March 1992), 205-208.
10. Hrnak.
11. Remark by a senior official at the US Embassy, Haiti, via telephone, 5 March 1993.
12. Ibid. The official suggests that there is much the US military can do in Haiti in a civic action role.
13. Barry Pans, "Song of Haiti," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* (7 March 1993), 10.
14. "CAREC Surveillance Report," Caribbean Epidemiology Centre (CAREC), Port of Spain, Trinidad (May 1991), 7.
15. Stephen D. Brown, 1st Psychological Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in letter to author, 14 May 1993, suggests these figures as of 5 May 1993.
16. Interview with senior USAID public health officer, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 1 December 1993. By contrast, the amount of HIV infected people in the Dominican Republic is less than 1 percent.
17. Edward Barnes, "Exodus from Haiti," *Life* (April 1992), 52.
18. Linda Robinson, "When Pressure Fails," *US News & World Report* (29 June 1992), 49-51.
19. Hilary Mackenzie, "A Cycle of Despair," *Macleans* (21 October 1991), 76-77.
20. Robinson, 49.
21. Richard A. Haggerty, ed., Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Pamphlet 550-36, *Dominican Republic and Haiti, Country Studies* (Area Handbook Series) (Washington, DC: HQDA, December 1989), 342.
22. "Haiti: Tonton Again," *The Economist* (5 October 1991), 44.
23. Bruce W. Nelson, "Haiti: One Coup Too Many," *Time* (14 October 1991), 34-35.
24. USNI Military Database, and US Embassy, Port-au-Prince, 17 May 1993.
25. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, US Department of State (March 1992), 205.
26. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20 Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Air Force, 5 December 1990), 5-4.
27. FM 100-20 AFP 3-20, 4-2.
28. Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Fellows Briefing, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 6 January 1993, slide 15A.
29. Ibid., slide 27A. The fellows suggest likely tasks of the peacekeeping force: surveillance, observation, reporting, information gathering and analysis, negotiation, investigation, patrolling, traffic control, monitoring transportation of goods, local security, search and seizure of contraband, medical care, supervision of internees and prisoners of war, humanitarian aid, evacuation and relocation of refugees, engineer construction, mine clearing, ordnance disposal, route maintenance, and force security.
30. Brown, letter to author.
31. Howard W. French, "Haitian Townspeople Tell of New Fear of Violence," *The New York Times International* (3 March 1993), 3.
32. Butler interview.
33. FM 100-20 AFP 3-20, A-8.
34. John T. Fisher, *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 31 August 1992), 38.

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The Cuba Contingency

Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey B. Demarest, US Army

WHATEVER Cuban fears exist regarding a US military effort against them, or whatever use is made of such fear by the communist government, it is very unlikely that the US military will in any way contribute to the removal of the dictator or his regime. When Fidel Castro ceases to hold power, it will be due to his own political frailty and by the will of Cubans in Cuba, or it will be due to old age. That said, a loss of effective control by the Castro regime could precipitate a state of chaos in Cuba. That chaos could, in turn, inspire a US government decision to provide stability and assistance for a transition to democracy. Army activities would be completed in conjunction with, or in support of, other agencies, other services and probably with foreign partners, perhaps led by or under the auspices of the UN or the Organization of American States (OAS). While there are no predicted Army-only missions, the Army's capability to rapidly deploy required assets might gain it a central role.¹

In this article, there is no speculation on when a Cuban political collapse might occur and no particular future scenario is advocated as being the most likely. Instead, this article reflects major recent and ongoing analyses (including contract research products and independent commentaries) to anticipate the entire range and character of potential Army responsibilities.² A list of those activities is offered in figure 1 along with an interpretation of the environment that could generate the included items. A few initial hypotheses are entertained—that the Army probably needs to accelerate its review of officer

training emphasis for operations other than war, that it should continue to consider more creative force structure possibilities and that it probably should stimulate hemispheric interest in coalition civil-military training and cooperation.

The makeup and virulence of post-collapse disorder and, therefore, the form and degree of possible Army involvement depend on the character of the scenario of the last days of the Castro regime. According to the expectations of published Cuba-watchers, that history can unfold in any of a hundred ways. While this article postulates no favorite scenario, a few are provided below as typical examples of what would be likely to generate Army tasks.

Scenario #1

Fidel and Raul Castro are shot by dissident army officers. The size of the assassination group does not have sufficient reach to gain control of the regime apparatus, and the group instantly becomes fugitive. However, other centers of ambition and frustration seize the opportunity to challenge the remnant regime by force. Powerful first- and second-tier leaders flinch and run (or intend to run) upon hearing news of the dictator's death, leaving third-tier apparatchiks with a more difficult dilemma. Do they grasp at the opportunity to fill their bosses' positions (provided they can reconcile with an ascending leadership), or do they attempt an escape that is not as well supported as those of their former bosses? In either case, they face competition from their peers and a window of exposure to violent retribution during a period of lawless-

ness. These conditions hold true, but on an even more lethal plane, within the Cuban military.

Scenario #2

Castro dies of natural causes under questionable circumstances. His brother Raul is still in control of the apparatus. An enormous funeral and wake is observed throughout the nation, but within days after the wake, Cubans begin to demonstrate openly against the post-Fidel regime. Raul accelerates liberalizing policies and carefully consolidates preferential property rights for the Cuban Communist Party, including ownership of information systems and key foreign currency earners such as tourist hotels. This

Possible activities in which the Army might participate after a Cuban political collapse

- Refugee reception, control and processing.
 - Ecological cleanup.
 - Public health management.
 - Security of key installations, notably former military bases.
 - Prison management and inventory.
 - Control and recovery of small arms.
 - Inventory/disposition of major weapon systems.
 - Mapping support.
 - Formation or reformation of public forces.
 - Restoration of domestic order, police operations.
 - Establishment and enforcement of interim landlord-tenant rules.
 - Regularization of real property dispositions.
 - Provision of basic services.
 - Physical infrastructure replacement.
 - Protection of US citizens.
 - Resistance to criminal organizing (probable counterdrug emphasis).
 - Control of counterfeiting.
 - Self-protection security operations.
 - Temporary reinforcement of Guantanamo Bay's perimeter.
 - Peacekeeping/peace enforcement/conflict resolution/war termination.
 - Counter guerrilla operations.
 - Graves registration.
- (Few of the above tasks would be Army-specific; most would involve Army support of other agencies in the form of technical expertise, manpower and equipment).

Figure 1.

[We must] anticipate the entire range and character of potential Army responsibilities [that would be generated by a Cuban political collapse]. . . . The Army probably needs to accelerate its review of officer training emphasis for operations other than war, . . . it should continue to consider more creative force structure possibilities and . . . stimulate hemispheric interest in coalition civil-military training and cooperation.

cynical abandonment of the revolution in favor of privileged survival is transparent to lower-ranking bureaucrats and outer-circle rivals. Violence breaks out between major institutions with historic grudges, and the competition is fueled as exile leaders and money are attracted to the fray. Leverage is soon applied to change migration, investment, banking and property ownership policies. Once this happens, the regime loses effective political control.

Scenario #3

Castro reevaluates Cuba's prospects and liberalizes domestic policies in conjunction with a relaxation of the US economic embargo. Accelerated contact with foreigners emboldens Cuban human rights groups, and fissures within the regime hierarchy widen over how to handle increasingly provocative public demonstrations. Excessive force is used. This sparks large-scale riots that are supported, on occasion, by dissident military units. Castro, seeing the dissipation of the regime's revolutionary legitimacy, puts out feelers for a possible retirement in exile, and violent competition for control of the state begins.

These scenarios are not daring. They reflect respected academic predictions, but they are not posited as the most likely futures. They are only presented as logical and possible. The question of when any of these scenarios might come to pass is fuel for even more idle speculation. Equally believable predictions have Fidel Castro continuing to improvise the bare-bones survival of his revolution.³ However, even if

Under many plausible scenarios, effective control of key national properties will be lost. These properties could include large land holdings of the Cuban military. . . . Even if all Cuban military units were to divorce themselves from organized participation in any internal violence, much of the military land could be exposed to looters and squatters. It may be in the best interest of any follow-on government to ensure the maintenance or orderly disposition of this land, especially if ecological recovery operations are needed.

Castro were to become the longevity champion of modern dictators, his tour should not last much beyond this decade. Many observers predict an earlier end. In the face of these assessments, and considering the impact Cuba's collapse can have on the United States, the Army is understandably alert as to how it might become involved in Cuba's impending history.

The following explanations of Army missions selected from Figure 1 should be read while keeping in mind what will likely be the most important intangible influence on the prospect for Army success. That intangible is the acceptance by Cubans of US government and especially US military involvement in the Cuban maelstrom. The breadth and intensity of Cuban rejection of the Army is anybody's guess, but the Army, to the best of its ability, will need to establish mechanisms to measure and monitor Cuban attitudes toward it. The margin of success or failure in any given mission area may depend on subtle changes in the overall emotion Cubans feel toward Army presence.

Refugee reception, control and processing. A postcollapse Cuban immigration could be many times larger than the Mariel immigration of 1980 and may include individuals whose criminal extradition could be later sought by a post-Castro government.⁴ If there is to be a change in Cuban immigration status, it will be directly important to the Army since it will, to a great degree, determine the completion of

Army participation in this mission. Some time may pass before the treatment of Cubans is normalized and the Immigration and Naturalization Service applies standard entrant determinations. Afterward, the Army role may change markedly or will end. The release of criminal prisoners from Cuban jails, whether intended as a cynical jab at the United States or just the result of abandoned wardenship, could also complicate the task of migrant control.

The most important simplifying aspect of the refugee control mission, at least for the Army, will be its primarily CONUS geography. Other missions the Army might be asked to perform require in-Cuba presence.

Ecological cleanup.⁵ Fidel Castro's environmental record may present the Army with an important opportunity. Energetic action in direct cleanup and attention to establishing protective criteria for polluting industries directly serve US national interests. Indirectly, the business of environmental protection constitutes a visible service to the Cuban people. It could constitute a significant quid pro quo for what will be seen as more abrasive aspects of any US presence. Potential clean-up sites such as the Boyeros Asbestos factory near Havana or the experimental nuclear waste reprocessing center at Arroyo Naranjo strongly suggest that agencies other than the Army would take the lead, but the Army may be able to play a major supporting role, especially in areas such as earth moving.

Public health. It may turn out, as some predict, that the Cuban health care system is either not as good as claimed or has been severely degraded since the collapse of Warsaw Pact economic sponsorship. In addition, specialized Cuban medical personnel may opt to leave Cuba. The US government may perceive an obligation to undertake immediate reinforcement of the public health care system.⁶ Again, most responsibilities may be assumed by civilian agencies, but depending on the unfolding of events, the Army could be asked to contribute. As with other nation assistance tasks, Army medical support may be a consequence of the Army's unique capability to deploy specialized


resources quickly and in quantity. At the same time, Cuban socialized medicine has been a source of national pride and a redeeming aspect of the system in the minds of many Cubans. Visible dependence on the US military for the maintenance of public health may be a bitter pill.

Security of key installations. Under many plausible scenarios, effective control of key national properties will be lost. These properties could include large land holdings of the Cuban military, such as the Ignacio Agramonte training area near Camagüey or the Siguanea training area on the Isle of Pines. Even if all Cuban military units were to divorce themselves from organized participation in any internal violence, much of the military land could be exposed to looters and squatters. It may be in the best interest of any follow-on government to ensure the maintenance or orderly disposition of this land, especially if ecological recovery operations are needed.

Prison management. Among the most troublesome properties will be the prisons. War-dien cadres may be among the first to flee in order to avoid suffering acts of vengeance. They are likely to leave behind an extensive, unattended prison system and population. It will be in the best interests of the United States and Cuba to gain control as quickly as possible. Persecution of human rights monitors has contributed to an increasing number of purely political prisoners in the last few years, as well. Quivicán prison in Havana province, Guanajay prison in Havana province, Aguica prison in Matanzas province, Villa Marista detention center in Havana, the Jagua Psychiatric Hospital and the Mazorra National Psychiatric Hospital all contain political prisoners identified by international human rights groups.⁷ These political prisoners are likely to run an increased danger to their lives during the death throes of a collapsing regime. It is likely that the Army could be asked to support other agencies in locating and protecting these individuals.

Control and recovery of small arms. There are estimated to be several hundred thousand military small arms on the island of Cuba, almost all of them controlled by the government. Secu-

US military personnel prepare to help offload a boat crammed with Cuban refugees, Key West, Florida, 11 May 1980.



A postcollapse Cuban immigration could be many times larger than the Mariel immigration of 1980 and may include individuals whose criminal extradition could be later sought by a post-Castro government. If there is to be a change in Cuban immigration status, it will be directly important to the Army since it will, to a great degree, determine the completion of Army participation in this mission.

rity and possession of weapons control documents could become a priority mission under many scenarios.⁸ It is also reasonable that a mission could be ordered to recover as many of these weapons as possible before they became seed materiel for a future round of guerrilla combat. This may be a frustratingly difficult job if it is assigned. However, even its partial accomplishment could ameliorate future combat actions.

Formation, reformation of Cuban public forces. The reestablishment of internal confidence in civil police operations may be deemed

As with landlord-tenant rules, there may be a breakdown in the overall system of land title registry. . . . Given the lack of a real estate profession, a condition of anarchy in the area of land titles will probably invite all kinds of conflicting claims and blatant fraud schemes. These registry problems could be a tremendous source of violence.

a priority. In such a case, it is logical that military police and intelligence units may be tasked to help other agencies screen police force members and perhaps to accompany police activities.⁹ Depending on the overall context of the US military presence on the island, Army support to civilian police would probably require a waiver of prohibitions included in security assistance legislation.¹⁰

Real property dispositions. As with landlord-tenant rules, there may be a breakdown in the overall system of land title registry. The history and control of land registry is distinct in Latin American countries as compared to the United States. It is still more distinct in countries having experienced communist governments.¹¹ Given the lack of a real estate profession, a condition of anarchy in the area of land titles will probably invite all kinds of conflicting claims and blatant fraud schemes. These registry problems could be a tremendous source of violence. In a sense, most of the disputes in post-Castro Cuba will revolve around rights associated with property, whether this means control of common property formerly owned by the state, preferences in the privatization of industries, return of prerevolution titles or control of formal electoral mechanisms that are tied to political control of land issues. Most immediately, Cubans will confront the question of claims to real property by prerevolutionary owners.¹² Some of these will be non-Cubans who will attempt to take recourse in the system of international business law to recapture some equity from previously owned properties. For many commentators, this question of prerevolutionary holdings is at the forefront of the Cuban problem, but the possibil-

ity of a precollapse property grab by the communists may be its most exacerbating aspect. The Nicaraguan experience after the election of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro provides a hint regarding the potential for violence between prerevolutionary claims against confiscated property and Communist Party land seizures.¹³ The Army could be asked to help provide legal expertise and police management for control of property claims in a particularly emotionally charged environment.

Protection of US citizens. Security requirements may exceed the capacity of other agencies while the US diplomatic mission is being developed. In addition, many thousands of returning Cuban exiles would also be US citizens. This would generate some difficult political and legal decision requirements. Many US citizens could become targets, or perpetrators, of violent acts of retribution.

Resistance to criminal organizing. Internal political convulsion and the attendant inability to conduct sophisticated police investigations will invite criminal opportunists.¹⁴ Also, some key members of the former regime may already be under indictment in US courts for narcotics trafficking or related charges.¹⁵ The capture of these individuals may become a priority objective before agencies other than the Army can deploy sufficient strength to accomplish it.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The Army could conceivably be asked to participate in peacekeeping or peace enforcement activities among warring Cuban factions. Again, this will be complicated by the possibility that some of the factions might include US citizens.¹⁶ The scenarios used to introduce this article present possible futures in which a prostrate and ruined Cuba compels US assistance. The same scenarios could be continued to describe events leading to a US military intervention during a period of civil war. If the Cuban leadership divides, and no new elite can gain effective control quickly, then it is likely that US citizens with strong Cuban affinities would lobby Washington, D.C. to intervene to stop protracted violence. Some would arm themselves to take sides in the

struggle, a struggle that could spill north over the straits of Florida.

Military response to attack or provocation. Some commentators have speculated on the possibility of a last spasm of fatalistic defiance in which a cornered Castro launches a military attack against the United States or against the US Guantanamo Naval Base.¹⁷ Such a move might not be entirely fatalistic since Castro could rally nationalist support for a violent, flamboyant challenge to the United States. Even in failure, he could augment his revolutionary credibility before going into a semiretired exile abroad. The cost for Castro himself would be minimal, and while this may be an unlikely event, some resources may have to be devoted to it as Castro's end begins to near.

As suggested by the type scenarios and by the potential mission list, grave disorder is the anticipated result if Castro and the repressive mechanisms of his personalist regime lose effective control. Many of the determinants of that disorder are already engaged, while others await precipitating events. These ingredients of chaos will interrelate to form a complicated calculus of disorder, but the principal components can also be listed for consideration (fig. 2). Comprehensive discussion of the foreboding weave of Cuba's social fabric is beyond reach here, but the follow-

Contributors to Postcollapse Cuban Disorder

Property disputes Retribution
Emigration Racism Immigration
Prison release
Services and infrastructure collapse
Assertiveness of residual/rogue military units
Extranational opportunism—business and political
Organized criminal opportunism
Religious competition
Generational clash
Black market replacement
Ecological errors
Abandoned accountability of weapons
and other dangerous materials
Ideological intransigence

Figure 2.

Internal political convulsion and the attendant inability to conduct sophisticated police investigations will invite criminal opportunists. Also, some key members of the former regime may already be under indictment in US courts for narcotics trafficking or related charges. The capture of these individuals may become a priority objective before agencies other than the Army can deploy sufficient strength to accomplish it.

ing discussion of a few of the more difficult threads in that fabric gives a feel for the breadth of planning considerations should the Army be called to conduct the missions suggested.

Retribution. The intensity of ill will by Cubans toward each other is difficult to measure. Some interested observers insist that a bloodbath is likely given the abuses of power and the personal atrocities committed by the communist regime. An environment of violent retribution can easily devolve into anarchy. Such a condition might make the call for US military presence more likely, while at the same time complicating that presence.

Racism. Observers note that Cuban racial demographics are different today than they were 35 years ago. For example, the Cuban exile community is considered by many Cubans to be virtually all white, whereas the proportion of "black" Cubans on the island is considered to have increased from a prerevolutionary 20 to 30 percent to perhaps as high as 50 percent today.¹⁸ In fact, Cuban racial categorization is poorly defined and often politically motivated. The nature of Cuban black-white racism is itself difficult to appreciate from the US perspective. As such, the possible importance of Cuban racial differences to an Army presence is not entirely clear. There is a clear warning, however, that groups identifying internal violence with their best interests will be able to find kindling in racial fears, whether reasonable or not. The projection of racial biases onto members of a US military deployment will probably not be a

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problem as it was in Somalia.¹⁹ Still, the Army could become involved in issues painted partially in racial terms and would do well to vaccinate against harmful interpretations of Cuban racism by way of an explicit training preparation before deployment.

Extranational opportunism. Business entrepreneurship should, for the most part, be welcomed. But there will probably be some backlash to a perceived invasion by foreign capital, especially if opportunities are exploited in industries closely identified by the Cubans with previous national successes. Political opportunism could come in the form of internationalist support to political party organizations, such as Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and so on. While also welcome to infuse the electoral mechanism with seed capital and ideas, these foreign influences may be the source of additional stress on an already suffering body politic.

Religious competition. Castro has staged some visits by apparently politicized international church organizations, but he has repressed organized religion internally.²⁰ A few Cuban-African cults, including the influential Santería, Palo Monte and Abakuás groups are said to have been courted by Castro in recent years.²¹ This may cause them to support the regime a little too long toward its end, thereby causing congregants to fall away just as other religious attractions pour in from the mainland. An increase in spiritual options should prove a democratizing factor over time. Initially, it may add to the possible radicalization of some sects, especially if racial identity and competition become a more important aspect of religious choice. Also, the important religious dimension of Cuban social

and political life can easily be overlooked.²² Perceived unfairness or indifference to a given religious current could have detrimental effects on a US military presence.

Assertiveness of residual/rogue military units. If the integrity of Castro's military hierarchy were to dissolve, appearance of potent, independent smaller armies could provide the principal attention-getter for the US Army. A single rogue army could control several hundred major weapon systems, several thousand soldiers and significant Cuban territory.²³ With this leverage, such an army could make demands, draw support, claim identity and decide objectives against

Influences on Postcollapse Cuban Instability

Postcollapse Cuban instability will be influenced by the weight and sequence of movement to and from the island. Perhaps in unprecedented numbers, groups will wish either to escape the chaos, benefit from it or help determine its outcome. Who will be the first to arrive in Cuba after the collapse, and who will be the first to leave? This predictably rapid change in the mix of groups present on the island goes to the heart of Cuba's turmoil. Every potential Army mission in Cuba will be influenced by changes in who is where.

First to arrive in Cuba after a collapse

(the order is not suggested)

- News media Land speculators
- Intergovernmental organization (IGO) representatives
- Nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives
- Exiles with property claims
- Exile political aspirants
- Scouts and promoters for sports and arts
- Religious missionaries
- Guerrilla hobbyists
- (ideological troublemakers, mercenaries)
- Non-Cuban government bureaucrats and programists, such as AID Investors
- Tourists Academicians
- Criminal investors/opportunists/organizers

First to leave Cuba after a collapse

(the order is not suggested)

- Communists with political baggage (to Mexico, Nicaragua, Spain?)
- Criminals
- Relatives of families established in Florida and elsewhere
- Older teenagers, young adults
- Specially skilled professionals

Figure 3.

the backdrop of instability painted above. A rogue army might find it easy to recruit dislocated Cubans spurred by racial fear, desire for or fear of retribution, furor over property losses, abstract ideological fanaticism or by any combination of these and other motivators. Rejection of a US imperialist military occupier is an obviously lucrative concept that could rally Cubans ranging from the most sincere to the most cynical.

What kind of lessons can this reduction of the Cuba problem provide to Army planners? First, there may yet be adequate time to prepare. This analysis has avoided a panicked tone. Castro's revolution may survive for many more years, or Cuba may exit its communist revolutionary experience with an anticlimactic whimper. On the other hand, considerable evidence suggests that Cuba could become a larger challenge for the Army than Somalia, Kurdistan and Panama combined. Preparation for the possibility would not be wasteful. Even six months is enough time to complete a basic language course, and probably no other midterm preparation could ease operational pain as much as expanding the overall language capability of the force, since the mission list calls for more talking than shooting.

The second lesson may be organizational. In reviewing the recent Panama, Somalia and Kurdistan experiences, the Army might need to reconsider a beefed-up structure when considering a possible Cuba deployment. Not only might training and experience be better focused for transition assistance, such a structure would avoid the otherwise inevitable pilfering of warfighting units to wasteful, long-term commitments of strength.²⁴ Nevertheless, the relative requirement for combat versus noncombat assets is depen-

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dent on a very unpredictable situation mix in this case. The possible deployment of heavy combat forces cannot be rejected. However, even if an initial combat orientation is necessary, police, intelligence, legal, medical, transportation, civil affairs, psychological operations and engineer assets will be paramount for mission success in the long run. Reserve components will have to be tapped for many of these assets.

Third, given the overriding warning regarding the acceptability of US troops, more attention might be accorded to the appropriate training development of Latin American officers from countries willing to participate in cooperative deployments. Existing organizations such as the US Army School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia, or the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C., could prove to be ideal and underutilized assets for the preparation of such a personnel reservoir. **MR**

NOTES

1. The joint, combined, multiagency nature of future missions is now becoming axiomatic to such an extent that no assertion on the fact should any longer be necessary. For a more thorough consideration of the mechanics, however, see William W. Mendel and Stephen K. Stewman, *Planning for Haiti* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1993); and John T. Fisher, *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute [SSI], US Army War College [USAWC], 1992).

2. At the time this article was written, a major research project sponsored by

the Office of Research, US Department of State, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean was under review. The massive (675 page) study undertaken by the Cuban Research Institute of Florida International University is likely to constitute a major influence on current official policy thinking toward Cuba. Although the full study, *Cuba in Transition* was not yet available to the author of this article, nothing in the summary report appears to contradict anything asserted in this article.

3. Marxist ideologues are recovering confidence after briefly ducking for cover while the East Europeans reported their experiences. Richard L. Harris presents

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an upbeat prognosis of the contribution of Cuban Marxism in *Marxism, Socialism, and Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).

4. For a complete history and analysis of the 1980 Cuban boatlift, see Alex Larzelere, *The 1980 Cuban Boatlift* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, US Government Printing Office, 1988).

5. For an overview of possible ecological problem areas, see Jose R. Oro, *The Poisoning of Paradise: Environmental Pollution in the Republic of Cuba*. The Endowment for Cuban American Studies, Cuban American National Foundation.

6. See Luzette Alvarez, "Malnourished Cubans Flock to Hospitals. Thousands Treated for Severe Eye Disease," *Miami Herald* (14 April 1993): 1.

7. "The Persecution of Human Rights Monitors: Cuba," *Cuba in the Nineties* (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 1990), 117.

8. The problem of weapons control and collection was conspicuous in the Somalia intervention. See Robert M. Press, "Somali Civil War is Fueled by Huge Stockpiles of Weapons," *Christian Science Monitor* (14 October 1992): 1.

9. A guide to the US military experience with restoring public order in Panama, as well as specific notes on military support to the police, can be found in John T. Fisher, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: SSI, USAWC, 1992).

10. Section 650, Title 22 U.S.C. 2420.

11. US government involvement in the Cuban system of registry and validity of real estate interests may be perceived by some as an especially unwelcome function of an occupying power. However, not intervening into the systems of property ownership control and tenant law could still leave the US military reacting to the consequences.

12. In 1990, the University of Miami's Research Institute for Cuban Studies began a registry of expropriated properties. Andres Oppenheimer, *Castro's Final Hour: The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 323.

13. Oppenheimer, *Castro's Final Hour*, 324. The Sandinista army was able to maintain its political identity and physical integrity in spite of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro's election. This fact provided the coercive backstop to resist claims of prerevolutionary owners. A similar environment could exist in a post-Castro Cuba, but it is more difficult to envision US military involvement in the land question if the Cuban army survives in the way that the Sandinista army did.

14. "Former Eastern European communist security personnel have created organizations suspected of coercive actions and terrorist planning (for example, Red Fist in the former German Democratic Republic); the prospect of former DGI [Cuban intelligence service] free-lance activities in an unsettled region must at least be considered." Graham H. Turbville Jr., "The Cuban Threat in the Southern Hemisphere: Goodbye to All That?" *Military Review* (December 1991): 87.

See also Turbville, "Operations Other Than War: Organized Crime Dimension," *Military Review* (January 1994).

15. A proposed indictment of Raul Castro and the Cuban government on narcotics trafficking charges is reported in Jeff Leen and Oppenheimer, "Clinton Caught Off Guard by Proposed Cuba Charges," *Miami Herald* (9 April 1993): 1A. For a broad accusation regarding Cuban narcotics dealings of the Castro government, see *Castro & the Narcotics Connection: Special Report* (Washington, DC: Cuban American National Foundation, 1984).

16. For insight into the various Cuban political attitudes toward Cuba's transformation, see Manuel Ramon De Zayas, "Who's on First? The Cuban Political Railgame," *Postmodern Notes* (Spring 1991): 8-26.

17. See, for instance, Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, "Final Showdown for Manydom," *Cuba Adrift in a Postcommunist World* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992), 57, and Daniel L. Russo Jr., *Cuba's Military Power as a Threat to South Florida* (Coral Gables, FL: Research Institute for Cuban Studies, 1990).

18. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) *The World Fact Book 1992* places ethnic divisions as follows: mulatto: 51 percent, white: 37 percent, black: 11 percent, Chinese: 1 percent. *The World Fact Book 1992* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 86.

19. The US Army experience with Somali racial prejudice toward US soldiers was more severe than anything to be expected in Cuba. The Somali problem, submitted to the Center for Army Lessons Learned by this office, was related by officers of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion who had deployed with Operation Restore Hope. Fierce racial bigotry by Somalis was directed at some black American soldiers during deployment of US forces.

20. "Castro Meets with Methodist General Assembly Delegates," Havana Tele Rebelde and Cuba Vision Newsreels in Spanish (4 April 1993), as translated in *FBIIS-LAT-93-064*, 6 April 1993. Castro talked to the assembly about the US embargo, his ministers called the embargo anti-Christian. One hundred representatives from 21 countries attended. It should be noted that the article making Cuba an atheist state was dropped from the 1992 Cuban Constitution.

21. Oppenheimer, *Castro's Final Hour*, 342.

22. For insight on the religious component of the Cuban political misery, see Damian Fernandez, "Revolution and Political Religion in Cuba," *The Religious Challenge to the State*, eds. Matthew C. Moen and Lowell F. Gustafson (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992).

23. For an unclassified review of Cuban military strength, see "Cuban Threat Assessment," *Threats Update* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Command Threats Directorate, December 1992), 109.

24. See LTC Geoffrey B. Demarest, "Beefing Up at the Low End," *Military Review* (June 1993): 50-56.

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Cary, a *US News & World Report* journalist, with the XVIII Airborne Corps engineers. He said, "After two weeks there, I had had enough." His conclusion: "If I had had the choice, I would have covered something else."

The other aspect of the argument: Did the pool system suppress the truth? The general truth—a huge buildup, a rapid victory, a good combat readiness, few allied casualties—came out in a timely manner. However, the public affairs system did distort the picture. For example, the American public saw a lot of video on "smart bombs," although they only represented about 9 percent of ordnance dropped during the ground war. The American public saw more stories on the US Marines than on the US Army, despite the Army's more prominent role. Finally, some important questions remain unanswered over two years after the war's end. For instance, during the war, US Central Command always declined to estimate the amount of Iraqi casualties and, to this date, no reliable number exists on this very important subject.

"Assumption 2. Reporters are uniquely qualified to obtain and relay military operational information." Wells-Petry also argues that reporters do not need access to the front because journalists are not "uniquely qualified to obtain and relay military oper-

ational information." As a consequence, according to Wells-Petry, the press should have access only if it "can bring something unique or insightful to the process of obtaining and relaying military information."

It is strange to consider that reporters should only report on matters where they can bring "something unique." No specialist will ever consider a reporter more qualified to report on the specialist's field. However, the reporter's specialty is just that—communicating to the public. On the other hand, military operations do differ in some respects. Few would question the military's right, need and responsibility to keep some information secret. Troop locations, equipment, exact size of units, intelligence matters or battle plans should not be reported. Crippling the media's ability to report on operations, however, is not the appropriate path to protect such secrets.

Wells-Petry insists that the reporters' presence is all the less necessary since they cannot provide "the big picture." How strange an argument! As she said, reporters, as well as the "private who stoked the gun [and] the sergeant who drove the tank" do not have the whole picture. But, in democratic societies, reporters are not expected to bring the whole picture. They are expected to report what they see, when they see it. Reporters are not telling the whole story of the presidency each time they report from the

White House. Does it mean that no journalist should report from the White House?

"Assumption 3. Reporters are better positioned or better qualified than the military to resolve competing interests in information and to judge what should be reported." Wells-Petry's third argument deals with the press' incapacity to judge what constitutes a violation of security rules. As a major argument against the security review used in the Gulf War, the press essentially argued that it would not publish information that would endanger operations, so long as the military provided a clear statement of what constituted "restricted" information. On the other hand, the military required all battlefield reports to go through reviews because journalists could inadvertently release precise troop locations or intelligence details.

The press has two arguments against the process. First, the reviewing process causes unjustifiable and inconsistent delays in reporting (especially in the Army). Second, the media sees this process as "unwarranted and unnecessary" because they have had a good record throughout American history in this regard. Despite Wells-Petry's assertions, press reluctance has nothing to do with whether reporters judge themselves more qualified than the military to know what constitutes a violation of security. It has to do with technical dispositions: How can the military review reports without delaying release? And some fear that the review process gives the military the ability to censor reports beyond "operational necessity."

Wells-Petry adds that, "under the Constitution, [the press'] function is not necessarily to provide a mechanism for military accountability." She is technically right (under the Constitution), but in essence, she cannot be further from the truth. In this country, the press performs two roles: it reflects the debates and tendencies present in the society, and it also acts as a "watchdog" against abuses in the government and elsewhere. If the press did not, from time to time, provide a mechanism for military accountability, would the American people have ever heard of My Lai or procurement abuses from the most basic (hammers and toilet seats) to the most sophisticated (such as the US Navy's A-12 stealth aircraft)?

In some cases, the military institution discovers abuses, disciplines the abusers and takes the necessary steps for reform. To a certain extent, the Tailhook incident falls into this category. But, on other occasions, military institutions cannot or simply will not do so. In that case, it is not only legitimate but also necessary that the press has the ability to investigate and to report independently. If operational security leads to restricted press access, the press must have enough access to perform its roles to

inform the people and eventually denounce abuses.

"Assumption 4. The safety of reporters is not a legitimate factor in restricting the media, and reporters' safety is not the military's problem."

Wells-Petry's fourth argument is certainly the strongest. She correctly points out that reporters regularly claim that the military should not care about their safety. But press corps and news organizations pressure the president to take effective steps when American journalists are in danger.

Now, the media must choose. Either the reporters' safety is not the military's business, and no complaints occur when reporters are held hostage or prisoner, or reporters' safety is the military's business, and the press thus has to abide by military rules to secure its safety. Although the media have proved pretty successful in the past years when they asked the president to take steps in favor of journalists held prisoner, they should not have it both ways. The president should review this issue, adopt clear rules, publicize and implement them—no matter what. However, any press inconsistency on this issue does not provide enough justification to place inappropriate restrictions on the job.

In her article, Wells-Petry raises important issues, and while many in the military might agree with her conclusions, virtually no one in the media would. Rather than visceral broadsides on the rights and responsibilities of the press in a democratic society, the US military would be better served by a search for compromises on how and when reporters can cover military operations.

The media, in essence, demand that the military allow unlimited numbers of reporters (without consideration of qualifications) access to the battlefield. This aggravates military-media tension without necessarily leading to better reporting. Perhaps quotas would present a more appropriate approach than pools.

The pool arrangements of the Gulf War evolved from the pools established to handle crises escalating in secret—this was not such a situation. Simply applying an existing institution does not necessarily provide the best approach. Limited numbers of more qualified reporters would aid implementation of a policy to control information through agreement rather than censorship. The media should compromise—they should trade numbers for freer access.

The media, as well, should realize that sources other than the battlefield are critical to reporting a modern war. If the military remained wedded to pools, then the media remained wedded to the Vietnam War image of covering a conflict in which the individual platoon action represented the most important source for information. For the Gulf War (and many other conflicts), higher headquarters (all the way back to the president) are the truly critical

sources of information. Such a realization would reduce the quantitative pressure on the operational commander where logistic support for a few reporters is easier than for a horde.

So that reporters can fulfill their roles in a democratic society, the military has to allow reporters into the field to speak freely with soldiers and to stay with units, as appropriate, without public affairs officers as constant chaperons. The media and military institutions should search for the means to allow this to happen rather than propagate diatribes by one castigating the evils of the other.

Pascale Combelles, Toulouse, France

Wrong Conclusions Says Wells-Petry

Pascale Combelles' lively letter raises several thoughtful points. The relationship between the media and the military is an important one, and I am glad there are people making it a matter of close study. But a close reading of my article belies Combelles' conclusions that I argue reporters are not necessary and "do not need access to the front." Indeed, I wrote my article precisely to counter such all-or-nothing extremism on the part of the press, as well as the military.

My goal in writing the article was to bring some perspective to the extreme position taken in a lawsuit and, to a certain extent, in the media at large that reporters must always, no matter what, "damn the torpedoes," be free of *any* restrictions in combat theaters and during operations. Throughout my article, I emphasize that the gauntlet thrown down by the media representatives who were suing the Department of Defense was that the military had *no* right to exercise *any* prerogatives in controlling the battlefield vis-à-vis reporters. Think about it.

The fact that I reject this extreme view that reporters have a *constitutional right, enforceable over the military's objection*, for example, to hop rides on bombing raids or advise the world that Company A is out of fuel, does not mean that I advocate the other extreme—that the press "deserves little or no consideration." Quite the opposite. I said, and still believe, that the interests of the military and the interests of the press must be kept in realistic *balance*. The interests of the press deserve serious consideration but, contrary to the theory of the lawsuit that prompted my article, *so do the interests of the military*.

Combelles recognizes this when she states, "Few would question the military's right, need and responsibility to keep some information secret." But then she goes on to say that "crippling the media's ability to report on operations, however, is not the

appropriate path to protect such secrets." My point remains: If the media argue (and even lodge lawsuits) that *any* restriction "cripples" them, then what paths are available to "protect such secrets?" Should soldiers sit on the maps when they see reporters coming?

My clarion call is and will always be simply this: On balance, operational concerns must come first. This does not mean curtains for the free press. It does not mean the press is unimportant. It does mean that, from time to time, it is prudent to fashion various degrees of restriction on the press to save lives (reporters' included) and win wars. Thus, the conclusion of my article bears repeating:

"Military restrictions on the press are, as they have been over history, *tailored to operational requirements and the nature of the warfighting at hand*. A simple cost-benefit analysis proves that such restrictions strike an *appropriate balance* between the interest of the press in gathering information and the interest of the military, and the nation, in winning our wars. . . .

"Press restrictions are necessary to *strike a balance on the battlefield*. Press restrictions balance the professional interests of reporters, the informational benefit to the public of *unfettered* access to and *reporting from the battlefield*, operational considerations that may determine whether soldiers live or die and whether the nation succeeds or fails in the task it has given its Army. It is soldiers, not reporters, who take an oath to defend with their lives the US Constitution. When soldiers are about that dangerous task, common sense, as well as the law, counsels the appropriateness of restricting the press." [Emphases added.]

People may reasonably disagree on how this balance is struck in any given fire fight. Except for the fact that Combelles inaccurately sets up my position as advocating the total shutdown of the press, we agree in several important respects. She states, and I agree, that "it is not only legitimate but also necessary that the press has the ability to investigate and to report independently. If operational security leads to restricted press access, the press must have enough access to perform its roles. . . ." Thus, Combelles advocates *balance*, and I wholeheartedly support her. As we both contend, for all of us to get the most from this sometimes spirited debate, we would do well to focus on the best ways to achieve that balance rather than on setting up all-or-nothing strawmen at either end of the spectrum.

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WWII Almanac

The Landings at Anzio

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Editor's Note—The invasion of Italy began in September 1943 with Operations Avalanche and Slapstick. By November, the southern half of Italy as far north as Naples was cleared, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower gave General Sir Harold R. Alexander orders to maintain pressure on the Germans and capture Rome. It was decided at the Tehran Conference, however, that the troops needed to do this would have to come from Italy, not from those needed for Operation Overlord, the invasion of Central Europe. These Almanacs provide two illustrations of how not to conduct an operation.

The VI (US) Corps landed at Anzio during the early morning darkness on 22 January 1944. By midday, the assault force experienced minor casualties, and two divisions secured the beachhead—the landing clearly caught the Germans flat-footed. The long-debated turning movement against the Gustav Line was under way. Operation *Shingle* appeared to exceed every expectation and promised to end the bloody stalemate on the Italian peninsula. By nightfall, however, there were disturbing signs that this illusion would quickly evaporate.

How did *Shingle*, which tantalized the Allies with success, evolve into a bloody disaster that would eventually cost 43,000 casualties? The Anzio landing ended in stalemate because it was driven not by compelling military logic but by frivolous political forces and a tragic series of faulty assumptions. Specifically, the landings lacked a single, clear objective; the turning movement itself was too shallow; and the most glaring defect was the inadequate size of the landing force.

The idea for an amphibious end run was not new to Allied planners in early 1944. This type of operation was tried earlier with varying degrees of success in Sicily and on the mainland. In fact, the genesis of *Shingle* is traceable to early November 1943, when General Dwight D. Eisenhower offered it as a means to break the deadlock on the Volturno River. *Shingle* became an increasingly attractive alternative in December 1943 when the Allied advance again stalled, this time in front of the Gustav Line. General Sir Harold R. Alexander, 15th Army Group command-

er, pressured by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, decided that the US Fifth Army had to execute an amphibious operation to flank this barrier and break the stalemate.¹

Slowly, Anzio began to assume a life of its own, and Churchill quickly became its greatest proponent. Much to his chagrin, the Italian Campaign was, by strategic design, rapidly becoming a sideshow whose stated objective was to divert German units from other battlefields while using minimum Allied resources.² As the campaign entered 1944, Churchill pressed Alexander and Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark (US Fifth Army) for decisive results.

Increasingly, the Allies based their hopes for decisive success on the Anzio landings and Rapido River crossings.³ There was, however, growing opposition to the operation within the Allied camp for cogent military reasons. Operational planners at Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in Carthage quickly pointed out that *Shingle*'s risks outweighed its chance of success. Logisticians at AFHQ also questioned the plan's feasibility.⁴ In fact, by early December, *Shingle*'s principal commanders, Clark and Major General John P. Lucas (VI [US] Corps), held little enthusiasm for the plan. Insufficient landing craft and their doubtful availability after 15 January 1944 caused serious apprehension among AFHQ planners and US Fifth Army commanders.

Landing craft and shipping space were the common denominators in almost every Allied undertaking in World War II. This problem represented a considerable restriction on any amphibious operation in the Mediterranean Theater and specifically for Anzio. Consistent with decisions promulgated at the Quadrant and Sextant conferences, Operation *Overlord* became the Western Allies' main effort. Correspondingly, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) directed the transfer of nearly all landing craft in the Mediterranean to England by 15 December 1943. This decision effectively shelved the Anzio landings. Eisenhower managed to delay their departure to 15 January 1944 based on Churchill's urgings—*Shingle* was on again.

Significant obstacles lay in *Shingle*'s path. Though the landing craft could remain until mid January,

sufficient numbers were available only to transport two divisions, eight days of supply and no subsequent reinforcements.⁵ To Clark, this was clearly inadequate. The Anzio plan appeared to die on 19 December when he canceled it because weather conditions prevented timely rehearsals and deployment before the mid-January deadline.⁶

Churchill remained undaunted despite the plan's limitations. He pressed the CCS to again delay transferring landing craft and lobbied President Franklin D. Roosevelt directly on the subject. On 8 January 1944, Roosevelt agreed to support Churchill and recommended to General George C. Marshall that the landing craft remain in-theater. The CCS, through Alexander, directed US Fifth Army to execute the landings—*Shingle* was set for 22 January.⁷ Lucas (the commander of the landing force) and others no longer believed in the operation and doubted that it could succeed given its limitations. Nonetheless, Churchill pushed the operation through. This fact was not lost on Lucas as he summed up Churchill's role in his diary, "This whole affair has a strong odor of Gallipoli and apparently the same amateur [Churchill] was still on the coaches bench."⁸

Shingle's abrupt resurrection from military oblivion is clearly a testament to Churchill's powerful influence.⁹ He had no intention of allowing his pet campaign against his self-proclaimed "soft underbelly of the crocodile" to become an afterthought in history, regardless of declared combined Allied strategy. His prolonged presence in the Mediterranean after Sextant in December 1943—he was ill with pneumonia—assured his continuous pressure on top Allied leaders to kick start the stalled campaign and capture Rome.

Churchill saw the Anzio operation as a means to obtaining that prize. *Shingle* was originally conceived out of military necessity; however, the realities of the situation in-theater—available forces, the enemy and landing craft—dictated its cancellation for compelling military reasons.¹⁰ Churchill advocated *Shingle* for his own political purposes despite military opinion that it was no longer a good idea. How did he accomplish this?

Two events in December 1943 enabled Churchill to exert greater influence on operations in the Mediterranean and essentially revive *Shingle* with his personal will. First, a major shift in the Allied senior command replaced Eisenhower with British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. With Alexander commanding 15th Army Group, Churchill had the luxury of dealing with an almost all-British command structure.

Second, as an adjunct to agreements established at Sextant, executive direction of theater affairs passed from the CCS directly to the British chiefs.¹¹ US influence was virtually eliminated from Mediterranean

policy. This command structure was clearly subject to manipulation by Churchill and all but assured that Anzio would proceed despite its obvious flaws.¹²

Militarily, *Shingle* was fundamentally flawed by two specious assumptions that irrevocably shaped its size and scope. Churchill does not bear solitary responsibility on this indictment. The British chiefs (specifically General Sir Alan Brooke, with considerable help from Alexander) sold him on the first ruinous assumption—that a small, two-division force could stand by itself and provoke a German withdrawal from the Gustav Line.¹³ Churchill, clearly convinced, declared that the landings would "astonish the world and certainly frighten [Field Marshal Albert] Kesselring."¹⁴

This logic discounted any realistic German reaction and was not consistent with Kesselring's past dealings with Allied landings. At Salerno (9 September), Bari (22 September) and Termoli (3 October), Kesselring met the landings with violent counterattacks, and each was nearly thrown back into the sea—air power and naval gunfire saved the day.¹⁵ To think that *Shingle* would somehow elicit a more timid reaction and "frighten" Kesselring out of his excellent positions in the Gustav Line was simply wishful thinking.

A successful attack and penetration of the Gustav Line, coupled with a rapid linkup near Anzio delineated the second flawed assumption on which *Shingle* hinged. *Shingle* and its subsequent rapid thrust to Rome depended on the 36th (US) Division's Rapido River crossing on 20 January. Alexander assumed that it would take 10 days to link up with VI (US) Corps on the Anzio plain. When this attack failed, the Anzio force had to fend for itself.¹⁶ The decisive failure at the Rapido unhinged the entire premise behind *Shingle*. Again, wishful thinking overrode military reality in the Allied high command. Since mid-October, Allied progress in Italy was typically measured in yards.

Yet, Alexander and others postulated that somehow Allied forces would quickly penetrate the formidable defenses of the Gustav Line and execute a stunning exploitation to Anzio in 10 days. What conditions changed for Allied leaders to believe that they would accomplish in the dead of winter, in appalling conditions, what they had been unable to do over a period of four months?

The Rapido disaster was certainly predictable. Failure there shattered the possibility of a quick linkup with VI (US) Corps and any chance of initiating a German desertion of the Gustav Line, let alone the liberation of Rome. Basing a plan of *Shingle*'s magnitude on such flimsy assumptions appears unconscionable; however, Churchill's intrigues clearly propelled Mediterranean commanders into ill-advised action.¹⁷ The entire premise behind the Anzio land-

A wounded German prisoner receives aid from 3d Division soldiers in the Cisterna area.



ing was flawed, and even without the benefit of hindsight, its success appeared doubtful.¹⁸

Potential success at Anzio was further degraded by a pervasive lack of clarity in the intent of the operation and the objectives assigned to VI (US) Corps. The *Shingle* directive gave Lucas three broad and rather obscure objectives: relieve pressure on the Gustav Line by causing the Germans to withdraw; disrupt German supply lines between Rome and the Gustav Line by advancing on the Alban Hills; and eventually capture Rome. A single, well-defined objective is clearly absent.¹⁹ These three objectives furnished VI (US) Corps with very ambiguous *ends* but, more important, failed to offer the *means* and *ways*. As Army Group commander, Alexander identified the Alban Hills as key terrain and saw their seizure as essential to the operation's success—seizure would absolutely establish the conditions for success of the first two objectives mandated in the *Shingle* directive. How then, did this operational disconnect occur?

The Alban Hills are located 20 miles northwest of Anzio. They dominate movement in and out of the Anzio plain, Route 6 and the rail line linking Rome and the Gustav Line.²⁰ Alexander thought it was essential to *seize* this key terrain to secure the beachhead and cut off the Gustav Line. He communicated this intent to Clark, who thought VI (US) Corps lacked the means to achieve this objective. These divergent convictions confused any clear definition

of what Lucas was to accomplish once ashore.²¹

Clark and his US Fifth Army planners fundamentally changed Alexander's objective. The original *Shingle* plan unquestionably directed Lucas to seize the Alban Hills—the logical objective of the operation.²² However, as it became apparent to Clark that the invasion force was too small to seize the hills and secure the intervening 20 miles, he authorized a change to the plan on 12 January. The US Fifth Army plan, as amended, directed VI (US) Corps to "advance on the Colli Laziali [Alban Hills]."²³ This directive gave Lucas more leeway to conduct operations. As a result, he saw his primary mission—with hindsight, rightly so—as securing the beachhead. Clark, still profoundly affected by the near disaster at Salerno, did nothing to change Lucas' intention. In fact, during his first visit to the beachhead, he told Lucas, "Don't stick your neck out, Johnny. I did at Salerno and got into trouble."²⁴ Further, Clark cancelled a planned airborne drop on the Alban Hills intended to assist in their capture.

Much of this befuddlement resulted from Clark's inability to designate and sustain the main effort. Based on US Fifth Army guidance, Lucas saw Anzio as a diversion for II (US) Corps' penetration of the Gustav Line. Major General Geoffrey Keyes, commander of II Corps, saw his attack as an adjunct to the Anzio landings, designed to initially fix German forces. Alexander never wavered from his position that Anzio was the main effort and said as

much in his communications with the CCS. Clark, however, preferred to hedge his bets on both attacks and offered indecisive guidance to his two principal ground commanders. Unfortunately, Alexander did not intercede, but such is the nature of coalition warfare. In any event, VI (US) Corps never took the Alban Hills. Indecision surrounding this vital objective proved nearly lethal because the Germans retained unimpeded access to the Anzio plain.

Confusion over *Shingle's* tactical objective was manifest in the placement of the seaborne envelopment. Operationally, *Shingle* was a turning movement designed to cause the Germans to withdraw from the Gustav Line. However, the depth of the envelopment was simply not great enough to do this and afforded the Germans interior lines, which they used with consummate skill.²⁵ Anzio was too close to the Gustav Line and the excellent transportation facilities in Rome. Whether or not VI (US) Corps could have landed further north is problematic, based on available forces and shipping constraints. Regardless, one thing is clear, the assumption that the presence of the Anzio beachhead would alone "frighten" Kesselring and stampede the Germans out of the Gustav Line could not have been further from reality.

By all accounts, Kesselring expected an Allied landing somewhere, but was misled by German Admiral Wilhelm F. Canaris. He told Kesselring that there was no possibility of an Allied amphibious assault in the foreseeable future, just 48 hours before the actual landing.²⁶ Kesselring was certainly alarmed, but not dismayed. He was a defensive genius and prepared carefully for this eventuality. In an impressive display of generalship and operational planning, he issued the code word for "PLAN RICHARD" and had 20,000 first-rate panzer troops at Anzio by nightfall and parts of 13 divisions converging from northern Italy, France, Germany and the Balkans. By 25 January, three days after the landings, he concentrated eight divisions around the beachhead.²⁷

As a turning movement, *Shingle* was too close to the static front in Italy. This enabled Kesselring to move a corps headquarters and six divisions from the Gustav Line to participate in his 3 February counterattack that nearly destroyed the beachhead.²⁸ A deeper turning movement could have perhaps eliminated this significant interior lines advantage. Allied planners identified Civitavecchia, 40 miles north of Anzio, as a more favorable landing site. Clark, however, insisted that the landings occur within supporting range of the US Fifth Army, and Anzio was chosen instead.²⁹

In 1950, General Douglas MacArthur was confronted with similar objections when he wanted to conduct a very deep amphibious turning movement at Inch'on with a similar two-division force. Inch'on

was risky, but it was a brilliant success.³⁰ Conditions may not have permitted Lucas to conduct a similar deep envelopment, but *Shingle* was clearly not deep enough to succeed on its own merits.

Perhaps *Shingle's* most troublesome deficiency was the small size of the landing force. The assault force was limited by shipping space to two divisions. Clark and Lucas considered this force too small for the mission, and events proved them correct. The inadequate size of the landing force was a consequence of the faulty assumptions on which the entire plan was based. VI (US) Corps' failure to take the Alban Hills resulted from this analysis. Clark and Lucas agreed that the corps could not secure the beachhead, the Alban Hills and the terrain between. The VI (US) Corps mission was contingent on its size, which was altogether inadequate as events quickly proved.³¹ *Shingle* was a job for an entire army, and committing less can be likened to sending a boy to do a man's job.³²

Shipping space was ostensibly the justification for employing only two divisions in the operation. However, not two weeks after the initial landing, shipping space apparently became available to reinforce the beachhead with the 1st (US) Armored Division, 45th (US) Division, 1st Special Service Force, and 168th Brigade, 56th (BR) Division—a force larger than the original landing.³³

It is apparent that the Allies, with Churchill's ceaseless meddling, tried to win this battle cheaply without properly establishing the conditions for success. The result was all too predictable. Kesselring was quick to point out this glaring error: "[The] biggest mistake of Anzio was in landing a force too small to accomplish the mission."³⁴

Of all the amphibious assaults launched by Allies, Anzio was the one most nearly thrown back into the sea. At the height of the crisis on 18 February, all that remained between the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division and the beach was a British infantry company and a small reserve of clerks and cooks.³⁵ *Shingle* would eventually cost the Allies 7,000 killed and 36,000 wounded or missing.³⁶ Anzio never came close to achieving its operational goals and, by every measure, must be considered an abject failure.

Anzio nearly ended in disaster because it was driven not by compelling military logic but by frivolous political forces and a tragic series of faulty assumptions. Specifically, the landings lacked a single, clear objective, the turning movement was too shallow and the landing force was too small.

I think there are important corollaries between Anzio and potential contingencies our smaller, less-capable armed services may be expected to execute in the future. The defense budget is shrinking, and despite the sunny picture painted by current leader-

ship, readiness will suffer. Our ability to project a large force is currently marginal at best, and it too will deteriorate from neglect. Future administrations must not commit an inadequate force to a contingency with vague objectives that correspond not to vital national interests but solely to fleeting political opportunism. **MR**

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The Rapido River Crossings

Major Robert M. Puckett, US Army National Guard

Fifty years ago this month, the US Fifth Army had finally reached the last German main line of defense south of Rome, the Gustav Line. This was a significant event in the Allied effort to invade Italy and attack the "soft underbelly" of Europe. In an effort to quickly break the German defensive line and throw the German army back upon the Alps and liberate Rome, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark ordered an assault across the Rapido River to break the Gustav Line. The attack failed. The realization had finally sunk in that the soft underbelly was, in reality, a tough old gut.


The Allied leaders, during their planning of the Italian Campaign, had thought it possible to invade and seize most of Italy quickly and with little cost. The common belief was that Germany would pull its forces back up the peninsula to the Alps, or a line just short of the Alps, and establish a permanent defense. Of course, it was assumed that the Germans would fight a delaying action and destroy the communications, roads and other infrastructure as their forces withdrew. The Allies believed, however, they could easily put enough strength into the Italian peninsula to readily push the Germans back.¹

This false assumption made Italy an inviting target for the next point of attack on the Third Reich after Sicily. There were many advantages to the Allied war effort in occupying Italy. From northern Italy, an amphibious assault could be launched against German positions in the Balkans and southern France.

Air bases could be used to make bomber raids deep into Germany, and the Ploesti oil fields could be threatened. Finally, virtual control of the Adriatic and Ionian seas would be realized. Strategically and operationally, Italy was an inviting target.²

The 9 September 1943 landing by US troops at Salerno (Operation *Avalanche*) was a major step in the Allied effort to seize the Italian peninsula. It also was the beginning of an awakening to the fact that the Germans had no intention of falling back to the Alps. They were going to fight to hold Italy. The Allies soon found the Italian terrain lent itself admirably to the defense. A central north-south mountain range, with peaks rising to 10,000 feet, forms the spine of the peninsula, with numerous spurs running east and west. Rivers flowed rapidly between these spurs through deep valleys all the way to the sea. Roads and the only areas suitable for maneuver were along the coastal plains on both the east and west coasts. The bridges that crossed the numerous rivers were generally dominated by high ground. This was, indeed, ideal defensive terrain.³

From Salerno, the Allies began the slow, slugging march up the peninsula. The first obstacle was the Volturno River. Once across, obstacle after obstacle met the Allies until reaching the Gustav Line that ran from Gaeta on the west coast to Pescara on the east coast and anchored on the Garigliano and Rapido rivers. This was a most frustrating kind of war for the Allies. Every time they fought their way over a



river or ridge line, there was another just like it waiting for them on the other side. From the Naples area, there were only two roads that led to Rome (the Allied objective)—Route 6, the interior road that led through the Liri valley straight to Rome, and Route 7, which ran along the coast and was effectively blocked by the Germans.⁴

January 1944 saw Clark's US Fifth Army on the banks of the Garigliano and Rapido rivers, looking across the Gustav Line. Clark's plan was to pierce the line and push an armored force up Route 6 toward Rome. With this action, he felt Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German commander for the defense of Italy, would be forced to abandon the Gustav Line and fall all the way back to the Apennines mountain range, thereby yielding Rome. His plan called for the British 10th Corps to conduct a supporting attack across the Garigliano River to the southwest to create a diversion on the German right flank. He hoped to draw the German reserves to the extreme German right flank while II Corps conducted the main attack by assaulting across the Rapido River at Sant'Angelo. Once the crossing sites were secure, he would launch an armored column through the infantry for a dash up Route 6. The key action to the success of this plan was the speedy crossing of the Rapido River by II (US) Corps' 36th Infantry Division.⁵

Crossing the Rapido River would not be an easy task. The Gustav Line was a very formidable defensive line. Preparation of this line had begun in early November and was the German's final defensive line in the defense of Rome. The line consisted of trenches, concrete bunkers, barbed wire entanglements and minefields on both sides of the river. Automatic weapons with interlocking fire covered both the river and the forward slope approaches. Artillery

and mortars covered dead space and the reverse slope approaches. Monte Cassino gave the Germans excellent observation of any approach, allowing them to direct and adjust indirect fire.⁶

The location selected for the attack was poor. The village of Sant'Angelo sat on high ground and was heavily defended. The approach was along the open floodplain of the valley, where there was no cover or concealment. The advance would be under direct observation from the moment it started. The Germans, to reinforce the natural obstacles, had diverted the river to flood the floodplain, turning any approach route selected into a miry swamp. The use of vehicles to move troops or engineer equipment to the river was impossible. The river itself was only 50 feet across but was 12 feet deep, had steep banks and was flowing at a torrential speed. Major General Eberhard Rodt's 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, a crack unit, was charged with the defense in this sector and had concentrated around Sant'Angelo. This site was the strongest point on the whole Gustav Line.⁷

The 36th Infantry Division was a poor choice to conduct the attack. It was dramatically understrength due to the heavy casualties it had experienced in the tough fighting at San Pietro in December. The replacements it had received were green and had not experienced combat before. In fact, they had just arrived two weeks prior to the attack. There was little time for unit training or team building. The division was worn out and lacked the cohesion required for combat.⁸

The division also lacked the proper equipment to conduct the crossing. Because the Germans had flooded the areas along the river, trucks could not transport bridging equipment and assault boats to the river. The infantry assault troops would have to

carry any engineer equipment over a mile from the assembly area to the river bank during the assault. Footbridges were unobtainable, so Bailey bridge catwalks laid upon inflatable rubber boats were improvised. Inflatable rubber boats would be used as assault boats because the wooden barge-type were too heavy for the troops to carry to the river.⁹ The equipment provided the 36th was makeshift and hardly survivable from enemy fire.

The 36th Infantry Division commander, Major General Fred L. Walker, decided to conduct a night attack to limit the German capability to observe and disrupt the attack with direct and indirect fire. The division consisted of three infantry regiments: the 141st, 142d and 143d. His plan called for sending the first, with attached engineers, across the river above the village; the second would go below; and the third would be held in reserve. With the attack beginning just after sunset at 2000, it gave the assault elements 11 hours to cross the river and seize a large enough bridgehead to free the crossing sites from small-arms fire so that engineers could throw pontoon bridges across the river. Once the bridges were in place, the 1st Armored Division would pass through into the Liri Valley and race toward Rome.¹⁰ The plan was deceptively simple.

A night river crossing under fire is probably the most difficult exercise a combat unit and commander could possibly be tasked to conduct. It requires careful planning and coordination. Rehearsals that create teamwork with the types of units involved—in this case infantry, engineers and fire support—are essential. Reconnaissance of assault lanes and clearing obstacles are also critical. The proper equipment, such as assault boats and bridging, must be on hand. Soldiers must be trained to use the equipment. Finally, command and control must work perfectly. These are the areas where failure occurred.¹¹

Things went wrong from the very beginning. At approximately 1730, 20 January 1944, assault elements from the 141st Infantry Regiment began moving from the assembly area to the river above Sant'Angelo while a friendly artillery preparation fired upon the German positions across the river. The German artillery answered with extremely accurate counterfire, hitting the assembly area and avenue of approach. The German fire damaged assault boats, hit troops and drove others from the narrow passage lanes into the minefields. Chaos resulted. Twenty-five percent of the assault boats were destroyed by the time the first element reached the river. More boats and bridging were damaged by the accurate German fire as the assault troops tried to enter the water. By 2100, only 100 soldiers had crossed the river, and they were pinned down by


heavy fire. By 0400, 21 January, only one footbridge had been installed. Most of the 1st Battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment had crossed by 0630, but unfortunately, they were cut off and pinned down without communication. Daylight came, and the remainder of the regiment had to withdraw back to the assembly area to escape the heavy German fire, abandoning the 1st Battalion as it dug in only 200 yards from the river.¹²

The 143d Infantry Regiment moved from its assembly area to the river below Sant'Angelo with little or no difficulty. At 2000 on 20 January, with one platoon of Company C across, all hell broke loose. All the boats in the water and on the bank, as well as a footbridge just installed, were destroyed immediately by the intense German fire. Despite continuing efforts, only the 1st Battalion was across by 0500 the next morning. German fire was so intense that, by 0740, the battalion commander ordered everyone back across the river to escape annihilation. Those that were able to get back across the river had done so by 1000.¹³

As a result of the first attempt to force a crossing of the Rapido River, only a portion of one battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment was across, and they were cut off and fighting for their lives. The rest of the division had been beaten back from the river to a position of cover and concealment to regroup.

Major General Geoffrey Keyes, the II (US) Corps commander, directed another attack be made as soon as possible. Despite constant delays in obtaining more engineer equipment, the 143d Infantry

Smokepots and stretchers are carried past a line of Sherman tanks near the Rapido River, 22 January 1944.



Army mules ferrying supplies up a hill inaccessible to trucks and jeeps.



Regiment again attacked at 1600, 21 January. With smoke to screen its crossing, the 3d Battalion crossed in rubber boats by 1830. At another crossing site, the 1st Battalion got two companies across by 1835. The farthest penetration made was by the 3d Battalion, which advanced only 500 yards. The 1st Battalion penetrated only 200 yards. Stopped cold at this point, the regiment dug in. Decimated by heavy fire, the regimental commander finally ordered a withdrawal early in the afternoon.

The 141st attacked at 2100. After 5 hours, only one platoon from Company F, 3d Battalion, was able to get across the river. With the installation of three footbridges during the night, the entire 2d Battalion and the remainder of the 3d Battalion were able to cross by daylight. No survivors of the 1st Battalion that crossed the day before were found by this assault group. The 2d and 3d battalions were able to penetrate 1,000 yards before they were forced to stop and dig in. The fire was so intense that, by 1500, all the officers in the two battalion headquarters were casualties. By 1600, every commander on the far side of the river, except one, had been killed or wounded. In addition, at 1600, the last footbridge was knocked out by fire. Lacking leadership and due to the unrelenting heavy fire, the unit disintegrated. Those survivors that could, swam back across the river. Firing on the far side of the Rapido River ceased by 2000.¹⁴

Further offensive efforts by the 36th Infantry Division to cross the Rapido River ceased. The attack was a failure. The 36th Infantry Division had incurred 1,681 casualties: 143 killed, 663 wounded and 875 missing. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division later reported it captured 500 Americans during the fight. The 36th Infantry Division lay shattered and the US Fifth Army stalled at the Gustav Line. The Gustav Line would not be penetrated until May 1944 during Operation Diadem.¹⁵

There are two important reasons for studying the action at the Rapido River. The first is the effect it had upon the Italian Campaign and our understanding of World War II. This was an important action that had a significant impact on the duration of the war. If the attack had been a success, it would possibly have shortened the campaign and the war and spared a great many lives in the difficult fighting of the resulting battles to secure Italy. The second reason is that there are important lessons to be learned by the professional military leader: The Rapido River action is an example on how not to conduct operations. The Rapido action was a failure in leadership, tactics, staff work and execution. Hopefully, future leaders will heed the price paid by our World War II soldiers at the Rapido River 50 years ago this month. **MR**

NOTES

1. Martin Blumenson, *The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino* in United States Army in World War II Series (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1967), 175-76.
2. *Ibid.*, 176.
3. John Keegan, *The Second World War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 352.
4. Carlo D'Este, *World War II in the Mediterranean* (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1990), 119.
5. *Ibid.*, 123.
6. Blumenson, 312-13.
7. D'Este, 123-24.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Blumenson, 330.
10. Fred L. Walker, "My Story of the Rapido River Crossing," *ARMY* (September 1962), 56-57.
11. Blumenson, 350.
12. *Ibid.*, 334-35.
13. *Ibid.*, 336-37.
14. *Ibid.*, 343-46.
15. *Ibid.*, Carlo D'Este, *Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 171.

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January 1944

Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

Saturday 1—The German army selects Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to command Army Group B, which is defending the Atlantic Wall from the Netherlands to the Loire River.

Sunday 2—The US Army's 126th Infantry Regiment, 32d Division, lands at Saidor, isolating some 12,000 Japanese troops in New Guinea. Australian forces reach Sialum.

Monday 4—The Nazi government mobilizes German schoolchildren for war-related duty.

US aircraft, for the first time, drop supplies to partisans in Western Europe, an activity the Royal Air Force (RAF) has been doing for some time.

Tuesday 5—In Italy, the US Fifth Army launches its final assault on the German Winter Line.

The Red Army seizes Berdichev, a key rail junction southwest of Kiev, Soviet Union.

Wednesday 6—US forces capture San Vittore in Italy.

Friday 8—The Red Army seizes the Soviet city of Kirovograd.

German units deploy south of Rome to block an Allied advance up the Liri River valley.

Saturday 9—The British army seizes Maungdaw in Burma.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle begin meetings in Marrakech, Morocco, to determine the role of French forces in the invasion of Europe.

Sunday 10—In Burma, the RAF begins mining the mouths of the Salween river.

The Red Army severs the rail line between Kristinovka and Smela in the Ukraine.

Monday 11—The RAF and US Army Air Corps begin Operation *Pointblank*, designed to eliminate the *Luftwaffe* in northwest Europe in preparation for Operation *Overlord*.

Tuesday 12—Troops of the US Fifth Army seize Cervaro, preparing to advance to the Rapido River.

Wednesday 13—In Burma, the Chinese 38th Division secures the Tarung River line.

Thursday 14—Three forces of the Red Army begin an offensive against German Army Group North aimed at the Baltic states.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt requests additional Chinese military forces, threatening to reduce China's lend-lease aid if not provided.

Friday 15—In Italy, German forces withdraw behind the Rapido River into their fortified Gustav Line positions.

A British cabinet committee recommends that, at the end of hostilities, Germany be partitioned.

Saturday 16—General Dwight D. Eisenhower becomes Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

Chiang Kai-shek replies to Roosevelt, saying that without an additional loan of \$1 billion, China will no longer supply US troops in China.

Sunday 17—Allied troops in Italy begin a general offensive to cross the Rapido River.

In Moscow, *Pravda* alleges Great Britain plans to reach a separate peace with Germany.

Tuesday 19—The Red Army liberates Novogorod. Anthony Eden, in the House of Commons, warns Spain against its continued support of Germany.

Wednesday 20—The US 36th Division receives a bloody check in its attempt to cross the Rapido River.

Friday 22—Against light opposition, Allied forces land at Anzio, 35 miles south of Rome.

Saturday 23—Moscow announces that the Red Army has encircled German forces in Vitebsk, although heavy rains have stalled the offensive.

Allied forces consolidate their beachhead at Anzio against stiffening German resistance.

Monday 25—The Red Army seizes the Gatchina rail junction southwest of Leningrad (St. Petersburg).

In Italy, Allied forces renew their offensive against the Gustav Line.

Allied aircraft strike Rabaul in the Pacific.

Tuesday 26—Liberia declares war against Japan and Germany, while Argentina severs diplomatic relations with the Axis powers.

Wednesday 27—The Soviet government announces that the siege of Leningrad has been lifted.

Friday 29—The Red Army opens the Leningrad-Moscow railroad. In the Ukraine, it launches an offensive against the German 8th Army.

Eight hundred heavy bombers of the US Eighth Air Force bomb Frankfurt am Main, killing 736 people.

US Navy aircraft launch a nine-day attack against the Marshall Islands.

Saturday 30—The US Fifteenth Air Force inflicts considerable damage in attacks against *Luftwaffe* bases in the Italian Po River valley.

Chinese forces occupy the Taro plain in Burma.

Insights

The Army's Light Divisions: Where Next? Colonel Peter F. Herrly, US Army

Now is the right moment to re-examine the concepts that underpin the US Army's light force structure. Cutting Army light divisions has been a tough but sound choice among the painful alternatives. As light forces quantitatively slope downward, the Army should reshape the qualitative aspects of what remains.

The fundamental doctrine and technology issues with Army light forces spring from the basic operational and organizing concepts at the heart of these forces. These issues have left the Army perilously close to serious operational problems several times in the last few years. Specifically, by designing the light infantry divisions (LIDs) for strategic mobility and by retaining the 50-year-old concept and structure of the airborne division, the Army has restricted the tactical mobility, lethality and survivability of these forces for most likely missions and terrain.

Recent examples of such suboptimization include the ad hoc adjustments needed to move elements of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) from place to place in Panama during Operation *Just Cause*; the epic effort associated with "souping up" the 82d Airborne Division for desert defense and offense in the Persian Gulf; the extensive work needed by the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) to become more mobile for Somalia; and, finally, a host of training exercises and rotations where many US soldiers have asked themselves and others the simple questions, "Why walk when we can ride?" and "How can we carry all this stuff?"

The difficult trade-offs between strategic mobility, on one hand, and tactical and operational mobility, lethality and survivability, on the other hand, are not new. It has been a dozen years since then Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer opened the contemporary debate on these issues with his proposal for a light force with "high-tech" vehicles, weapons and equipment, and less than a decade since General John A. Wickham Jr. changed the shape of that debate so sharply with his LID initiative. Unfortunately, the Meyer concept embodied in the now departed 9th Motorized Division was the superior idea, and its demise left the Army with a conceptual void.

What can the Army's experiment with "motorized" warfighting, in general, and motorized infantry, in particular, teach us? The answer is, quite a lot. First, at least as measured by rotations to the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, the

experiment was successful, even in the demanding case of mid-intensity, armored warfare. Motorized units employed the tactical mobility and lethality afforded by modern vehicles (the high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles [HMMWVs]) and weapons (the Mark 19 Grenade Launching Machinegun and the TOW [tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile]), and conceptually shaped their operations around an AirLand Battle combined arms perspective. These units not only survived but scored many notable victories. As the NTC's Brigadier General William G. Carter III put it in November 1991, "Those guys are very tough to kill."

At the heart of the motorized experiment was the combination of cavalry and armor-like doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and spirit with classic infantry skills and attitudes. Simply assigning HMMWVs as prime movers for rifle squads provided dramatic operational and tactical mobility advantages, including the conservation of the strength to walk and crawl when needed. Wheeled squad carriers gave those infantry squads more lethality (besides the Mark 19, they got more ammunition and more mines) and survivability (more picks, shovels, pickets, concertina and portable planking with which to dig in and an increased ability to avoid enemy fire concentrations).

All this capability, supported by larger caliber mortars, heavy maneuver unit-style logistics, and so forth, was *conditioned by load planning and maintenance as a way of life*—just like an armored unit but with wheels. This is the first rejoinder to those who argue, "Stay light and augment with trucks and buses when needed." It is more difficult to create the critically important family of skills, techniques and attitudes associated with wheeled combat mobility while working with augmentation equipment and people in a deployed environment. By definition, being motorized means always stretching the envelope of limited equipment; constantly working with and adjusting the precise nuances of load plans, tactics and techniques of that equipment; and, hence, staying "plugged in" to the armor and logistic schools and infrastructure of the Army.

At the same time, 9th Motorized Division infantry units maintained a superb dismounted capability. Unlike mechanized infantry encumbered with the maintenance and training implications of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, motorized infantry

units have more time available to practice dismounted operations. Moreover, a dismounted motorized infantry unit pays a substantially reduced penalty in terms of soldiers left with the vehicles, from a maximum of only five soldiers down to a more usual minimum of two or three.

Another important, if less tangible, difference is that soldiers transported in Bradleys "feel safer" and are less exposed to the elements than motorized infantry riding in the backs of M998T HMMWVs (the specialized HMMWV troop carrier variant used in the 9th Motorized Division infantry companies), protected only by a roll bar. In fact, there appears to be a growing reluctance on the part of the Bradley-equipped infantry to dismount and operate independently from the Bradley's perceived safety. The motorized infantryman does not suffer from this "separation anxiety" because the M998T HMMWV provides mobility and supporting firepower but simply does not impart the Bradley's sense of safety. All these factors produced rugged, highly capable motorized infantry with dismounted skills on a par with LID, airborne and air assault units.

The ability to dismount with finely honed infantry skills, but with physical strength and endurance conserved, led motorized infantry to repeated training triumphs, not only against armored units but against a variety of opposing light infantry and US Marines. Of these many experiences, one of the most vivid was Exercise *CASCADE RAIN 86* in I Corps, where then Lieutenant General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. pitted a LID task force against a motorized one. The exercise concluded with the frozen, exhausted and poorly nourished LID unit defeated in detail by a mobile assault, which made its initial penetration with dismounted motorized infantry infiltrating on their bellies through deep snow in

some of the toughest terrain at Yakima, Washington.

The point is not that the LID unit's infantry skills were not excellent—they were—but that the doctrinal mind-set and the available equipment of the motorized concept enabled the motorized infantry to enter battle with conserved combat power and optimized dismounted *and* mounted skills. The dynamics of modern land combat and associated technology are inescapable. "Why walk when we can ride? . . . How can we carry all this stuff?"


A broad solution to the issues raised by the above discussion is to increase the emphasis on tactical and operational mobility, lethality and survivability in light force doctrine and design (not involving heavy armored ballistic protection). Not addressed here are some complex issues associated with such an emphasis, including the mix and type of brigades in the lighter divisions, the nature of the combat support packages in those divisions and especially whether to increase the amount of "light armor" in light divisions, brigades and battalions.

The central focus of this discussion is the issue of light infantry itself, not the assault gun system or light armor and light cavalry. It should be noted that the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) (Light), Fort Polk, Louisiana—the principal "wedge" for future innovation in light armor and light cavalry—has relinquished motorized infantry units, though it retains a capability to dismount scouts for reconnaissance and combat as part of the cavalry security mission and thus maintains a "dragoon" flavor and orientation. Both the 2d ACR *and* light infantry units have key roles to play in driving future light, but mobile and lethal, combat technology.

A simple first step to fixing the light infantry part of the lighter force equation is to *start motorizing the light infantry battalions and brigades*. This proposal generally applies to whatever LID divisions and brigades will remain, plus the 82d Airborne Division—though there may well be a need to retain some "pure" light infantry forces within these divisions for certain scenarios. Not addressed here is any specific mix of forces or proposals to take some 82d Airborne Division infantry units off jump status. This proposal does, however, envision letting the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, already focused on operational and tactical mobility and lethality, have more ground mobility assets for its infantry units with which to experiment.

Motorizing light infantry battalions and brigades should be a priority of the redesign discussion for a force-projection Army, leading to an interim table of organization and equipment design and some rapid experimentation. Since the few motorized infantry companies at Fort Lewis, Washington, have just been converted to light cavalry, *the details of an interim design proposal could be first sketched out by*

**Strategic Lift Requirements for
Various Lighter Forces
(C-141 Sorties*)**



a team drawn from the ranks of those who have served in motorized infantry units.

A proposal to motorize light infantry units makes sense when measured against various criteria associated with division redesign:

- First, as far as designing to *doctrine* is concerned, motorized infantry aligns with the tenets in the new US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*: such units are more agile, versatile and tailorable; leverage key technologies; and are more suited to combined arms action.

- In terms of designing to *mission*, motorized infantry units have more core combat capability than light infantry units (with the exception of forcible entry, but ample capability already exists with airborne, air assault and Marine forces). Motorized forces tailor nicely to missions other than combat. There are many examples, but a prosaic one is the mission of fighting forest fires. Unlike a light or mechanized infantry unit, a motorized unit simply convoys to the scene complete with all organic support and maintenance; if the fire is not accessible by road, a rarity in these days of many logging roads, the soldiers walk to the fire, with their ability to do so enhanced by having a robust organic supporting base readily available.

- As far as designing to *force-projection* capabilities, adding wheeled mobility and additional equipment obviously carries a strategic deployment penalty. But the penalty is not extreme, and the LID itself is the perfect example of the pitfalls associated with designing to arbitrary end-strength and deployability parameters. Moreover, since motorized forces still have sufficient time to maintain dismounted skills, including airborne and air assault operations if necessary, they can deploy dismounted, with their vehicles to follow. Their unit training focus offers a bo-

nus potential of integrating locally available wheeled mobility more effectively into their operations, once deployed.

- As for *resource constraints*, motorized infantry is financially more expensive than a light infantry force. The added expense, still far less than an armored force, is worth it in terms of combat capability. A motorized infantry force is a good fit to Army modernization objectives. Still very projectable compared to armored forces, motorized forces are much better suited than light infantry to sustain and protect the force, win the battlefield information war, assist in precision strikes throughout the battlefield and dominate the maneuver battle.

Ideally, then, motorized infantry forces will provide the Army a mix of two critically important worlds: the irreplaceable age-old skills and attitudes of dismounted infantry and the flair for the fast-moving lethal operations associated with modern maneuver warfare. The time is right for a bold conceptual initiative to shape the Army's light infantry divisions into a more agile, versatile and combat effective tool with which to help execute the Army's new warfighting doctrine. **MR**

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Book Reviews

TURMOIL AND TRIUMPH: My Years As Secretary of State by George P. Shultz. 1,184 pages. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1993. \$30.00.

One of the quaint customs of ex-officials of the national government is to immediately write a book when they have concluded their tenure of office. This type of book is employed to assure that:

- The author was, in fact, "Present at the Creation."

- The Republic would have perished without the inspiration, guidance and leadership of the author.

- What for years were portrayed as "warm collegial relationships" were actually associations of mutual detestation.

- If only everyone would have listened, we would all be living in the elysian fields.

(Plus, a substantial sum of money is usually involved.)

These and other comparable activities usually result in a flurry of critical reviews, a spate of denials by those accused of failing the republic, talk show extravaganzas, and in a few months, the worthy tome is on the remainder bookshelves for \$1.95. This book, however, does not fit the mold. Secretary George P. Shultz best describes his intention in writing the book:

"As I looked into my records, I felt a renewed sense of excitement about what happened on my

watch, and a desire to set out the flow of events, the hows and the whys, as they appeared from my own angle of view. Much had been accomplished during these crucial years . . . When I started as Secretary of State, the world was in turmoil, and when I left office, the cold war was over and, after a struggle lasting over four decades, the idea of free and open political and economic systems had triumphed . . . My objective has been to produce a living history, recreating the scene as I experienced it. I was exposed to a fire hose of information and a kaleidoscopic round of action, day after day, week after week—with an unrelenting pressure to perform and an opportunity to make a difference . . .”

The secretary has been true to his objective. One cannot read this book without having the impression of having a ringside seat at great events. This is a historical record of six and a half years of one of the most momentous decades of the 20th century. The dramatic developments in Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Panama, the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty are all present in this volume.

The stories are told from the standpoint of a principal participant. Not only was Shultz the secretary of state, but he brought to the job a background that few in public life could, or would be able to match: as dean at the University of Chicago, 1966 to 1968; a tenured professor at Stanford University; secretary of labor, 1969 to 1970; the first director of the Office of Management and Budget, 1970 to 1972; and secretary of the treasury from 1972 through President Richard Nixon's administration. He served on the President's Council of Economic Advisors in 1955 and was chairman of the President's Economic Advisory Board in 1981. In corporate life, he was president of the Bechtel Corporation, as well as a member of the board of several multinational corporations.

One particularly informative section is called "What Really Happened at Reykjavik." According to Schultz, far from being the debacle that the press pronounced, "The reality of the actual achievement at Reykjavik ironically never overcame the perception conveyed by the scenes of [Ronald] Reagan and [Mikhail] Gorbachev parting at Hofdi House and my own depressed appearance at my press conference . . . The achievements at the Reykjavik summit were greater than those in any US-Soviet meeting before, but the popular perception of the outcome in Iceland at the time was one of near disaster or near farce. Over the years, that perception hardened into accepted truth."

Running throughout the book is the tension and the realities of the relationship between the State Department and the National Security Council. This also, of course, involves the relationship between the

secretary of state and the national security advisor. No president has ever used his National Security Council (NSC) or NSC advisor exactly the same as any predecessor. For students of government, the relationship of the NSC to the rest of any administration is a source of wonderful material—good, bad and outrageous. The Reagan NSC has provided historians such a bountiful crop that Luther Burbank would be hard pressed to match the blossoms. Schultz is not sparing in his characterizations. It is refreshing to read such honesty, particularly when it is done so courteously.

This book is not a story, but rather it is a study. Any professional soldier will find appropriate lessons of life and purpose in this remarkable book. One final comment—it is not a book to read in bed without a system of weights and pulleys—the 1,184 pages weigh in at about 100 pages per pound.

LTJG Richard G. Trefry, USA, Retired, Clifton, Virginia

100 MILES FROM BAGHDAD: With the French in Desert Storm by James J. Cooke. 223 pages. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. 1993. \$45.00.

There are plenty of Operation *Desert Storm* books purporting to reveal the truth about how the war was won or not won. Most come with an agenda: Harry Summer's *On Strategy* asserts that the war ended a malaise at the strategic level of the Armed Forces, the US Army in particular; Bob Woodward's *The Commanders* argues that things are still a mess at the top, which General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr.'s memoir does little to contradict; and Rick Atkinson's *Crusade* demonstrates that personality, service rivalry and politics still count. There are also a growing number of glossy photograph-laden "official" accounts, including the Army's own *Certain Victory*. None of these accounts tell what the war was like from the soldier's point of view or, for that matter, go much below the top levels of command—except anecdotally.

Army National Guard Lieutenant Colonel James J. Cooke is one of the first soldiers to tell his part of the story. Cooke is no ordinary soldier. A tanker in the Mississippi Guard, he is also a university professor who teaches African and Middle Eastern history. Fluent in French and able to do more than get by in Arabic, Cooke found himself in high demand in the fall of 1990. Called up, he joined the XVIII Airborne Corps intelligence (G2) upon arrival in Saudi Arabia and then went to the French 6th Light Armored Division, better known as the Daguet Division.

Cooke's account of his call-up, the dizzying trip from college professor to "new guy" in the corps G2 shop compels attention. He never loses his sense of wonder at this transformation or the irony that a

Mississippi tanker might be useful to the airborne elite of the Regular Army. Conscious of the need to tell the story as it happened, his account is fresh, without pretention and, except in detail, is very like that of the other 70,000 Reserve Component soldiers who did everything from pumping fuel to dying in Scud attacks. On this basis alone, his story is well worth reading.

An already interesting story goes further when Cooke enters the Poste de Command of the Daguet Division as corps liaison officer. The French, enigmatic and sometimes obstreperous, are our oldest and sometimes most grudging allies. The story of the Daguet and the eventual acceptance by the division of its Americans, to a large extent, mirrors the professional reconciliation of the French army with its history and its old ally. Cooke may overstate the breach a bit; but it was there nonetheless. The French and US armies did put behind them their respective Vietnam wars and their own differences. Perhaps in forging a renewed relationship, the two armies have made it stronger.

Cooke's recollection of the war and the complex post-hostilities operations in the Iraqi hinterland add dimension and texture to our understanding of the war by bringing into it a thoughtful interpretation of the coalition and Reserve Component experience in the Gulf. His narrative on the fighting illustrates the ambiguity of large combat operations from the perspective of a participant. Thoughtful, even provocative, Cooke has advanced our understanding of *Desert Storm* in an entertaining and sensitive memoir.

COL. Gregory Fontenot, USA,
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WARTHOG: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War by William L. Smallwood. 241 pages. Brassey's (US), Inc., McLean, VA. 1993. \$22.00.

A number of A-10 pilots are my friends. I have heard their stories and bought them beer just to keep them talking about "what they did in the war." But I was not sure I would enjoy *Warthog*. I thought it might be just another "I was there" book. While sometimes fun, this type book can be very narrow in its orientation without the wider perspective a military practitioner wants or needs.

Warthog, though, is more like a historical novel or a well-written newspaper article. I could not put it down. William L. Smallwood is not an A-10 pilot, but he understands men who fly and the Warthog drivers' love affair with their mission and their aircraft. His blending of personal anecdotes with absorbing narrative to tell the story of the A-10 in its first war is great.

In the 1970s, the US Air Force needed to replace the A-1 Skyraider in the close air support (CAS)

and counterinsurgency roles. Reorienting US military planning from the jungles of Vietnam to the Soviet threat, the primary mission evolved into one of killing tanks. This led to an airplane built around the 30mm Gatling gun, with the survivability features necessary for the low and slow CAS environment—the A-10.

After Vietnam, the A-10 community trained to fight the tank armies of the Warsaw Pact and North Korea. A-10 squadrons were deployed as first-line-of-defense units in Europe and South Korea. During operations *Urgent Fury* (Grenada) and *Just Cause* (Panama), the units were alerted or deployed but not used. All this changed when Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait.

In August 1990, during Operation *Desert Shield*, the Air Force's primary task was to gain and maintain air superiority. Two A-10 squadrons, though, were included in the initial deployment package. Their mission was dedicated CAS for the 82d Airborne Division, which was charged with holding the "line in the sand" against the Iraqi armor and mechanized infantry divisions. The 82d needed the A-10's firepower to defeat Iraqi armor. As the A-10's mission evolved and US Central Command planners prepared for the coming air and ground offensive, it became obvious that more A-10s were needed. When the air war began 17 January 1991, there were six A-10 squadrons operating from bases in Saudi Arabia.

Throughout their careers, A-10 pilots train in the Arizona and Nevada deserts. But the Arabian Peninsula deserts are not the same. Nor do low and slow, terrain-masking techniques and unpredictable attacks (which allow the A-10 to avoid air defense threats and deliver its munitions before the enemy can coordinate its defenses) work in the flat, featureless deserts. The pilots and their commanders realized they would need new tactics to fight and survive. But "Hog" drivers are nothing, if not innovative.

Smallwood chronicles the process these dedicated warriors used to prepare themselves for the coming war. In the months between arriving in theater and the start of the air war, the pilots and the squadron weapon (tactics) officers developed and taught themselves new tactics and procedures for employing their weapons, ones they believed would keep them alive while providing the US Army the best CAS possible. When the air war began, they were ready.

Throughout the war, A-10s were assigned missions other than CAS: armed reconnaissance, battlefield air interdiction, Scud hunting, night CAS, surface to air missile suppression and deep attack missions—taskings not normally given to the relatively unsophisticated A-10. Smallwood does a good job describing how the squadrons and their commanders overcame the limitations of their aircraft, accepted their assigned missions and prepared their

people for them. He offers a commander's version of the process and then compares it to another version of the same story from the line pilot's perspective. One is struck by the bond between the commanders and their pilots, and that this was clearly a team effort.

Warthog is a personal and a unit perspective of how theater-level decisions affected the men who fought. It is a story of aviation warriors who threw "the book" away and, with their beloved "ugly" airplanes, went to war and came home heroes. They proved the worth of an airplane the Air Force leadership had intended to delete from the inventory. A back cover quote by Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, Air Force component commander, says it all: "I take back everything I said about the A-10s. I love them. They're saving our asses." The Gulf War assured the A-10 a place in the Air Force's post-Cold War inventory. Smallwood's *Warthog* assures the A-10 an honored place in history.

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TARGET AMERICA & THE WEST: Terrorism Today by Yossef Bodansky. 461 pages. S. P. I. Books, Inc., New York. 1993. \$5.99 paperback.

Claire Sterling wrote *The Terror Network* 12 years ago, exposing international terrorism as the creature of the Soviet Union. Yossef Bodansky performs the same service, exposing radical Islam. It is interesting that many of the same names, organizations and countries appear in both books. This suggests that these groups have an agenda that is not tied to any ideology.

The ideological basis for recent terrorism is fundamentalist Islam. It is not new to see religion used as a political ideology, nor is it confined to Islam. The author traces the new terror network to the authoritarian Shi'ite branch of Islam, made famous by the Ayatollah Khomeini. With oil money, revolutionary enthusiasm and missionary zeal, agents of the Iranian government have co-opted existing Islamic and Middle Eastern organizations. The author at last answers the question of why the Palestinian terrorist organizations were not unleashed on the West during the Gulf War. The political leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization allied itself with Iraq, but the support networks for its terrorists had been taken over by Iran, which enjoyed watching Iraq suffer.

The author covers the ideology of radical fundamentalist Islam, its spread and occasional pragmatic alliance with such non-Islamic groups as the drug cartel. The training of car bombers is interesting, as is the idea that they need training. Of more importance is the organizational and support network.

Fortunately, this area is the book's strong point. The origin and growth of the movement is traced, as are its activities in Western Europe and the United States. It is astonishing to find the subject of recent newspaper headlines in a scholarly work.

The repeated Arabic and Farsi (Iranian) names slow the flow of the narrative to Western readers. The lack of an index is a serious drawback to an important work on the subject of terrorism in the 1990s. Given the extensive terrorist support network uncovered by the author, there is much more on this topic to be written.

Kevin L. Jamison, Kansas City, Missouri

AFTER THE STORM: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East by Anthony H. Cordesman. 811 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1993. \$68.50.

Anthony H. Cordesman has given us a pile of information on the trends in arms and potential arms use in the Middle East in *After The Storm*. This book is a compendium of data, tables, sources and analyses of recent history and politico-military conflict in the lands that stretch from the Maghreb around the Horn of Africa, across the Red Sea, up into the Arabian Peninsula and Mesopotamia, across the Zagros Mountains into Iran and back again to the Near East.

As you might expect, this makes for a big book and one not filled with many pleasant thoughts. This is a version of the International Institute's annual military balance writ large, focused on one particular (and frightening) region of the world. The view is of a seething cauldron of nationalistic fervor mixed with heavy doses of religious fundamentalism of every stripe and ethnic hatreds whose bloodlusts defy satiation. And boiling over in the middle of the pot are arms, arms and more arms: combat aircraft, air defense weapons, tanks, antitank weapons, missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, guns, guns, guns, and on and on and on. Cordesman takes a look at them all, tries to put them in strategic context and help the reader figure out what it all means.

Therein lies the limit of the book. By itself, it cannot tell you what it all means. What is missing are the deeper social, cultural, historic, economic, political and religious roots that inspire such a lunatic arms spiral and lend it a logic of its own. The author tries to help there by including a long-running, if unexhaustive, bibliography. The one book not listed, but one that I would suggest as a companion to this one, is Thomas Friedman's *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, which takes the reader in microcosm through the labyrinth of perceptual distortions and distended emotions in only one corner of the region discussed by Cordesman.

After the Storm is not the type of book you read from beginning to end. The plot line does not carry you along, and soon your eyes are floating upward from the rising tide of unending arms details that flood the Middle East. But it is the kind of book you keep handy so that when the next horrific spasm of bloodletting splatters across the news media you have a source to check out what pool of weaponry enabled it and where the spillage is likely to lead. In short, this is a sobering book for sobering times.

COL. James R. McDonough, USA, Southern European Task Force Infantry Brigade, Vicenza, Italy

PALESTINIANS: The Making of a People by Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal. 396 pages. The Free Press, New York. 1993. \$29.95.

This is a most timely, readable and informative work on a subject of current international controversy—the Palestinians—and will be of immense value to anyone involved in or interested in the "Palestine Question." Most books on this subject seem to be

written by those who openly support one side of the question to the detriment of the other, their agendas often being far from secret, tainting any claimed impartiality with suspicion. This book has refreshing objectivity.

The theme is the Palestinians' struggle for nationality, which the authors date from the "Arab Revolt" of 1834, against Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt, who briefly controlled that part of the Ottoman Empire (from 1831 to 1940). Pasha's harsh taxation, conscription and other measures caused the whole population of Palestine, which included Christians, Jews and others, as well as Arabs, to rise up against him. The revolt was crushed with ferocity, but it sowed the seeds of nationalism in the clan-centered, agrarian society of the Arab inhabitants.

These seeds developed in the late 19th century, when Jewish immigrant settlements were founded, and both Arab Palestinians and Jewish settlers developed political opposition to each other. World War I brought about the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, when the British assumed the Mandate for

PASS IN REVIEW

THE LITTLE BIGHORN CAMPAIGN: March–September 1876

by Wayne Michael Sarf. 312 pages. Combined Books, Inc., Conshohocken, PA. 1993. \$22.95.

LETTERS HOME: Henry Matrau of the Iron Brigade.

Edited by Marcia Reid-Green. 166 pages. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE. 1993. \$22.50.

THE ORIGINS OF SDI, 1944–1983

by Donald R. Baucom. 276 pages. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1992. \$29.95.

Written with clarity, detail and fascinating sidebar biographies, this little book will delight and elucidate. Continuing the "Great Campaign" series, the book underscores the Seventh Cavalry's conspicuous shortage of, in modern parlance, command and control between 24 and 26 June 1876. Lacking mass, General George Custer fragmented his efforts among uninspired and lackadaisical subordinate leaders who did not understand his intent. And all seemed to have misjudged the Plains Indians' total numbers, conviction and competence.—**LTC Arthur W. McMaster, USAR, US Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida**

Enlisting at age 16 as a private in the 6th Wisconsin Regiment, Henry Matrau served four years in the Army of the Potomac. Remarkably, he rose to the rank of captain. He witnessed such decisive and famous engagements as Gettysburg, Cold Harbor and the siege of Petersburg. His letters home describe his many battles and offer fascinating insights into the boredom of camp life, the hardships imposed by living in the field, the irregularity of the U.S. Army pay system and the longing to see family and friends.—**MAJ Arthur T. Coumbe, USAR, ROTC Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia**

Donald R. Baucom lays the groundwork for understanding the future of ballistic missile defense. A historian for the former Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) office, Baucom masterfully summarizes the early history of the SDI program, now known as the Ballistic Missile Defense program. Administrators, and those who fund such programs, would do well to read his study—the same questions now being asked about defense and funding plagued Robert McNamara in the early 1960s.—**CPT Phillip L. Osborne, USAF, Headquarters, Air Force Intelligence Command, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas**

Palestine, while the Balfour Declaration gave political impetus to Jewish settlers. The Arab Revolt (1936 to 1939) in protest against Jewish immigration, furthered the cause of Arab Palestinian nationalism. The State of Israel was founded in 1948, and its wars against Arabs are well documented, as are Palestinian misfortunes. Palestinians came into existence "largely through their interaction with the Jewish people and the Jewish State."

In this carefully researched history, the authors take us through the painful travails of Palestinian political development, including reconstruction of the Palestinian nation; dispersal; rebirth and resistance; and the Path under Occupation. Uncomfortable events, such as the "armed struggle," have not been omitted, but are analyzed reasonably and fairly, being neither glossed over nor omitted. The analysis takes the reader beyond the usually accepted stereotype of Palestinians.

The authors optimistically believe the Palestinians are maturing politically and that a new leadership will abandon "anti-Zionism as an organizing

principle." Both Palestinians and Israelis realize that neither "can make the other disappear," and that history has linked, and is still linking, the two peoples and their national movements. The hope expressed is that new leadership on both sides may bring pragmatic tolerances leading to peaceful arrangements.

COL Edgar O'Ballance,
British Army, Retired, Matlock, England

HITLER'S DIPLOMAT: The Life and Times of Joachim von Ribbentrop by John Weitz. 376 pages. Ticknor & Fields, New York. 1992. \$25.00.

Perhaps no regime in history has attracted as much scrutiny and justifiable condemnation as that of the Third Reich, and of Adolf Hitler and his henchmen. Here, at last, is the first full-length English-language biography of Joachim von Ribbentrop. Hitler's chief diplomat and foreign minister. Author John Weitz, an émigré from Hitler's reich in 1938, has completed a lifetime of research and examined a wide array of primary sources to present not only a

SUICIDE CHARLIE:

A Vietnam War Story by Norman L. Russell. 189 pages. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. 1993. \$19.95.

Those who cringe and hiss at movies or books with technical errors will not enjoy *Suicide Charlie*. But, as a narrative of the draftee experience from basic training through a Vietnam tour to discharge and beyond, Norman L. Russell's book is well worth the reader's time. Russell includes *all* his Vietnam experience, warts and all. So, the reader should forgive him for an occasional lapse in terminology and enjoy the short, very readable narrative found within. —LTC Paul A. Rohde Jr., USA, Retired, Hickory Hills, Illinois

KUWAIT: The Transformation of an Oil State by

Jill Crystal. 194 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1992. \$37.50.

This book is a good general reference that touches almost all aspects of life in Kuwait. Jill Crystal's analysis is mostly successful. Unfortunately, she looks at Kuwait only through the "rich and famous scope." I had hoped her analysis would be more balanced, with Kuwait's economic difficulties also elaborated. No one can deny that oil has affected Kuwaiti society but not to the degree Crystal states. Kuwaiti society has roots in common with other Gulf states, the Arab world and the Islamic world that have nothing to do with oil. —LTC Yusef Hussain Ali, Kuwaiti Army, Hawalli, Kuwait

THE NAZI ELITE.

Edited by Ronald Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann. 259 pages. The New York University Press, New York. 1993. \$35.00.

The Nazi Elite is an important addition to the corpus of knowledge on Nazi Germany. It is excellent from nearly every standpoint — scholarly, concise, informative and highly readable — offering fresh perspectives on the history of Nazi Germany and the motivations of its leading political figures. The contributing authors examine the most recent scholarship and source materials, including endnotes and an annotated bibliography. The translation of the German essays is generally superb. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the Nazi rise to power or Germany in World War II. —MAJ Scott R. McMeen, USA, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

superb biography but also an in-depth look into Berlin's cabaret society of the interwar period.

Born in 1893, Ribbentrop was a late convert to the Nazi cause, not joining the party until 1932. Well known in Berlin's social circles, due in no small part to his marriage into one of the city's most prominent families, Ribbentrop's experience as a linguist and translator attracted Hitler's attention. He worked his way from "adviser to the Führer," to the post of ambassador to the Court of St. James in London and, ultimately, to the position of foreign minister in 1938. Ribbentrop listed a number of diplomatic accomplishments, including the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939.

Weitz, however, portrays his subject in less than flattering terms, more as a "vessel adrift" than a skilled diplomat. A self-promoting opportunist, Ribbentrop favored 19th-century power bloc politics while Hitler thought in 20th-century ideological and racial terms. Prone to diplomatic gaffes due to his lack of foreign policy experience, Ribbentrop's influence rapidly waned once war began in 1939. By 1943, German diplomacy was at an end. Hitler and the military conducted the war, and the party controlled the occupied territories.

In an effort to secure favor with the Führer, Ribbentrop directed the foreign ministry to assist in the "Final Solution." That decision resulted in disastrous personal consequences. Contrary to his later claims that he was ignorant of the subsequent atrocities, Ribbentrop, following the war, was tried and condemned as a Nazi war criminal. Unrepentant to the end, he was hanged on 16 October 1946.

What makes this biography so interesting and shocking is Weitz's success in portraying the historical background that gave rise to the national support Hitler and the Nazi Party enjoyed in Germany. The author's claim that hardly a secure, intelligent person fell completely under Hitler's spell is dubious at best; the reality is the majority of the nation willingly accepted Hitler. Germany, like Ribbentrop, placed its faith and trust in a madman more concerned about his own destiny than that of his people. In a sense, the nation, like its maniacal leader and its notorious foreign minister, received its due.

COL Cole C. Kingseed, USA,
US Military Academy, West Point, New York

CASE BY CASE: A U.S. Army Counterintelligence Agent in World War II by Ib Melchior 384 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1993. \$21.95

For decades, motion pictures and novels have sensationalized the secret struggle of espionage during World War II and the Cold War. By contrast, during this time, relatively few studies have de-

scribed the real, sometimes unglamorous role of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in its support of tactical operations. Edward Koudelka's *Counter-Intelligence: The Conflict and the Conquest* and William A. Owens' *Eye-Deep in Hell: A Memoir of the Liberation of the Philippines, 1944-45*, have been notable exceptions, but they have reached only a limited audience.

The appearance of *Case by Case*, whose author is not only an experienced CIC agent but a professional writer of style and wit, is therefore doubly welcome. Ib Melchior, a Danish immigrant to the United States, placed his extensive knowledge of European languages and culture at the disposal of the US government in 1942. He underwent the full training program for espionage agents of the Office of Strategic Services, only to see his mission compromised just before he was to parachute into occupied territory.

Instead, he was transferred to the US Army's CIC, where he ultimately accompanied the US XII Corps across France, Belgium, Germany and Czechoslovakia. In the process, he was able to use his training in both espionage and counterespionage, living the type of real-life adventure that he later recorded in a series of novels. In 1990, he and his wife retraced the steps of this campaign to visit the scenes he describes in this memoir.

Melchior's true tale is filled with the suspense and daring one expects in an espionage novel. On one occasion, he masqueraded as an SS officer to help a German scientist defect to US lines. Later, he captured the commander and staff of one of Hitler's "Werewolf" groups before it could launch guerrilla attacks in the US rear areas.

Throughout his book, Melchior carefully provides the context of the time, the mind-set of both the Germans and the Americans. While describing the appalling genocide carried out by the Nazi regime, he also illustrates how some "ordinary" Germans retained a contempt for all foreigners—a contempt that has reappeared this year in violence against refugees.

Perhaps equally important to military readers is Melchior's generous account of the other functions of tactical intelligence, functions that rarely appear in histories of the war. While espionage and signal intelligence have drawn extensive attention, the author describes the functions and value of photographic interpretation, prisoner-of-war interrogation and order of battle records.

In short, *Case by Case* is both an engrossing adventure story and an evocative account of a war that is now fading in modern memory. This is entertainment and history in the same package.

MAJ Jonathan M. House, USAR,
Gaithersburg, Maryland

JEFFERSON DAVIS: The Man and His Hour by William C. Davis. 784 pages. Harper Collins Publishers, New York. 1991. \$35.00.

William C. Davis, a prolific Civil War historian with numerous campaign histories and biographies to his credit, has produced an exhaustive biography of Confederate President Jefferson Davis. The author draws almost exclusively from primary sources, notably the papers and correspondence of Davis, his wife Varina, and many others, to objectively portray Davis' complex character.

While the author claims to describe only a "life," not "the life and times" of the South, he nevertheless succeeds in establishing the historical stage upon which Davis acted. Further, the author provides insight into the times through the words and actions of his subject, one of the South's foremost advocates. In enumerating Davis' avid proslavery arguments, for example, the author presents the arguments of all proslavery Southerners, arguments that, as misguided as they seem today, were then firmly held as gospel.

Although over half of this massive work is devoted to the Civil War years, the details of Davis' earlier life are not neglected. The reader can see Davis' character develop, long before he became president of the Confederacy, through his graduation from the US Military Academy, West Point, New York; his service in the harsh, drab environment of the Frontier Army; his resignation to become a Mississippi planter and slave owner; and his increasing interest in local politics.

He was elected to the US House of Representatives in 1845 but left in 1846 to command a regiment of Mississippi volunteers in the Mexican-American War, earning considerable fame. He then served in the US Senate and as secretary of war to President Franklin Pierce.

Following the secession of the deep Southern states from the Union, Davis was elected by a convention at Montgomery, Alabama, to be the Confederacy's first president. The author details the workaholic Davis' heroic efforts to form a government and an army from scratch in a new nation whose member states were more inclined toward states' rights than nationalism.

Davis' wartime shortcomings are chronicled: his tendency to support favorites well beyond the point of their showing incompetence; his inability to curry the favor and support of Congress, the press and his state governors; his weakness for "yes" men; and his obstinacy and aloofness. Davis' strong points are also included: his devotion as husband and father, his compassion, intelligence, determination and bravery.

Ending with an excellent analysis of Davis' character, the author sees his deep insecurity as the cause of his flaws. Because of these flaws, Davis was a

good man but not a great one: "Lincoln was Lincoln, a man of myriad quirks and failings, who yet could govern his weaknesses; Davis was Davis, and was governed by them." This is a thorough, insightful effort by William C. Davis that is well worth the price.

LTC Peter S. Kindsvatter, USA, Retired,
Horsham, Pennsylvania

THE CLANDESTINE BUILDING OF LIBYA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS FACTORY: A Study of International Collusion by Thomas C. Wiegeler. 199 pages. Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, IL. 1992. \$29.95.

Thomas C. Wiegeler, late director of the Program for Biosocial Research and professor of political science, Northern Illinois University, uses the construction of the chemical weapons factory at Rabta, Libya, as a case study. He examined how a Third World nation has been able to build a chemical weapons capability in a world climate committed to limiting the spread of such weapons.

How Libya's factory happened will be of great interest to those seeking to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Wiegeler presents his thoughts on the factors that statesmen need to consider as they seek to restrict the spread of chemical and biological weapons. He points out, however, that the next case will naturally be different. He soberly notes that it will likely be even more sophisticated and deceptive.

The author first viewed the Libyan program as a success in restraining the spread of chemical weapons. The charge by the United States in December 1987, that Libya was pursuing this project attracted wide attention in the media and led to a major international conference on chemical weapons. Wiegeler reversed this sanguine view as his research led to the conclusion that not only had Libya been successful in obtaining a chemical weapons factory but that it was not likely to be deterred from further development.

Wiegeler begins by describing the conflict between Libya and the United States that led to the 1987 charge. He then examines the international reaction. Libya denied the charge, asserting that it was just building a pharmaceutical factory. President Ronald Reagan hinted of possible military action but also called for an international conference to explore ways to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons.

The 1989 Paris Chemical Weapons Conference, which Wiegeler describes in some detail, was the result. The role of German industry in developing the chemical weapons factory is fully discussed as is the reaction of the governments and press in Germany and the United States.

This is an excellent examination of one case of chemical weapons proliferation. Wiegele provides good documentation of his sources and includes a useful bibliography on the topic. He not only presents the historical facts but does so in a way that builds an intellectual framework within which to study and deal with future cases of proliferation.

The work is, however, restricted to analysis of information in the public realm. For this reason it must be viewed as tentative, subject to refinement as more information becomes available. This should not take away from the book's value. Wiegele's work is an important study of interest to all concerned with controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Daniel E. Spector, *Command Historian, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama*

THE ART OF WAR IN THE AGE OF PEACE: U.S. Military Posture for the Post-Cold War World

by Michael E. O'Hanlon. 159 pages. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. 1992. \$42.95.

A 400,000-soldier Active Army of 10 divisions? Eighteen tactical fighter wings? Eight carrier battle-groups? These are among the proposals suggested by the author based on his analysis of the force posture necessary to give credible US power projection capability for the foreseeable future.

While these numbers are striking in their dramatic departure from the base force proposed by the George Bush administration, Michael E. O'Hanlon's position is a reasoned argument for a smaller force that will accommodate significant budget reductions and still allow sufficient force to overwhelm potential adversaries. O'Hanlon sees that modernization and mobility are key to the smaller forces retaining their relative advantage. He argues that as many as 40 fast sealift ships are necessary to ensure that we can put force where we need it quickly.

A particularly contentious proposal concerns the role of the Reserve Components in the future.

O'Hanlon believes that evidence supports the case for assigning the Reserves exclusively to combat support and combat service support functions. He concludes that the nature of probable future crises will demand a rapid response from deployable combat forces. He points out that Reserve combat divisions and brigades cannot be ready quickly enough, unlike support formations that do not need as much postmobilization training.

Central to the book's thesis is the assumption that force planning must depend upon probable war-fighting missions. O'Hanlon contends that humanitarian or similar missions should not be the rationale for future force posture. In fact, he strongly advocates avoiding civil wars completely.

The military professional will undoubtedly take issue with both the book's bottom line and the assumptions that lead there. For example, the definition of vital interests is too narrow and ignores the fact that human rights are of vital interest to the United States. Simply because that area is the murkiest and most difficult to deal with by means of military force does not exclude it.

However, the author's presentation is an honest attempt to establish reasonable parameters for defining and deriving what force posture we need to meet our national security requirements. The result, although not stimulating reading, is a cogent and compelling case that provides an excellent marker along the path of the debate. Additionally, the endnotes for each chapter provide a wealth of information and sources for expanded study.

The price of this book, as well as its limited relevance beyond the current downsizing debate, recommend against its addition to the personal library. Nevertheless, anyone seriously interested in grappling with the rationale for shaping our future defense establishment ought to spend some time with this book.


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USS *Missouri* Down the Ways

The USS *Missouri*, constructed at the Brooklyn Navy Yard in New York, was the last battleship to be completed by the United States during World War II. It was christened on 26 January 1944 by Margaret Truman, daughter of Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri.

The *Missouri* entered the Pacific in November 1944 and, beginning in January 1945, served as a screening ship for aircraft carriers during air strikes against Japan.

It also provided gunfire support for the landings on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. On 15 July 1945, the 16-inch guns of the ship joined in bombarding the Japanese home island of Hokkaido in the first surface attack on Japan.

The *Missouri* entered Tokyo Bay on 29 August 1945 and, on 2 September 1945, served as the site where representatives of Japan and the Allied nations signed the instrument of surrender.